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GeezerVison is showing github.com — mcpproxy-go/scripts/dev-server-edition.sh at main · DocSpring/mcpproxy-go Expand file tree/ Copy pathdev-server-edition.shMore file actions executable file ·509 lines (487 loc) · 24.7 KB / Copy pathdev-server-edition.shFile metadata and controlsexecutable file ·509 lines (487 loc) · 24.7 KB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 #!/usr/bin/env bash # dev-server-edition.sh — Spec 107 local verification rig (quickstart.md). # # Isolated, synthetic, loopback-only. Builds the server edition into a scratch # directory, starts the fake OpenID Provider from tests/oauthserver, writes a # scratch config + data dir, boots the server edition on a high port, performs # the headless login as [email protected] and prints /api/v1/auth/me. Nothing # here touches ~/.mcpproxy, the tray's core, or a production IdP. # # Usage: # scripts/dev-server-edition.sh [--phase b|c|d] [--scratch DIR] [--port N] # [--idp-port N] [--idp-args "<flags>"] # [--keep] [--skip-build] # # --phase b quickstart §0–§4: build, fake IdP, config, boot, headless login, # open-redirect check, /mcp auth gate (session cookie and no # credential both 401) (default) # --phase c + §5: tenant principal on core REST (PR-C) # --phase d + §6: mint an agent token as Alice, call /mcp, audit tail (PR-D) # --scratch root for the binary, config, data dir and logs # (default: $MCPPROXY_RIG_SCRATCH or mktemp under $TMPDIR) # --idp-args extra flags for the fake IdP, e.g. "-token-error bad-signature"; # any tamper flag switches the login step to expect a refusal — # 403 (FR-024's closed-reason class) for most flags, but 503 # ("Sign-in is temporarily unavailable") for the unavailability # class: -discovery-http-token-endpoint, -token-endpoint-redirect, # and -userinfo-error redirect|non-json|unavailable # --keep keep the scratch directory on success (always kept on failure) # --skip-build reuse <scratch>/mcpproxy-server and <scratch>/oauthserver # # Rules this script encodes (all verified, see quickstart.md "Rules"): # * the server binary is built with `-o` — a bare `go build -tags server # ./cmd/mcpproxy` clobbers ./mcpproxy; # * the instance runs with BOTH --config and --data-dir, else the generated # API key lands in a file the next boot never reads; # * teardown kills only the PIDs this script started — never pkill by name; # * every curl carries --max-time and every wait loop is bounded, so a # missing feature (e.g. the OIDC provider on an older branch) is reported, # never hung on. set -euo pipefail HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" REPO="$(cd "$HERE/.." && pwd)" cd "$REPO" PHASE="b" SCRATCH="${MCPPROXY_RIG_SCRATCH:-}" PORT="" IDP_PORT="" IDP_EXTRA="" KEEP="0" SKIP_BUILD="0" SCRATCH_OWNED="0" usage() { sed -n '2,34p' "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'; } while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do case "$1" in --phase) PHASE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;; --phase=*) PHASE="${1#*=}"; shift ;; --scratch) SCRATCH="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;; --scratch=*) SCRATCH="${1#*=}"; shift ;; --port) PORT="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;; --port=*) PORT="${1#*=}"; shift ;; --idp-port) IDP_PORT="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;; --idp-port=*) IDP_PORT="${1#*=}"; shift ;; --idp-args) IDP_EXTRA="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;; --idp-args=*) IDP_EXTRA="${1#*=}"; shift ;; --keep) KEEP="1"; shift ;; --skip-build) SKIP_BUILD="1"; shift ;; -h | --help) usage; exit 0 ;; *) echo "unknown argument: $1" >&2; usage >&2; exit 2 ;; esac done case "$PHASE" in b | c | d) ;; *) echo "--phase must be b, c or d (got: '$PHASE')" >&2; exit 2 ;; esac # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Output helpers. Assertions are fail-fast: later steps depend on earlier ones. