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pf.conf —
packet filter configuration
file
The pf(4) packet filter modifies, drops, or passes packets according to
rules or definitions specified in pf.conf.
This is an overview of the sections in this manual page:
- PACKET FILTERING
- including network address translation (NAT).
- OPTIONS
- globally tune the behaviour of the packet filtering engine.
- QUEUEING
- provides rule-based bandwidth and traffic control.
- TABLES
- provide a method for dealing with large numbers of addresses.
- ANCHORS
- are containers for rules and tables.
- STATEFUL FILTERING
- tracks packets by state.
- TRAFFIC NORMALISATION
- includes scrub, fragment handling, and blocking spoofed traffic.
- OPERATING SYSTEM
FINGERPRINTING
- is a method for detecting a host's operating system.
- EXAMPLES
- provides some example rulesets.
- GRAMMAR
- provides a complete BNF grammar reference.
The current line can be extended over multiple lines using a
backslash (‘\’). Comments can be put anywhere in the file
using a hash mark (‘#’), and extend to the end of the current
line. Care should be taken when commenting out multi-line text: the comment
is effective until the end of the entire block.
Arguments not beginning with a letter, digit, or underscore must
be quoted.
Additional configuration files can be included with the
include keyword, for example:
include "/etc/pf/sub.filter.conf"
A macro is defined with a command of the form
name=value. The macro
name can contain letters, digits, and underscores and
cannot be a reserved word (for example, pass,
in, or out). Within unquoted
arguments, the string $name is later expanded to
value.
For example:
ext_if = "kue0"
all_ifs = "{" $ext_if lo0 "}"
pass out on $ext_if from any to any
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 25
pf(4)
has the ability to block,
pass, and match packets
based on attributes of their layer 3 and layer 4 headers. Filter rules
determine which of these actions are taken; filter parameters specify the
packets to which a rule applies.
Each time a packet processed by the packet filter comes in on or
goes out through an interface, the filter rules are evaluated in sequential
order, from first to last. For block and
pass, the last matching rule decides what action is
taken; if no rule matches the packet, the default action is to pass the
packet without creating a state. For match, rules
are evaluated every time they match; the pass/block state of a packet
remains unchanged.
Most parameters are optional. If a parameter is specified, the
rule only applies to packets with matching attributes. The matching for some
parameters can be inverted with the ! operator.
Certain parameters can be expressed as lists, in which case
pfctl(8)
generates all needed rule combinations.
By default pf(4) filters packets statefully: the first time a packet matches a
pass rule, a state entry is created. The packet
filter examines each packet to see if it matches an existing state. If it
does, the packet is passed without evaluation of any rules. After the
connection is closed or times out, the state entry is automatically
removed.
The following actions can be used in the filter:
block
- The packet is blocked. There are a number of ways in which a
block rule can behave when blocking a packet. The
default behaviour is to drop packets silently,
however this can be overridden or made explicit either globally, by
setting the block-policy option, or on a per-rule
basis with one of the following options:
drop
- The packet is silently dropped.
return
- This causes a TCP RST to be returned for TCP packets and an ICMP
UNREACHABLE for other types of packets.
return-icmp
-
return-icmp6
- This causes ICMP messages to be returned for packets which match the
rule. By default this is an ICMP UNREACHABLE message, however this can
be overridden by specifying a message as a code or number.
return-rst
- This applies only to TCP packets, and issues a TCP RST which closes
the connection. An optional parameter,
ttl,
may be given with a TTL value.
Options returning ICMP packets currently have no effect if
pf(4) operates
on a bridge(4), as the code to support this feature has not yet been
implemented.
The simplest mechanism to block everything by default and only
pass packets that match explicit rules is specify a first filter rule
of:
block all
match
- The packet is matched. This mechanism is used to provide fine grained
filtering without altering the block/pass state of a packet.
match rules differ from
block and pass rules in
that parameters are set every time a packet matches the rule, not only on
the last matching rule. For the following parameters, this means that the
parameter effectively becomes “sticky” until explicitly
overridden: nat-to,
binat-to, rdr-to,
queue, rtable, and
scrub.
log is different still, in that the
action happens every time a rule matches i.e. a single packet can get
logged more than once.
pass
- The packet is passed; state is created unless the
no
state option is specified.
The following parameters can be used in the filter:
in
or out
- A packet always comes in on, or goes out through, one interface.
in and out apply to
incoming and outgoing packets; if neither are specified, the rule will
match packets in both directions.
log
(all | matches |
to interface |
user)
- In addition to any action specified, log the packet. Only the packet that
establishes the state is logged, unless the
no
state option is specified. The logged packets are sent to a
pflog(4)
interface, by default pflog0; pflog0 is monitored
by the pflogd(8) logging daemon which logs to the file
/var/log/pflog in pcap binary format.
