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No attack successfully demonstrated — attack only breaks a reduced version of the hash or requires more work than the claimed security level of the hash
Attack demonstrated in theory — attack breaks all rounds and has lower complexity than security claim
Attack demonstrated in practice — complexity is low enough to be actually used
Common hash functions
Collision resistance
| Hash function |
Security claim |
Best attack |
Publish date |
Comment |
| MD5 |
264 |
218 time |
2013-03-25 |
This attack takes seconds on a regular PC. Two-block collisions in 218, single-block collisions in 241.[1] |
| SHA-1 |
280 |
261.2 |
2020-01-08 |
Paper by Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Peyrin[2] |
| SHA256 |
2128 |
31 of 64 rounds (265.5) |
2013-05-28 |
Two-block collision.[3] |
| SHA512 |
2256 |
24 of 80 rounds (232.5) |
2008-11-25 |
Paper.[4] |
| SHA-3 |
Up to 2512 |
6 of 24 rounds (250) |
2017 |
Paper.[5] |
| BLAKE2s |
2128 |
2.5 of 10 rounds (2112) |
2009-05-26 |
Paper.[6] |
| BLAKE2b |
2256 |
2.5 of 12 rounds (2224) |
2009-05-26 |
Paper.[6] |
Chosen prefix collision attack
| Hash function |
Security claim |
Best attack |
Publish date |
Comment |
| MD5 |
264 |
239 |
2009-06-16 |
This attack takes hours on a regular PC.[7] |
| SHA-1 |
280 |
263.4 |
2020-01-08 |
Paper by Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Peyrin[2] |
| SHA256 |
2128 |
|
|
|
| SHA512 |
2256 |
|
|
|
| SHA-3 |
Up to 2512 |
|
|
|
| BLAKE2s |
2128 |
|
|
|
| BLAKE2b |
2256 |
|
|
|
Preimage resistance
| Hash function |
Security claim |
Best attack |
Publish date |
Comment |
| MD5 |
2128 |
2123.4 |
2009-04-27 |
Paper.[8] |
| SHA-1 |
2160 |
45 of 80 rounds |
2008-08-17 |
Paper.[9] |
| SHA256 |
2256 |
43 of 64 rounds (2254.9 time, 26 memory) |
2009-12-10 |
Paper.[10] |
| SHA512 |
2512 |
46 of 80 rounds (2511.5 time, 26 memory) |
2008-11-25 |
Paper,[11] updated version.[10] |
| SHA-3 |
Up to 2512 |
|
|
|
| BLAKE2s |
2256 |
2.5 of 10 rounds (2241) |
2009-05-26 |
Paper.[6] |
| BLAKE2b |
2512 |
2.5 of 12 rounds (2481) |
2009-05-26 |
Paper.[6] |
Length extension
- Vulnerable: MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512
- Not vulnerable: SHA384, SHA-3, BLAKE2
Less-common hash functions
Collision resistance
| Hash function |
Security claim |
Best attack |
Publish date |
Comment |
| GOST |
2128 |
2105 |
2008-08-18 |
Paper.[12] |
| HAVAL-128 |
264 |
27 |
2004-08-17 |
Collisions originally reported in 2004,[13] followed up by cryptanalysis paper in 2005.[14] |
| MD2 |
264 |
263.3 time, 252 memory |
2009 |
Slightly less computationally expensive than a birthday attack,[15] but for practical purposes, memory requirements make it more expensive. |
| MD4 |
264 |
3 operations |
2007-03-22 |
Finding collisions almost as fast as verifying them.[16] |
| PANAMA |
2128 |
26 |
2007-04-04 |
Paper,[17] improvement of an earlier theoretical attack from 2001.[18] |
| RIPEMD (original) |
264 |
218 time |
2004-08-17 |
Collisions originally reported in 2004,[13] followed up by cryptanalysis paper in 2005.[19] |
| RadioGatún |
Up to 2608[20] |
2704 |
2008-12-04 |
For a word size w between 1-64 bits, the hash provides a security claim of 29.5w. The attack can find a collision in 211w time.[21] |
| RIPEMD-160 |
280 |
48 of 80 rounds (251 time) |
2006 |
Paper.[22] |
| SHA-0 |
280 |
233.6 time |
2008-02-11 |