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ts() { date '+%H:%M:%S'; } log() { echo "$(ts) [rig] $*"; } ok() { echo "$(ts) [rig] ok $*"; } FAILED="0" die() { FAILED="1" echo "$(ts) [rig] FAIL $*" >&2 exit 1 } tail_log() { # tail_log <label> <file> [[ -f "$2" ]] || return 0 echo "----- last 30 lines of $1 ($2) -----" >&2 tail -n 30 "$2" >&2 echo "----- end $1 -----" >&2 } need() { command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "missing tool: $1"; } # curl wrapper: bounded, silent, never follows redirects unless asked. c() { curl -s --max-time 10 "$@"; } port_free() { ! (exec 3<>"/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/$1") 2>/dev/null; } pick_port() { # pick_port <prefix> local p n=0 while :; do p="$1$((RANDOM % 900 + 100))" port_free "$p" && { echo "$p"; return 0; } n=$((n + 1)) [[ $n -lt 20 ]] || die "no free 1${1#1}xxx port found" done } wait_http() { # wait_http <url> <seconds> [curl args...] local url="$1" secs="$2" i shift 2 for ((i = 0; i < secs * 2; i++)); do if c -f -o /dev/null "$@" "$url"; then return 0; fi sleep 0.5 done return 1 } pid_alive() { kill -0 "$1" 2>/dev/null; } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Teardown: PID-scoped, runs on every exit path. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- MP_PID="" IDP_PID="" cleanup() { local rc=$? trap - EXIT set +e for pid in "$MP_PID" "$IDP_PID"; do [[ -n "$pid" ]] || continue pid_alive "$pid" || continue kill -TERM "$pid" 2>/dev/null done for pid in "$MP_PID" "$IDP_PID"; do [[ -n "$pid" ]] || continue for _ in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10; do pid_alive "$pid" || break sleep 0.5 done pid_alive "$pid" && kill -KILL "$pid" 2>/dev/null wait "$pid" 2>/dev/null done if [[ "$rc" -ne 0 || "$FAILED" == "1" ]]; then [[ -n "${SCRATCH:-}" ]] && tail_log "main.log" "$SCRATCH/main.log" echo "$(ts) [rig] scratch kept for inspection: $SCRATCH" >&2 exit "${rc:-1}" fi if [[ "$KEEP" == "1" || "$SCRATCH_OWNED" != "1" ]]; then log "scratch kept: $SCRATCH" else rm -rf "$SCRATCH" # only a directory this run created via mktemp log "scratch removed" fi exit "$rc" } trap cleanup EXIT trap 'exit 130' INT trap 'exit 143' TERM # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # §0 One-time: tools, ports, scratch, build, fixture deps. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- need go; need node; need npm; need jq; need curl [[ -d "$REPO/cmd/mcpproxy" && -d "$REPO/tests/oauthserver/cmd/server" ]] || die "not a mcpproxy-go checkout: $REPO" if [[ -z "$SCRATCH" ]]; then tmp_root="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}" SCRATCH="$(mktemp -d "${tmp_root%/}/mcpproxy-107.XXXXXX")" SCRATCH_OWNED="1" else mkdir -p "$SCRATCH" SCRATCH="$(cd "$SCRATCH" && pwd)" fi [[ -n "$PORT" ]] || PORT="$(pick_port 18)" [[ -n "$IDP_PORT" ]] || IDP_PORT="$(pick_port 19)" port_free "$PORT" || die "port $PORT is busy" port_free "$IDP_PORT" || die "port $IDP_PORT is busy" log "phase=$PHASE scratch=$SCRATCH port=$PORT idp_port=$IDP_PORT" BIN="$SCRATCH/mcpproxy-server" IDP_BIN="$SCRATCH/oauthserver" if [[ "$SKIP_BUILD" == "1" && -x "$BIN" && -x "$IDP_BIN" ]]; then log "§0 reusing $BIN and $IDP_BIN (--skip-build)" else log "§0 go build -tags server -o $BIN ./cmd/mcpproxy" go