The keywords all,
matches, to, and
user are optional and can be combined using
commas, but must be enclosed in parentheses if given.
Use all to force logging of all
packets for a connection. This is not necessary when no
state is explicitly specified.
If matches is specified, it logs the
packet on all subsequent matching rules. It is often combined with
to interface to avoid
adding noise to the default log file.
The keyword user logs the UID and PID
of the socket on the local host used to send or receive a packet, in
addition to the normal information.
To specify a logging interface other than
pflog0, use the syntax
to interface.
quick
- If a packet matches a rule which has the
quick
option set, this rule is considered the last matching rule, and evaluation
of subsequent rules is skipped.
on
interface |
any
- This rule applies only to packets coming in on, or going out through, this
particular interface or interface group. For more information on interface
groups, see the
group keyword in
ifconfig(8). any will match any existing
interface except loopback ones.
on
rdomain number
- This rule applies only to packets coming in on, or going out through, this
particular routing domain.
inet
|
inet6
- This rule applies only to packets of this address family.
proto
protocol
- This rule applies only to packets of this protocol. Common protocols are
ICMP, ICMP6, TCP, and UDP. For a list of all the protocol name to number
mappings used by pfctl(8), see the file /etc/protocols.
from
source port
source os
source to
dest port
dest
- This rule applies only to packets with the specified source and
destination addresses and ports.
Addresses can be specified in CIDR notation (matching
netblocks), as symbolic host names, interface names or interface group
names, or as any of the following keywords:
any
- Any address.
no-route
- Any address which is not currently routable.
route
label
- Any address matching the given
route(8) label.
self
- Expands to all addresses assigned to all interfaces.
- <table>
- Any address matching the given table.
urpf-failed
- Any source address that fails a unicast reverse path forwarding (URPF)
check, i.e. packets coming in on an interface other than that which
holds the route back to the packet's source address.
Ranges of addresses are specified using the ‘-’
operator. For instance: “10.1.1.10 - 10.1.1.12” means all
addresses from 10.1.1.10 to 10.1.1.12, hence addresses 10.1.1.10,
10.1.1.11, and 10.1.1.12.
Interface names, interface group names, and
self can have modifiers appended:
:0
- Do not include interface aliases.
:broadcast
- Translates to the interface's broadcast address(es).
:network
- Translates to the network(s) attached to the interface.
:peer
- Translates to the point-to-point interface's peer address(es).
Host names may also have the :0
modifier appended to restrict the name resolution to the first of each
v4 and v6 address found.
Host name resolution and interface to address translation are
done at ruleset load-time. When the address of an interface (or host
name) changes (under DHCP or PPP, for instance), the ruleset must be
reloaded for the change to be reflected in the kernel. Surrounding the
interface name (and optional modifiers) in parentheses changes this
behaviour. When the interface name is surrounded by parentheses, the
rule is automatically updated whenever the interface changes its
address. The ruleset does not need to be reloaded. This is especially
useful with NAT.
Ports can be specified either by number or by name. For
example, port 80 can be specified as www. For a
list of all port name to number mappings used by
pfctl(8), see the file /etc/services.
Ports and ranges of ports are specified using these
operators:
= (equal)
!= (unequal)
< (less than)
<= (less than or equal)
> (greater than)
>= (greater than or equal)
: (range including boundaries)
>< (range excluding boundaries)
<> (except range)
‘><’, ‘<>’ and
‘:’ are binary operators (they take two arguments). For
instance:
port
2000:2004
- means ‘all ports ≥ 2000 and ≤ 2004’, hence
ports 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004.
port
2000 >< 2004
- means ‘all ports > 2000 and < 2004’, hence ports
2001, 2002, and 2003.
port
2000 <> 2004
- means ‘all ports < 2000 or > 2004’, hence ports
1–1999 and 2005–65535.
The operating system of the source host can be specified in
the case of TCP rules with the os modifier. See
the OPERATING
SYSTEM FINGERPRINTING section for more information.
The host,
port, and os
specifications are optional, as in the following examples:
pass in all
pass in from any to any
pass in proto tcp from any port < 1024 to any
pass in proto tcp from any to any port 25
pass in proto tcp from 10.0.0.0/8 port >= 1024 \
to ! 10.1.2.3 port != ssh
pass in proto tcp from any os "OpenBSD"
pass in proto tcp from route "DTAG"
The following additional parameters can be used in the filter:
all
- This is equivalent to ‘
from any to
any’.
allow-opts
- By default, packets with IPv4 options or IPv6 hop-by-hop or destination
options header are blocked. When
allow-opts is
specified for a pass rule, packets that pass the
filter based on that rule (last matching) do so even if they contain
options. For packets that match state, the rule that initially created the
state is used. The implicit pass rule, that is used when a packet does not
match any rules, does not allow IP options or option headers. Note that
IPv6 packets with type 0 routing headers are always dropped.
divert-packet
port port
- Used to send matching packets to
divert(4) sockets bound to port port. If the
default option of fragment reassembly is enabled, scrubbing with
reassemble tcp is also enabled for
divert-packet rules.
divert-reply
- Used to receive replies for sockets that are bound to addresses which are
not local to the machine. See
setsockopt(2) for information on how to bind these sockets.
divert-to
host port
port
- Used to redirect packets to a local socket bound to
host and port. The packets
will not be modified, preserving the original destination address for the
application to access.