Two-block collisions using boomerang attack. Attack takes estimated 1 hour on an average PC.[23] |
| Streebog |
2256 |
9.5 rounds of 12 (2176 time, 2128 memory) |
2013-09-10 |
Rebound attack.[24] |
| Whirlpool |
2256 |
4.5 of 10 rounds (2120 time) |
2009-02-24 |
Rebound attack.[25] |
Preimage resistance
| Hash function |
Security claim |
Best attack |
Publish date |
Comment |
| GOST |
2256 |
2192 |
2008-08-18 |
Paper.[12] |
| MD2 |
2128 |
273 time, 273 memory |
2008 |
Paper.[26] |
| MD4 |
2128 |
2102 time, 233 memory |
2008-02-10 |
Paper.[27] |
| RIPEMD (original) |
2128 |
35 of 48 rounds |
2011 |
Paper.[28] |
| RIPEMD-128 |
2128 |
35 of 64 rounds |
| RIPEMD-160 |
2160 |
31 of 80 rounds |
| Streebog |
2512 |
2266 time, 2259 data |
2014-08-29 |
The paper presents two second-preimage attacks with variable data requirements.[29] |
| Tiger |
2192 |
2188.8 time, 28 memory |
2010-12-06 |
Paper.[30] |
Attacks on hashed passwords
Hashes described here are designed for fast computation and have roughly similar speeds.[31] Because most users typically choose short passwords formed in predictable ways, passwords can often be recovered from their hashed value if a fast hash is used. Searches on the order of 100 billion tests per second are possible with high-end graphics processors.[32][33]
Special hashes called key derivation functions have been created to slow brute force searches. These include pbkdf2, bcrypt, scrypt, argon2, and balloon.
References
- ↑ Tao Xie; Fanbao Liu; Dengguo Feng (25 March 2013). "Fast Collision Attack on MD5". IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
- 1 2 Gaëtan Leurent; Thomas Peyrin (2020-01-08). SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust (PDF). USENIX Security Symposium. SEC'20. Vol. 29. USENIX Association. pp. 1839–1856. ISBN 978-1-939133-17-5.
- ↑ Florian Mendel; Tomislav Nad; Martin Schläffer (2013-05-28). Improving Local Collisions: New Attacks on Reduced SHA-256. Eurocrypt 2013.
- ↑ Somitra Kumar Sanadhya; Palash Sarkar (2008-11-25). New Collision Attacks against Up to 24-Step SHA-2. Indocrypt 2008. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-89754-5_8.
- ↑ L. Song, G. Liao and J. Guo, Non-Full Sbox Linearization: Applications to Collision Attacks on Round-Reduced Keccak, CRYPTO, 2017
- 1 2 3 4 LI Ji; XU Liangyu (2009-05-26). "Attacks on Round-Reduced BLAKE". IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
- ↑ Marc Stevens; Arjen Lenstra; Benne de Weger (2012-07-12). "Chosen-prefix Collisions for MD5 and Applications" (PDF). International Journal of Applied Cryptography. 2 (4): 322–359. doi:10.1504/IJACT.2012.048084.
- ↑ Yu Sasaki; Kazumaro Aoki (2009-04-27). Finding Preimages in Full MD5 Faster Than Exhaustive Search. Eurocrypt 2009. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_8.
- ↑ Christophe De Cannière; Christian Rechberger (2008-08-17). Preimages for Reduced SHA-0 and SHA-1. Crypto 2008.
- 1 2 Kazumaro Aoki; Jian Guo; Krystian Matusiewicz; Yu Sasaki; Lei Wang (2009-12-10). Preimages for Step-Reduced SHA-2. Asiacrypt 2009. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7_34.
- ↑ Yu Sasaki; Lei Wang; Kazumaro Aoki (2008-11-25). "Preimage Attacks on 41-Step SHA-256 and 46-Step SHA-512". IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
- 1 2 Florian Mendel; Norbert Pramstaller; Christian Rechberger; Marcin Kontak; Janusz Szmidt (2008-08-18). Cryptanalysis of the GOST Hash Function. Crypto 2008.