build -tags server -o "$BIN" ./cmd/mcpproxy || die "server edition build failed" log "§0 go build -o $IDP_BIN ./tests/oauthserver/cmd/server" go build -o "$IDP_BIN" ./tests/oauthserver/cmd/server || die "fake IdP build failed (tests/oauthserver)" fi # `version` prints "MCPProxy vX (server)" as text; the JSON form carries the # edition key the quickstart greps for. "$BIN" version -o json | jq -e '.edition=="server"' >/dev/null || die "binary does not self-identify as the server edition" ok "§0 $BIN self-identifies: $("$BIN" version | head -n 1)" FIXTURE="$REPO/tests/echo-rugpull-server" if [[ ! -d "$FIXTURE/node_modules/@modelcontextprotocol/sdk" ]]; then log "§0 npm ci --prefix $FIXTURE (once)" npm ci --prefix "$FIXTURE" --no-audit --no-fund >"$SCRATCH/npm-ci.log" 2>&1 || { tail_log "npm-ci.log" "$SCRATCH/npm-ci.log" die "npm ci for the stdio fixture failed" } fi ok "§0 stdio fixture ready: node $FIXTURE/index.js" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # §1 Fake OIDC IdP. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- IDP_ARGS=( -port "$IDP_PORT" -oidc -redirect-uri "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/api/v1/auth/callback" -user '[email protected]:pass:eng' -user '[email protected]:pass:' -user '[email protected]:pass:ops' -user '[email protected]:pass:' -groups-claim groups ) TAMPER="0" GROUPS_TAMPER="0" if [[ -n "$IDP_EXTRA" ]]; then read -r -a extra <<<"$IDP_EXTRA" IDP_ARGS+=("${extra[@]}") case " $IDP_EXTRA " in *" -groups-error non-array "*) # tests/oauthserver's GroupsNonArray knob renders the groups value as # a comma-joined STRING (token.go's joinGroups), and oidc_provider.go's # groupsFromClaims explicitly accepts a bare string as one valid group # name (`case string:`) — it is not a "non-array/non-string shape" # under FR-008's own wording, so it does NOT fail closed: the login # succeeds with that string as the caller's one group, exactly like # TestOIDCVerify_GroupsClaimMissingFailsClosed's # "single_string_is_one_group" case. Neither TAMPER nor GROUPS_TAMPER # — this falls through to the normal §4c assertions below, which the # caller must point at the expected joined-string group name instead # of the default ["eng"] (cross-review round 6, chunk 4 P2: an # earlier version of this script folded "non-array" into the # fail-closed GROUPS_TAMPER bucket alongside absent/overage and # asserted groups==[], which this claim shape never produces). ;; *" -groups-error "*) # FR-008 fail-closed groups fixtures (absent/overage): the login # still SUCCEEDS (groups land as [] and groups_claim_missing is # logged) — this is NOT a login-refusal tamper case (cross-review # round 5, chunk 4 P3). GROUPS_TAMPER="1" ;; *) TAMPER="1" ;; esac fi IDP_URL="http://127.0.0.1:$IDP_PORT" log "§1 starting fake IdP: $IDP_BIN ${IDP_ARGS[*]}" "$IDP_BIN" "${IDP_ARGS[@]}" >"$SCRATCH/idp.log" 2>&1 & IDP_PID=$! if ! wait_http "$IDP_URL/.well-known/openid-configuration" 20; then tail_log "idp.log" "$SCRATCH/idp.log" die "fake IdP did not serve /.well-known/openid-configuration within 20s (pid $IDP_PID)" fi c "$IDP_URL/.well-known/openid-configuration" | jq -e '.userinfo_endpoint and .jwks_uri and (.id_token_signing_alg_values_supported|index("RS256"))' >/dev/null || die "OIDC discovery document lacks userinfo_endpoint / jwks_uri / RS256" # The discovery endpoint answers as soon as the listener is bound — before # the startup banner (Confidential ID/Secret included) finishes printing to # idp.log — so a single read right after wait_http can race an empty file. # Poll the same bounded way wait_http