SOCK_STREAM connections can
access the original destination address using
getsockname(2). SOCK_DGRAM sockets can be
configured with the ip(4) IP_RECVDSTADDR and
IP_RECVDSTPORT socket options when receiving IPv4
packets, or the ip6(4) IPV6_RECVPKTINFO and
IPV6_RECVDSTPORT socket options when receiving
IPv6 packets.
flags
a/b |
any
- This rule only applies to TCP packets that have the flags
a set out of set b. Flags not
specified in b are ignored. For stateful
connections, the default is
flags S/SA. To
indicate that flags should not be checked at all, specify
flags any. The flags are: (F)IN, (S)YN, (R)ST,
(P)USH, (A)CK, (U)RG, (E)CE, and C(W)R.
flags
S/S
- Flag SYN is set. The other flags are ignored.
flags
S/SA
- This is the default setting for stateful connections. Out of SYN and
ACK, exactly SYN may be set. SYN, SYN+PSH, and SYN+RST match, but
SYN+ACK, ACK, and ACK+RST do not. This is more restrictive than the
previous example.
flags
/SFRA
- If the first set is not specified, it defaults to none. All of SYN,
FIN, RST, and ACK must be unset.
Because flags S/SA is applied by
default (unless no state is specified), only the
initial SYN packet of a TCP handshake will create a state for a TCP
connection. It is possible to be less restrictive, and allow state
creation from intermediate (non-SYN) packets, by specifying
flags any. This will cause
pf(4) to
synchronize to existing connections, for instance if one flushes the
state table. However, states created from such intermediate packets may
be missing connection details such as the TCP window scaling factor.
States which modify the packet flow, such as those affected by
af-to, modulate state,
nat-to, rdr-to, or
synproxy state options, or scrubbed with
reassemble tcp, will also not be recoverable
from intermediate packets. Such connections will stall and time out.
group
group
- Similar to
user, this rule only applies to packets
of sockets owned by the specified group.
icmp-type
type [code
code]
-
icmp6-type
type [code
code]
- This rule only applies to ICMP or ICMP6 packets with the specified type
and code. Text names for ICMP types and codes are listed in
icmp(4) and
icmp6(4).
The protocol and the ICMP type indicator
(
icmp-type or icmp6-type)
must match.
ICMP responses are not permitted unless they either match an
existing request, or unless no state or
keep state (sloppy) is specified.
label
string
- Adds a label to the rule, which can be used to identify the rule. For
instance, ‘
pfctl -s labels’ shows
per-rule statistics for rules that have labels.
The following macros can be used in labels:
- $dstaddr
- The destination IP address.
- $dstport
- The destination port specification.
- $if
- The interface.
- $nr
- The rule number.
- $proto
- The protocol name.
- $srcaddr
- The source IP address.
- $srcport
- The source port specification.
For example:
ips = "{ 1.2.3.4, 1.2.3.5 }"
pass in proto tcp from any to $ips \
port > 1023 label "$dstaddr:$dstport"
Expands to:
pass in inet proto tcp from any to 1.2.3.4 \
port > 1023 label "1.2.3.4:>1023"
pass in inet proto tcp from any to 1.2.3.5 \
port > 1023 label "1.2.3.5:>1023"
The macro expansion for the label
directive occurs only at configuration file parse time, not during
runtime.
max-pkt-rate
number/seconds
- Measure the rate of packets matching the rule and states created by it.
When the specified rate is exceeded, the rule stops matching. Only packets
in the direction in which the state was created are considered, so that
typically requests are counted and replies are not. For example, to pass
up to 100 ICMP packets per 10 seconds:
block in proto icmp
pass in proto icmp max-pkt-rate 100/10
When the rate is exceeded, all ICMP is blocked until the rate
falls below 100 per 10 seconds again.
once
- Create a one shot rule. The first matching packet marks the rule as
expired. Expired rules are skipped and hidden, unless
pfctl(8)
is used in debug or verbose mode.
probability
number%
- A probability attribute can be attached to a rule, with a value set
between 0 and 100%, in which case the rule is honoured using the given
probability value. For example, the following rule will drop 20% of
incoming ICMP packets:
block in proto icmp probability
20%
state
limiter name [(limiter
options)]
- Use the specified state limiter to restrict the creation of states by this
rule. By default if capacity is not available, the packet gets blocked and
ruleset evaluation stops. Use
no-match option to
change default behavior such rule is ignored and ruleset evaluation
continues with next rule. See the
State Limiters section for more
information.
source
limiter name [(limiter
options)]
- Use the specified source limiter to restrict the creation of states by
this rule. By default if capacity is not available, the packet gets
blocked and ruleset evaluation stops. Use
no-match
option to change default behavior such rule is ignored and ruleset
evaluation continues with next rule. See the
Source Limiters section for more
information.
prio
number
- Only match packets which have the given queueing priority assigned.
