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GeezerVison is showing github.com — undici vulnerable to CRLF Injection via blob-like body 'type' property

undici vulnerable to CRLF Injection via blob-like body 'type' property

Moderate
mcollina published GHSA-m8rv-5g2x-5cg5 Jul 29, 2026

Package

undici (npm)

Affected versions

< 6.28.0; 7.0.0 < 7.29.0; 8.0.0 < 8.9.0

Patched versions

6.28.0; 7.29.0; 8.9.0

Description

Impact

When an application passes a duck-typed blob-like body to undici's HTTP/1.1 dispatcher (via request(), stream(), pipeline(), or dispatch()) with a .type derived from untrusted input, an attacker can inject CRLF sequences (\r\n) to append arbitrary HTTP headers and potentially smuggle a second request past the upstream.

The vulnerable branch in lib/dispatcher/client-h1.js pushes body.type directly into the outgoing headers with no validation, while every other header path in undici goes through isValidHeaderValue():

} else if (util.isBlobLike(body) && request.contentType == null && body.type) {
  headers.push('content-type', body.type)  // bypasses isValidHeaderValue()
}

The bug requires a hand-rolled duck-typed blob object or a Blob subclass with a controlled .type. Native Blob is safe because its constructor strips CRLF from .type. fetch() is unaffected because it validates via the Headers class. Ecosystem consumers that build duck-typed blob shapes from user input include form-data-encoder, formdata-polyfill, and formdata-node.

Same defect class as CVE-2022-35948 (explicit content-type sink, fixed in undici 5.8.2) and CVE-2026-1527 (upgrade option sink, fixed in 6.24.0 / 7.24.0), both closed by adding isValidHeaderValue() on their respective sinks. This branch was missed.

Patches

Patched in undici v6.28.0, v7.29.0, and v8.9.0. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later.

Workarounds

  • Set an explicit, validated content-type header on the request options (skips the vulnerable branch).
  • Use a native Blob (or fetch-blob) instead of a hand-rolled duck-typed object.
  • Reject control characters in the MIME type before assigning it to .type.
  • Use fetch() instead of the non-fetch APIs.

References

  • Related CVE: CVE-2022-35948 / GHSA-f772-66g8-q5h3 (same class, content-type sink)
  • Related CVE: CVE-2026-1527 / GHSA-4992-7rv2-5pvq (same class, upgrade option sink)
  • RFC 7230 §3.2.4: HTTP/1.1 header field parsing (CRLF rule)

Severity

Moderate
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

CVE ID

CVE-2026-15157

Weaknesses

Weakness CWE-93

Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences

The product uses CRLF (carriage return line feeds) as a special element, e.g. to separate lines or records, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes CRLF sequences from inputs. Learn more on MITRE.

Credits

  • @mcollina mcollina Reporter
  • @UlisesGascon UlisesGascon Remediation reviewer
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