does. OIDC_CLIENT_ID="" OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET="" for ((i = 0; i < 40; i++)); do OIDC_CLIENT_ID="$(sed -n 's/^Confidential ID:[[:space:]]*//p' "$SCRATCH/idp.log" 2>/dev/null | head -n1)" OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET="$(sed -n 's/^Confidential Secret:[[:space:]]*//p' "$SCRATCH/idp.log" 2>/dev/null | head -n1)" [[ -n "$OIDC_CLIENT_ID" && -n "$OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET" ]] && break sleep 0.5 done [[ -n "$OIDC_CLIENT_ID" && -n "$OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET" ]] || die "could not read Confidential ID/Secret from idp.log within 20s" export OIDC_CLIENT_ID OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET ok "§1 fake IdP up (pid $IDP_PID), client_id=$OIDC_CLIENT_ID, tamper=$TAMPER" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # §2 Scratch configuration (the config references the IdP client through # ${env:} — nested server_edition.* keys have no env override, FR-020). # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONFIG="$SCRATCH/mcp_config.json" AUDIT="$SCRATCH/audit.jsonl" cat >"$CONFIG" <<EOF { "listen": "127.0.0.1:$PORT", "require_mcp_auth": false, "trusted_proxies": ["127.0.0.1/32"], "quarantine_enabled": false, "audit_log": {"enabled": true, "path": "$AUDIT", "stdout": false}, "mcpServers": [ {"name": "a", "command": "node", "args": ["$FIXTURE/index.js"], "protocol": "stdio", "enabled": true, "shared": true}, {"name": "b", "command": "node", "args": ["$FIXTURE/index.js"], "protocol": "stdio", "enabled": true, "shared": true}, {"name": "a__b", "command": "node", "args": ["$FIXTURE/index.js"], "protocol": "stdio", "enabled": true, "shared": true} ], "server_edition": { "enabled": true, "admin_emails": ["[email protected]"], "public_url": "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT", "session_cookie_secure": "auto", "oauth": { "provider": "oidc", "issuer_url": "$IDP_URL", "allow_insecure_issuer": true, "client_id": "\${env:OIDC_CLIENT_ID}", "client_secret": "\${env:OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET}", "scopes": ["openid", "profile", "email", "groups"], "groups_claim": "groups", "email_verified_policy": "refuse_false", "display_name": "Example Corp" }, "access": {"group_servers": {"eng": ["a"], "ops": ["a", "b"]}, "default_servers": []} } } EOF jq -e . "$CONFIG" >/dev/null || die "scratch config is not valid JSON" ok "§2 wrote $CONFIG" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # §3 Run. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- BASE="http://127.0.0.1:$PORT" MAIN_LOG="$SCRATCH/main.log" log "§3 $BIN serve --config $CONFIG --data-dir $SCRATCH --log-level=debug" "$BIN" serve --config "$CONFIG" --data-dir "$SCRATCH" --log-level=debug >"$MAIN_LOG" 2>&1 & MP_PID=$! for ((i = 0; i < 120; i++)); do if ! pid_alive "$MP_PID"; then wait "$MP_PID" && rc=0 || rc=$? reason="$(grep -E '^Error:|"level":"error"|ERROR' "$MAIN_LOG" | tail -n 1)" [[ "$rc" -eq 3 ]] && die "server exited 3 (BBolt lock) — another instance holds $SCRATCH/config.db" [[ "$rc" -eq 4 ]] && die "server refused the scratch config (exit 4): ${reason:-see main.log} — on a branch without the oidc provider this is the expected stop" die "server exited early with code $rc: ${reason:-see main.log}" fi c -f -o /dev/null "$BASE/readyz" && break sleep 0.5 done c -f -o /dev/null "$BASE/readyz" || die "server not ready on $BASE/readyz within 60s (pid $MP_PID)" API_KEY="$(jq -r '.api_key // empty' "$CONFIG")" [[ -n "$API_KEY" ]] || die "no api_key written back to $CONFIG (is --config + --data-dir wiring intact?)" c -f -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" "$BASE/api/v1/status" | jq -e '.data.edition=="server"' >/dev/null || die "/api/v1/status does not report edition=server" ok "§3 server edition ready (pid $MP_PID), api_key read from config (operator key; tenants never see it)" if grep -q 'Failed to initialize server features' "$MAIN_LOG"; then grep 'Failed to initialize server features' "$MAIN_LOG" | tail -n 1 >&2 die "server-edition features did not initialise — the /api/v1/auth/* front door is NOT mounted on this build (see the line above; on a branch without the oidc provider this is expected)" fi log "§3 boot notices:" grep -E 'require_mcp_auth.*overrid|public_url|audit_log.*enabled' "$MAIN_LOG" | head -n 5 | sed 's/^/ /' || true # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # §4 Headless login (Alice) — no browser, no API key. # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # headless_login <jar> <redirect_uri> -> prints "<callback http code> <redirect_url>" headless_login() { local jar="$1" want="$2" auth cb # 4a. /auth/login stores state+nonce server-side and 302s to the IdP. auth="$(c -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{redirect_url}' -c "$jar" "$BASE/api/v1/auth/login?redirect_uri=$want")" if [[ "${auth%% *}" != "302" && "${auth%% *}" != "303" && "${auth%% *}" != "307" ]]; then if [[ "$TAMPER" == "1" ]]; then # Some tamper flags (e.g. -discovery-http-token-endpoint) fail # synchronously at /auth/login itself — discovery runs before the # redirect to the IdP is built — so there is no IdP form to # submit and no callback to complete; the unavailable response IS # the terminal outcome for this attempt. Previously this always # died here, so that tamper case's expected-503 handling # downstream was unreachable (cross-review round 7, chunk 4 P2). echo "$auth" return 0 fi die "4a /auth/login answered HTTP ${auth%% *} instead of a redirect to the IdP (OIDC front door missing?)" fi auth="${auth#* }" [[ "$auth" == "$IDP_URL"/* ]] || die "4a /auth/login redirected off the fake IdP: $auth" echo "$auth" | grep -Eq 'code_challenge_method=S256' || die "4a authorize URL lacks code_challenge_method=S256 (FR-021)" echo "$auth" | grep -q 'nonce=' || die "4a authorize URL lacks nonce (FR-021)" # 4b. submit the fake IdP's form; do NOT follow the redirect. cb="$(c -o /dev/null -w '%{redirect_url}' -X POST "$auth" \ --data-urlencode [email protected] --data-urlencode password=pass \ --data consent=on --data action=approve)" [[ "$cb" == "$BASE/api/v1/auth/callback?"* ]] || die "4b fake IdP did not redirect to our callback (got: '$cb')" # 4c. complete the callback; the session cookie lands in the jar. c -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{redirect_url}' -b "$jar" -c "$jar" "$cb" } J="$SCRATCH/alice.jar" res="$(headless_login "$J" "/my/tokens")" code="${res%% *}"; loc="${res#* }" if [[ "$TAMPER" == "1" ]]; then # FR-024: unavailability (discovery/provider/internal failures) is the one # distinct class — 503, not the 403 closed-reason page — so a tamper flag # that injects one of those must expect 503, never a blanket 403. want="403" case " $IDP_EXTRA " in *" -discovery-http-token-endpoint "*|*" -token-endpoint-redirect "*|\ *" -userinfo-error redirect "*|*" -userinfo-error non-json "*|*" -userinfo-error unavailable "*|\ *" -token-error invalid_client "*|*" -token-error invalid_grant "*|\ *" -token-error invalid_scope "*|*" -token-error server_error "*) # These are HTTP-level token-endpoint failures (ExchangeCode returns # an error on a non-200 response), not ID-token content defects: the # callback maps them to provider_error, not authorization_denied # (cross-review round 5, chunk 4 P3). The other -token-error values # are id_token defects checked after a successful exchange and stay # in the 403 bucket (bad-signature, wrong-iss, wrong-aud, etc.). want="503" ;; esac [[ "$code" == "$want" ]] || die "4c tamper case: expected $want from the callback, got HTTP $code ($loc)" [[ "$(grep -c mcpproxy_session "$J" 2>/dev/null || true)" == "0" ]] || die "4c tamper case: a session cookie was issued" ok "4c tamper case refused with $want and no session (idp-args: $IDP_EXTRA)" log "§4 done (tamper run); phases c/d are not exercised under tamper" exit 0 fi [[ "$code" == "302" && "$loc" == "$BASE/my/tokens" ]] || die "4c callback: expected 302 -> $BASE/my/tokens, got HTTP $code -> '$loc'" [[ "$(grep -c mcpproxy_session "$J")" == "1" ]] || die "4c expected exactly one mcpproxy_session cookie in $J" ME="$(c -b "$J" "$BASE/api/v1/auth/me")" if [[ "$GROUPS_TAMPER" == "1" ]]; then # FR-008 fail-closed: a missing/non-array/oversized groups claim stores # [] (never the pre-existing value) rather than refusing the login. die "4c groups-error tamper case: expected alice with groups [] (fail-closed): $ME" ok "4c groups-error tamper case: alice logged in with groups [] (fail-closed, idp-args: $IDP_EXTRA)" log "§4 done (groups-tamper run); phases c/d are not exercised under tamper" exit 0 fi die "4c /auth/me is not alice with groups [eng]: $ME" ok "§4 alice logged in; /api/v1/auth/me:" echo "$ME" | jq . | sed 's/^/ /' # Open-redirect check (US2.7): an absolute redirect_uri must fall back to /ui/. J2="$SCRATCH/alice-evil.jar" res="$(headless_login "$J2" "https://evil.example/")" code="${res%% *}"; loc="${res#* }" [[ "$code" == "302" && "$loc" == "$BASE/ui/" ]] || die "4d open redirect: expected 302 -> $BASE/ui/, got HTTP $code -> '$loc'" ok "4d redirect_uri=https://evil.example/ landed on /ui/ (US2.7)" # §4e /mcp auth gate (T062, part of phase b itself — the session cookie and # JWT are never MCP credentials, and require_mcp_auth is forced true, so both # checks stand on PR-B alone and must run before the phase-b exit below # rather than only under --phase d, where they used to live unreachable # (cross-review round 7, chunk 4 P2). code="$(c -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -b "$J" -X POST "$BASE/mcp" -d '{}')" [[ "$code" == "401" ]] || die "4e cookie on /mcp must be 401 (FR-003, got $code)" code="$(c -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST "$BASE/mcp" -d '{}')" [[ "$code" == "401" ]] || die "4e no credential on /mcp must be 401 despite require_mcp_auth:false (FR-029, got $code)" ok "§4e /mcp refuses a session cookie and refuses no credential" [[ "$PHASE" == "b" ]] && { log "phase b complete"; exit 0; } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # §5 Tenant principal on core REST (PR-C). # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- c "$BASE/api/v1/auth/provider" | jq -e '.display_name=="Example Corp" and (keys|length==1)' >/dev/null || die "5 /auth/provider must expose exactly display_name (FR-030)" c -b "$J" "$BASE/api/v1/servers" | jq -e '[.data.servers[].name]==["a"]' >/dev/null || die "5 /servers as alice must list exactly [a] (entitlement-filtered)" c -b "$J" "$BASE/api/v1/user/servers" | jq -e '[.shared[].name]==["a"]' >/dev/null || die "5 /user/servers as alice must list shared=[a]" code="$(c -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -b "$J" "$BASE/api/v1/config")" [[ "$code" == "403" ]] || die "5 /config with a tenant cookie must be 403 (got $code)" code="$(c -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -b "$J" -X POST -d '{}' "$BASE/api/v1/tools/call")" [[ "$code" == "403" ]] || die "5 /tools/call with a tenant cookie must be 403 before body parse (got $code)" code="$(c -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -b "$J" -H 'X-API-Key: wrong' "$BASE/api/v1/status")" [[ "$code" == "401" ]] || die "5 wrong X-API-Key beside a valid cookie must be 401 (FR-001 precedence, got $code)" ok "§5 tenant principal on core REST" [[ "$PHASE" == "c" ]] && { log "phase c complete"; exit 0; } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # §6 Mint an agent token as Alice, call /mcp, read the audit line (PR-D). # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- TOK="$(c -b "$J" -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/user/tokens" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"t1","allowed_servers":["*"],"permissions":["read"],"expires_in":"720h"}' | jq -r '.token // empty')" [[ -n "$TOK" ]] || die "6 token mint as alice returned no token" c -b "$J" "$BASE/api/v1/user/tokens" | jq -e '.tokens[0].allowed_servers==["a"]' >/dev/null || die "6 minted token must have '*' materialised to [a] (US1.3)" mcp() { c -X POST "$BASE/mcp" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOK" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' "$@" } mcp -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"quickstart","version":"1"}}}' \ -D "$SCRATCH/init.h" >/dev/null SID="$(grep -i '^mcp-session-id' "$SCRATCH/init.h" | tr -d '\r' | cut -d' ' -f2)" [[ -n "$SID" ]] || die "6 initialize returned no Mcp-Session-Id" allowed="$(mcp -H "Mcp-Session-Id: $SID" -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"call_tool_read","arguments":{"name":"a:echo","args":{"text":"hello","secret":"AKIAQUICKSTART7SENTINEL0"}}}}' | jq -c '.result.isError')" # A successful call omits isError (omitempty), so jq renders the missing # field as `null`, not the literal `false` — both mean "not an error". [[ "$allowed" == "false" || "$allowed" == "null" ]] || die "6 a:echo through the token must succeed (isError=$allowed)" hiddenResp="$(mcp -H "Mcp-Session-Id: $SID" -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"call_tool_read","arguments":{"name":"b:echo","args":{}}}}')" hidden="$(echo "$hiddenResp" | jq -r '.result.content[0].text // empty')" log "6 b:echo refusal text: ${hidden:-<empty>}" # Server b is not in Alice's entitlement scope; the call must be refused, not # answered (an authorization regression here would otherwise pass the rig # silently — cross-review round 8, chunk 4 P2). echo "$hiddenResp" | jq -e '.result.isError==true' >/dev/null || die "6 b:echo must be refused (isError=true) for a token scoped to [a]" [[ -f "$AUDIT" ]] || die "6 audit log $AUDIT was not written" log "6 last audit lines:" tail -n 3 "$AUDIT" | jq -c '{event,decision,outcome,server,tool,reason,disclosed,caller:.caller.kind,email:.caller.user_email,rid:.request_id}' | sed 's/^/ /' [[ "$(grep -c 'AKIAQUICKSTART7SENTINEL0' "$AUDIT" || true)" == "0" ]] || die "6 secret bytes leaked into the audit log" [[ "$(grep -c '"event":"auth_event"' "$AUDIT" || true)" -ge 1 ]] || die "6 no auth_event line for alice's login" MCPPROXY_AUDIT_JSONL="$AUDIT" go test ./internal/audit -run TestExternalJSONLValidates -count=1 >"$SCRATCH/audit-schema.log" 2>&1 || { tail_log "audit-schema.log" "$SCRATCH/audit-schema.log" die "6 audit JSONL failed schema validation" } ok "§6 token mint, /mcp gate, audit lines and schema validation" log "phase d complete" |
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