- [
!]received-on
interface
- Only match packets which were received on the specified
interface (or interface group).
any will match any existing interface except
loopback ones.
rtable
number
- Used to select an alternate routing table for the routing lookup. Only
effective before the route lookup happened, i.e. when filtering inbound.
set
delay milliseconds
- Packets matching this rule will be delayed at the outbound interface by
the given number of milliseconds.
set
prio priority |
(priority, priority)
- Packets matching this rule will be assigned a specific queueing priority.
Priorities are assigned as integers 0 through 7, with a default priority
of 3. If the packet is transmitted on a
vlan(4)
interface, the queueing priority will also be written as the priority code
point in the 802.1Q VLAN header. If two priorities are given, TCP ACKs
with no data payload and packets which have a TOS of
lowdelay will be assigned to the second one.
Packets with a higher priority number are processed first, and packets
with the same priority are processed in the order in which they are
received.
For example:
pass in proto tcp to port 25 set prio 2
pass in proto tcp to port 22 set prio (2, 5)
The interface priority queues accessed by the
set prio keyword are always enabled and do not
require any additional configuration, unlike the queues described below
and in the QUEUEING section.
set
queue queue | (queue,
queue)
- Packets matching this rule will be assigned to the specified
queue. If two queues are given, packets which have a
TOS of
lowdelay and TCP ACKs with no data payload
will be assigned to the second one. See
QUEUEING for setup details.
For example:
pass in proto tcp to port 25 set queue mail
pass in proto tcp to port 22 set queue(ssh_bulk, ssh_prio)
set
tos string |
number
- Enforces a TOS for matching packets. string may be
one of
critical,
inetcontrol, lowdelay,
netcontrol, throughput,
reliability, or one of the DiffServ Code Points:
ef, af11
... af43,
cs0 ...
cs7; number may be either a
hex or decimal number.
tag
string
- Packets matching this rule will be tagged with the specified
string. The tag acts as an internal marker that can
be used to identify these packets later on. This can be used, for example,
to provide trust between interfaces and to determine if packets have been
processed by translation rules. Tags are “sticky”, meaning
that the packet will be tagged even if the rule is not the last matching
rule. Further matching rules can replace the tag with a new one but will
not remove a previously applied tag. A packet is only ever assigned one
tag at a time. Tags take the same macros as labels (see above).
- [
!]tagged
string
- Used with filter or translation rules to specify that packets must already
be tagged with the given string in order to match
the rule.
tos
string | number
- This rule applies to packets with the specified TOS bits set.
string may be one of
critical, inetcontrol,
lowdelay, netcontrol,
throughput, reliability,
or one of the DiffServ Code Points: ef,
af11 ...
af43, cs0
... cs7;
number may be either a hex or decimal number.
For example, the following rules are identical:
pass all tos lowdelay
pass all tos 0x10
pass all tos 16
user
user
- This rule only applies to packets of sockets owned by the specified
user. For outgoing connections initiated from the
firewall, this is the user that opened the connection. For incoming
connections to the firewall itself, this is the user that listens on the
destination port.
When listening sockets are bound to the wildcard address,
pf(4) cannot
determine if a connection is destined for the firewall itself. To avoid
false matches on just the destination port, combine a
user rule with source or destination address
self.
All packets, both outgoing and incoming, of one connection are
associated with the same user and group. Only TCP and UDP packets can be
associated with users.
The user and group
arguments refer to the effective (as opposed to the real) IDs, in case
the socket is created by a setuid/setgid process. User and group IDs are
stored when a socket is created; when a process creates a listening
socket as root (for instance, by binding to a privileged port) and
subsequently changes to another user ID (to drop privileges), the
credentials will remain root.
User and group IDs can be specified as either numbers or
names. The syntax is similar to the one for ports. The following example
allows only selected users to open outgoing connections:
block out proto tcp all
pass out proto tcp from self user { < 1000, dhartmei }
The example below permits users with uid between 1000 and 1500
to open connections:
block out proto tcp all
pass out proto tcp from self user { 999 >< 1501 }
The ‘:’ operator, which works for port number
matching, does not work for user and
group match.
Translation options modify either the source or destination
address and port of the packets associated with a stateful connection.
pf(4) modifies the
specified address and/or port in the packet and recalculates IP, TCP, and
UDP checksums as necessary.
