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Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.[1][2][3]
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Associated Groups: COPPER FIELDSTONE, APT36, Mythic Leopard, ProjectM
Contributors: Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India; Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India; Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation
Created: 02 September 2021
Last Modified: 31 July 2026
Associated Group Descriptions
Campaigns
Techniques Used
| Domain |
ID |
Name |
Use |
|
Enterprise
|
T1583
|
.001
|
Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
|
Transparent Tribe has registered domains to mimic file sharing, government, defense, and research websites for use in targeted campaigns.[1][3] For C0011, Transparent Tribe registered domains likely designed to appear relevant to student targets in India.[7]
|
|
Enterprise
|
T1059
|
.005
|
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
|
Transparent Tribe has crafted VBS-based malicious documents.[1][2] For C0011, Transparent Tribe used malicious VBA macros within a lure document as part of the Crimson malware installation process onto a compromised host.[7]
|
|
Enterprise
|
T1584
|
.001
|
Compromise Infrastructure: Domains
|
Transparent Tribe has compromised domains for use in targeted malicious campaigns.[1]
|
|
Enterprise
|
T1587
|
.003
|
Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates
|
For C0011, Transparent Tribe established SSL certificates on the typo-squatted domains the group registered.[7]
|
|
Enterprise
|
T1189
|
Drive-by Compromise
|
Transparent Tribe has used websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.[1][6][3]
|
|
Enterprise
|
T1568
|
Dynamic Resolution
|
Transparent Tribe has used dynamic DNS services to set up C2.[1]
|
|
Enterprise
|
T1203
|
Exploitation for Client Execution
|
Transparent Tribe has crafted malicious files to exploit CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2010-3333 for execution.[1]
|
|
Enterprise
|
T1564
|
.001
|
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
|
Transparent Tribe can hide legitimate directories and replace them with malicious copies of the same name.[2]
|
|
Enterprise
|
T1036
|
.005
|
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
|
Transparent Tribe can mimic legitimate Windows directories by using the same icons and names.[2]
|
|
Enterprise
|
T1027
|
.013
|
Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File
|
Transparent Tribe has dropped encoded executables on compromised hosts.[1]
|
|
Enterprise
|
T1566
|
.001
|
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
|
Transparent Tribe has sent spearphishing e-mails with attachments to deliver malicious payloads.[1][2][8][3][6] During C0011, Transparent Tribe sent malicious attachments via email to student targets in India.[7]
|
|
|
.002
|
Phishing: Spearphishing Link
|
Transparent Tribe has embedded links to malicious downloads in e-mails.[8][3] During C0011, Transparent Tribe sent emails containing a malicious link to student targets in India.[7]
|
|
Enterprise
|
T1608
|
.001
|
Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware
|
For C0011, Transparent Tribe hosted malicious documents on domains registered by the group.[7]
|
|
|
.004
|
Stage Capabilities: Drive-by Target
|
Transparent Tribe has set up websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.[1][6][3]
|
|
Enterprise
|
T1204
|
.001
|
User Execution: Malicious Link
|
Transparent Tribe has directed users to open URLs hosting malicious content.[8][3] During C0011, Transparent Tribe relied on student targets to click on a malicious link sent via email.[7]
|
|
|
.002
|
User Execution: Malicious File
|
Transparent Tribe has used weaponized documents in e-mail to compromise targeted systems.[1][2][8][3][6] During C0011, Transparent Tribe relied on a student target to open a malicious document delivered via email.[7]
|
Software
| ID |
Name |
References |
Techniques |
|
S0115
|
Crimson
|
[1][7]
|
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Audio Capture, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, Data from Local System, Data from Removable Media, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Email Collection: Local Email Collection, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, File and Directory Discovery, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Local Storage Discovery, Modify Registry, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Peripheral Device Discovery, Process Discovery, Query Registry, Replication Through Removable Media, Screen Capture, Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery, System Information Discovery, System Location Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery, System Time Discovery, Video Capture, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks |
|
S0334
|
DarkComet
|
[6]
|
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Audio Capture, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Clipboard Data, Command and Scripting Interpreter, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Disable or Modify System Firewall: Windows Host Firewall, Disable or Modify Tools, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, Modify Registry, Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing, Process Discovery, Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, System Information Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery, Video Capture |
|
S0385
|
njRAT
|
[1]
|
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Application Window Discovery, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, Data Encoding: Standard Encoding, Data from Local System, Disable or Modify System Firewall: Windows Host Firewall, Dynamic Resolution: Fast Flux DNS, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, File and Directory Discovery, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Indicator Removal: Clear Persistence, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Modify Registry, Native API, Non-Standard Port, Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File, Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery, Peripheral Device Discovery, Process Discovery, Query Registry, Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, Remote System Discovery, Replication Through Removable Media, Screen Capture, System Information Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery, Video Capture |
|
S0644
|
ObliqueRAT
|
[8][7]
|
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Data from Removable Media, Data Staged: Local Data Staging, Data Transfer Size Limits, File and Directory Discovery, Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography, Peripheral Device Discovery, Process Discovery, Screen Capture, System Information Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery, User Execution: Malicious Link, Video Capture, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks |
|
S0643
|
Peppy
|
[6]
|
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Automated Exfiltration, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, File and Directory Discovery, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Screen Capture |
References
-
Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
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Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.
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Malhotra, A. et al. (2021, May 13). Transparent Tribe APT expands its Windows malware arsenal. Retrieved September 2, 2021.
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Secureworks. (n.d.). COPPER FIELDSTONE. Retrieved October 6, 2021.
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