- 1 2 Xiaoyun Wang; Dengguo Feng; Xuejia Lai; Hongbo Yu (2004-08-17). "Collisions for Hash Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD". Cryptology ePrint Archive.
- ↑ Xiaoyun Wang; Dengguo Feng; Xiuyuan Yu (October 2005). "An attack on hash function HAVAL-128" (PDF). Science in China Series F: Information Sciences. 48 (5): 545–556. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.506.9546. doi:10.1360/122004-107. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-08-09. Retrieved 2014-10-23.
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- ↑ Lars R. Knudsen; John Erik Mathiassen; Frédéric Muller; Søren S. Thomsen (January 2010). "Cryptanalysis of MD2". Journal of Cryptology. 23 (1): 72–90. doi:10.1007/s00145-009-9054-1. S2CID 2443076.
- ↑ Yu Sasaki; Yusuke Naito; Noboru Kunihiro; Kazuo Ohta (2007-03-22). "Improved Collision Attacks on MD4 and MD5". IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences. E90-A (1): 36–47. Bibcode:2007IEITF..90...36S. doi:10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.1.36.
- ↑ Joan Daemen; Gilles Van Assche (2007-04-04). Producing Collisions for Panama, Instantaneously. FSE 2007.
- ↑ Vincent Rijmen; Bart Van Rompay; Bart Preneel; Joos Vandewalle (2001). Producing Collisions for PANAMA. FSE 2001.
- ↑ Xiaoyun Wang; Xuejia Lai; Dengguo Feng; Hui Chen; Xiuyuan Yu (2005-05-23). Cryptanalysis of the Hash Functions MD4 and RIPEMD. Eurocrypt 2005. doi:10.1007/11426639_1.
- ↑ RadioGatún is a family of 64 different hash functions. The security level and best attack in the chart are for the 64-bit version. The 32-bit version of RadioGatún has a claimed security level of 2304 and the best claimed attack takes 2352 work.
- ↑ Thomas Fuhr; Thomas Peyrin (2008-12-04). Cryptanalysis of RadioGatun. FSE 2009.
- ↑ Florian Mendel; Norbert Pramstaller; Christian Rechberger; Vincent Rijmen (2006). On the Collision Resistance of RIPEMD-160. ISC 2006.
- ↑ Stéphane Manuel; Thomas Peyrin (2008-02-11). Collisions on SHA-0 in One Hour. FSE 2008. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-71039-4_2.
- ↑ Zongyue Wang; Hongbo Yu; Xiaoyun Wang (2013-09-10). "Cryptanalysis of GOST R hash function". Information Processing Letters. 114 (12): 655–662. doi:10.1016/j.ipl.2014.07.007.
- ↑ Florian Mendel; Christian Rechberger; Martin Schläffer; Søren S. Thomsen (2009-02-24). The Rebound Attack: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Whirlpool and Grøstl (PDF). FSE 2009.
- ↑ Søren S. Thomsen (2008). "An improved preimage attack on MD2". Cryptology ePrint Archive.
- ↑ Gaëtan Leurent (2008-02-10). MD4 is Not One-Way (PDF). FSE 2008.
- ↑ Chiaki Ohtahara; Yu Sasaki; Takeshi Shimoyama (2011). Preimage Attacks on Step-Reduced RIPEMD-128 and RIPEMD-160. ISC 2011. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-21518-6_13.
- ↑ Jian Guo; Jérémy Jean; Gaëtan Leurent; Thomas Peyrin; Lei Wang (2014-08-29). The Usage of Counter Revisited: Second-Preimage Attack on New Russian Standardized Hash Function. SAC 2014.
- ↑ Jian Guo; San Ling; Christian Rechberger; Huaxiong Wang (2010-12-06). Advanced Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks: First Results on Full Tiger, and Improved Results on MD4 and SHA-2. Asiacrypt 2010. pp. 12–17.
- ↑ "ECRYPT Benchmarking of Cryptographic Hashes". Retrieved November 23, 2020.
- ↑ "Mind-blowing GPU performance". Improsec. January 3, 2020.
- ↑ Goodin, Dan (2012-12-10). "25-GPU cluster cracks every standard Windows password in <6 hours". Ars Technica. Retrieved 2020-11-23.
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