If specified on a match rule, subsequent
rules will see packets as they look after any addresses and ports have been
translated. These rules will therefore have to filter based on the
translated address and port number.
The state entry created permits
pf(4) to keep
track of the original address for traffic associated with that state and
correctly direct return traffic for that connection.
Different types of translation are possible with pf:
af-to
- Translation between different address families (NAT64) is handled using
af-to rules. Because address family translation
overrides the routing table, it's only possible to use
af-to on inbound rules, and a source address for
the resulting translation must always be specified.
The optional second argument is the host or subnet the
original addresses are translated into for the destination. The lowest
bits of the original destination address form the host part of the new
destination address according to the specified subnet. It is possible to
embed a complete IPv4 address into an IPv6 address using a network
prefix of /96 or smaller.
When a destination address is not specified, it is assumed
that the host part is 32-bit long. For IPv6 to IPv4 translation this
would mean using only the lower 32 bits of the original IPv6 destination
address. For IPv4 to IPv6 translation the destination subnet defaults to
the subnet of the new IPv6 source address with a prefix length of /96.
See RFC 6052 Section 2.2 for details on how the prefix determines the
destination address encoding.
For example, the following rules are identical:
pass in inet af-to inet6 from 2001:db8::1 to 2001:db8::/96
pass in inet af-to inet6 from 2001:db8::1
In the above example the matching IPv4 packets will be
modified to have a source address of 2001:db8::1 and a destination
address will get prefixed with 2001:db8::/96, e.g. 198.51.100.100 will
be translated to 2001:db8::c633:6464.
In the reverse case the following rules are identical:
pass in inet6 from any to 64:ff9b::/96 af-to inet \
from 198.51.100.1 to 0.0.0.0/0
pass in inet6 from any to 64:ff9b::/96 af-to inet \
from 198.51.100.1
The destination IPv4 address is assumed to be embedded inside
the original IPv6 destination address, e.g. 64:ff9b::c633:6464 will be
translated to 198.51.100.100.
The current implementation will only extract IPv4 addresses
from the IPv6 addresses with a prefix length of /96 and greater.
binat-to
- A
binat-to rule specifies a bidirectional mapping
between an external IP netblock and an internal IP netblock. It expands to
an outbound nat-to rule and an inbound
rdr-to rule.
nat-to
- A
nat-to option specifies that IP addresses are to
be changed as the packet traverses the given interface. This technique
allows one or more IP addresses on the translating host to support network
traffic for a larger range of machines on an “inside”
network. Although in theory any IP address can be used on the inside, it
is strongly recommended that one of the address ranges defined by RFC 1918
be used. Those netblocks are:
10.0.0.0 – 10.255.255.255 (all of net 10, i.e. 10/8)
172.16.0.0 – 172.31.255.255 (i.e. 172.16/12)
192.168.0.0 – 192.168.255.255 (i.e. 192.168/16)
nat-to is usually applied outbound. If
applied inbound, nat-to to a local IP address is not supported.
rdr-to
- The packet is redirected to another destination and possibly a different
port.
rdr-to can optionally specify port ranges
instead of single ports. For instance:
- match in ... port 2000:2999 rdr-to ... port 4000
- redirects ports 2000 to 2999 (inclusive) to port 4000.
- match in ... port 2000:2999 rdr-to ... port 4000:*
- redirects port 2000 to 4000, port 2001 to 4001, ..., port 2999 to
4999.
rdr-to is usually applied inbound. If
applied outbound, rdr-to to a local IP address is not supported.
In addition to modifying the address, some translation rules may
modify source or destination ports for TCP or UDP connections; implicitly in
the case of nat-to options and explicitly in the
case of rdr-to ones. Port numbers are never
translated with a binat-to rule.
Translation options apply only to packets that pass through the
specified interface, and if no interface is specified, translation is
applied to packets on all interfaces. For instance, redirecting port 80 on
an external interface to an internal web server will only work for
connections originating from the outside. Connections to the address of the
external interface from local hosts will not be redirected, since such
packets do not actually pass through the external interface. Redirections
cannot reflect packets back through the interface they arrive on, they can
only be redirected to hosts connected to different interfaces or to the
firewall itself.
However packets may be redirected to hosts connected to the
interface the packet arrived on by using redirection with NAT. For
example:
pass in on $int_if proto tcp from $int_net to $ext_if port 80 \
rdr-to $server
pass out on $int_if proto tcp to $server port 80 \
received-on $int_if nat-to $int_if
Note that redirecting external incoming connections to the
loopback address will effectively allow an external host to connect to
daemons bound solely to the loopback address, circumventing the traditional
blocking of such connections on a real interface. For example:
pass in on egress proto tcp from any to any port smtp \
rdr-to 127.0.0.1 port spamd
Unless this effect is desired, any of the local non-loopback
addresses should be used instead as the redirection target, which allows
external connections only to daemons bound to this address or not bound to
any address.
For af-to, nat-to
and rdr-to options for which there is a single
redirection address which has a subnet mask smaller than 32 for IPv4 or 128
for IPv6 (more than one IP address), a variety of different methods for
assigning this address can be used:
bitmask
- The
bitmask option applies the network portion of
the redirection address to the address to be modified (source with
nat-to, destination with
rdr-to).
least-states
[sticky-address]
- The
least-states option selects the address with
the least active states from a given address pool and considers given
weights associated with address(es). Weights can be specified between 1
and 65535. Addresses with higher weights are selected more often.
sticky-address can be specified to
ensure that multiple connections from the same source are mapped to the
same redirection address. Associations are destroyed as soon as there
are no longer states which refer to them; in order to make the mappings
last beyond the lifetime of the states, increase the global options with
set timeout
src.track.
random
[sticky-address]
- The
random option selects an address at random
within the defined block of addresses.
sticky-address is as described above.
round-robin
[sticky-address]
- The
round-robin option loops through the
redirection address(es) and considers given weights associated with
address(es). Weights can be specified between 1 and 65535. Addresses with
higher weights are selected more often.
sticky-address is as described above.
source-hash
[key] [sticky-address]
- The
source-hash option uses a hash of the source
address to determine the redirection address, ensuring that the
redirection address is always the same for a given source. An optional
key can be specified after this keyword either in
hex or as a string; by default
pfctl(8)
randomly generates a key for source-hash every time the ruleset is
reloaded. sticky-address is as described
above.
static-port
- With
nat-to rules, the
static-port option prevents
pf(4) from
modifying the source port on TCP and UDP packets.
When more than one redirection address or a table is specified,
bitmask is not permitted as a pool type.
If a packet matches a rule with one of the following route options
set, the packet filter will route the packet according to the type of route
option. When such a rule creates state, the route option is also applied to
all packets matching the same connection.
dup-to
- The
dup-to option creates a duplicate of the
packet and routes it like route-to. The original
packet gets routed as it normally would.
reply-to
- The
reply-to option is similar to
route-to, but routes packets that pass in the
opposite direction (replies) to the specified address. Opposite direction
is only defined in the context of a state entry, and
reply-to is useful only in rules that create
state. It can be used on systems with multiple paths to the internet to
ensure that replies to an incoming network connection to a particular
address are sent using the path associated with that address (symmetric
routing enforcement).
route-to
- The
route-to option routes the packet to the
specified destination address instead of the destination address in the
packet header. When a route-to rule creates state,
only packets that pass in the same direction as the filter rule specifies
will be routed in this way. Packets passing in the opposite direction
(replies) are not affected and are routed normally.
For the dup-to,
reply-to, and route-to route
options for which there is a single redirection address which has a subnet
mask smaller than 32 for IPv4 or 128 for IPv6 (more than one IP address),
the methods least-states,
random, round-robin, and
source-hash, as described above, can be used.
pf(4)
may be tuned for various situations using the set
command.
set
block-policy drop |
return
- The
block-policy option sets the default behaviour
for the packet block action:
drop
- Packet is silently dropped.
return
- A TCP RST is returned for blocked TCP packets, an ICMP UNREACHABLE is
returned for blocked UDP packets, and all other packets are silently
dropped.
The default value is drop.
set
debug level
- Set the debug level, which limits the severity of
log messages printed by pf(4). This should be a keyword from the following ordered list
(highest to lowest):
emerg,
alert, crit,
err, warning,
notice, info, and
debug. These keywords correspond to the similar
(LOG_) values specified to the
syslog(3) library routine. The default value is
err.
set
fingerprints filename
- Load fingerprints of known operating systems from the given
filename. By default fingerprints of known operating
systems are automatically loaded from
pf.os(5),
but can be overridden via this option. Setting this option may leave a
small period of time where the fingerprints referenced by the currently
active ruleset are inconsistent until the new ruleset finishes loading.
The default location for fingerprints is
/etc/pf.os.
set
hostid number
- The 32-bit hostid number identifies this firewall's
state table entries to other firewalls in a
pfsync(4) failover cluster. By default the hostid is set to a
pseudo-random value, however it may be desirable to manually configure it,
for example to more easily identify the source of state table entries. The
hostid may be specified in either decimal or hexadecimal.
set
limit limit-item number
- Sets hard limits on the memory pools used by the packet filter. See
pool(9) for
an explanation of memory pools.
Limits can be set on the following:
states
- Set the maximum number of entries in the memory pool used by state
table entries (those generated by
pass rules
which do not specify no state). The default is
100000.
src-nodes
- Set the maximum number of entries in the memory pool used for tracking
source IP addresses (generated by the
sticky-address and
src.track options). The default is 10000.
frags
- Set the maximum number of entries in the memory pool used for fragment
reassembly. The maximum may not exceed, and should be well below, the
maximum number of mbuf clusters (sysctl kern.maxclusters) in the
system. The default is NMBCLUSTERS/32.
NMBCLUSTERS defines the total number of
packets which can exist in-system at any one time. Refer to
<machine/param.h> for
the platform-specific value.
tables
- Set the number of tables that can exist. The default is 1000.
table-entries
- Set the number of addresses that can be stored in tables. The default
is 200000, or 100000 on machines with less than 100MB of physical
memory.
pktdelay_pkts
- Set the maximum number of packets that can be held in the delay queue.
The default is 10000.
anchors
- Set the number of anchors that can exist. The default is 512.
Multiple limits can be combined on a single line:
set limit { states 20000, frags 2000, src-nodes 2000 }
set
loginterface interface |
none
- Enable collection of packet and byte count statistics for the given
interface or interface group. These statistics can be viewed using:
# pfctl -s info
In this example pf(4) collects statistics on the interface named dc0:
set loginterface dc0
One can disable the loginterface using:
set loginterface
none
The default value is none.
set
optimization environment
- Optimize state timeouts for one of the following network environments:
aggressive
- Aggressively expire connections. This can greatly reduce the memory
usage of the firewall at the cost of dropping idle connections
early.
conservative
- Extremely conservative settings. Avoid dropping legitimate connections
at the expense of greater memory utilization (possibly much greater on
a busy network) and slightly increased processor utilization.
high-latency
- A high-latency environment (such as a satellite connection).
normal
- A normal network environment. Suitable for almost all networks.
satellite
- Alias for
high-latency.
The default value is normal.
set
reassemble yes |
no
[no-df]
- The
reassemble option is used to enable or disable
the reassembly of fragmented packets, and can be set to
yes (the default) or no.
If no-df is also specified, fragments with the
“dont-fragment” bit set are reassembled too, instead of
being dropped; the reassembled packet will have the
“dont-fragment” bit cleared. The default value is
yes.
set
ruleset-optimization
level
-
basic
- Enable basic ruleset optimization. This is the default behaviour.
Basic ruleset optimization does four things to improve the performance
of ruleset evaluations:
- remove duplicate rules
- remove rules that are a subset of another rule
- combine multiple rules into a table when advantageous
- reorder the rules to improve evaluation performance
none
- Disable the ruleset optimizer.
profile
- Uses the currently loaded ruleset as a feedback profile to tailor the
ordering of
quick rules to actual network
traffic.
It is important to note that the ruleset optimizer will modify
the ruleset to improve performance. A side effect of the ruleset
modification is that per-rule accounting statistics will have different
meanings than before. If per-rule accounting is important for billing
purposes or whatnot, either the ruleset optimizer should not be used or
a label field should be added to all of the accounting rules to act as
optimization barriers.
Optimization can also be set as a command-line argument to
pfctl(8), overriding the settings in
pf.conf.
set
skip on ifspec
- List interfaces for which packets should not be filtered. Packets passing
in or out on such interfaces are passed as if pf was disabled, i.e. pf
does not process them in any way. This can be useful on loopback and other
virtual interfaces, when packet filtering is not desired and can have
unexpected effects. PF filters traffic on all interfaces by default.
set
state-defaults state-option,
...
- The
state-defaults option sets the state options
for states created from rules without an explicit keep
state. For example:
set state-defaults pflow,
no-sync
set
state-policy if-bound |
floating
- The
state-policy option sets the default behaviour
for states:
if-bound
- States are bound to an interface.
floating
- States can match packets on any interfaces (the default).
set
syncookies never |
always
|
adaptive
- When
syncookies are active, pf will answer each
and every incoming TCP SYN with a syncookie SYNACK, without allocating any
resources. Upon reception of the client's ACK in response to the syncookie
SYNACK, pf will evaluate the ruleset and create state if the ruleset
permits it, complete the three way handshake with the target host, and
continue the connection with synproxy in place. This allows pf to be
resilient against large synflood attacks, which could otherwise exhaust
the state table. Due to the blind answers to each and every SYN,
syncookies share the caveats of synproxy: seemingly accepting connections
that will be dropped later on.
never
- pf will never send syncookie SYNACKs (the default).
always
- pf will always send syncookie SYNACKs.
adaptive
- pf will enable syncookie mode when a given percentage of the state
table is used up by half-open TCP connections, such as those that saw
the initial SYN but didn't finish the three way handshake. The
thresholds for entering and leaving syncookie mode can be specified
using:
set syncookies adaptive (start 25%, end 12%)
set
timeout variable value
-
frag
- Seconds before an unassembled fragment is expired (60 by
default).
interval
- Interval between purging expired states and fragments (10 seconds by
default).
src.track
- Length of time to retain a source tracking entry after the last state
expires (0 by default, which means there is no global limit. The value
is defined by the rule which creates the state.).
When a packet matches a stateful connection, the seconds to
live for the connection will be updated to that of the protocol and
modifier which corresponds to the connection state. Each packet which
matches this state will reset the TTL. Tuning these values may improve
the performance of the firewall at the risk of dropping valid idle
connections. Alternatively, these values may be adjusted collectively in
a manner suitable for a specific environment using set
optimization (see above).
tcp.closed
(90 seconds by default)
- The state after one endpoint sends an RST.
tcp.closing
(900 seconds by default)
- The state after the first FIN has been sent.
tcp.established
(24 hours by default)
- The fully established state.
tcp.finwait
(45 seconds by default)
- The state after both FINs have been exchanged and the connection is
closed. Some hosts (notably web servers on Solaris) send TCP packets
even after closing the connection. Increasing
tcp.finwait (and possibly
tcp.closing) can prevent blocking of such
packets.
tcp.first
(120 seconds by default)
- The state after the first packet.
tcp.opening
(30 seconds by default)
- The state after the second packet but before both endpoints have
acknowledged the connection.
tcp.tsdiff
(30 seconds by default)
- Maximum allowed time difference between RFC 1323 compliant packet
timestamps.
ICMP and UDP are handled in a fashion similar to TCP, but with
a much more limited set of states:
icmp.error
(10 seconds by default)
- The state after an ICMP error came back in response to an ICMP
packet.
icmp.first
(20 seconds by default)
- The state after the first packet.
udp.first
(60 seconds by default)
- The state after the first packet.
udp.multiple
(60 seconds by default)
- The state if both hosts have sent packets.
udp.single
(30 seconds by default)
- The state if the source host sends more than one packet but the
destination host has never sent one back.
Other protocols are handled similarly to UDP:
other.first
(60 seconds by default)
-
other.multiple
(60 seconds by default)
-
other.single
(30 seconds by default)
-
Timeout values can be reduced adaptively as the number of
state table entries grows.
adaptive.start
(60000 states by default)
- When the number of state entries exceeds this value, adaptive scaling
begins. All timeout values are scaled linearly with factor
(adaptive.end - number of states) / (adaptive.end -
adaptive.start).
adaptive.end
(120000 states by default)
- When reaching this number of state entries, all timeout values become
zero, effectively purging all state entries immediately. This value is
used to define the scale factor; it should not actually be reached
(set a lower state limit, see below).
Adaptive timeouts are enabled by default, with an
adaptive.start value equal to 60% of the state limit, and an
adaptive.end value equal to 120% of the state limit. They can be
disabled by setting both adaptive.start and adaptive.end to 0.
The adaptive timeout values can be defined both globally and
for each rule. When used on a per-rule basis, the values relate to the
number of states created by the rule, otherwise to the total number of
states.
For example:
set timeout tcp.first 120
set timeout tcp.established 86400
set timeout { adaptive.start 60000, adaptive.end 120000 }
set limit states 100000
With 90000 state table entries, the timeout values are scaled
to 50% (tcp.first 60, tcp.established 43200).
“pfctl -F Reset” restores default values for the
following options: debug, all limit options, loginterface, reassemble, skip,
syncookies, all timeouts.
Packets can be assigned to queues for the purpose of bandwidth
control. At least one declaration is required to configure queues, and later
any packet filtering rule can reference the defined queues by name. When
filtering, the last referenced queue name is where any
passed packets will be queued, while for blocked packets it specifies where
any resulting ICMP or TCP RST packets should be queued. If the referenced
queue does not exist on the outgoing interface, the default queue for that
interface is used. Queues attached to an interface build a tree, thus each
queue can have further child queues. Only leaf queues, i.e. queues without
children, can be used to assign packets to. The root queue must specifically
reference an interface, all other queues pick up the interfaces they should
be created on from their parent queues.
In the following example, a queue named std is created on the
interface em0, with 3 child queues ssh, mail and http:
queue std on em0 bandwidth 100M
queue ssh parent std bandwidth 10M
queue mail parent std bandwidth 10M
queue http parent std bandwidth 80M default
The specified bandwidth is the target bandwidth, every queue can
receive more bandwidth as long as the parent still has some available. The
maximum bandwidth that should be assigned to a given queue can be limited
using the max keyword. If a limitation isn't imposed
on the root queue, borrowing can result in saturating the bandwidth of the
outgoing interface. Similarly, a minimum (reserved) bandwidth can be
specified:
queue ssh parent std bandwidth 10M
min 5M max 25M
For each of these 3 bandwidth specifications an additional burst
bandwidth and time can be specified:
queue ssh parent std bandwidth 10M
burst 90M for 100ms
All bandwidth values are specified as bits
per second or using the suffixes K,
M, and G to represent
kilobits, megabits, and gigabits per second, respectively. The value must
not exceed the interface bandwidth.
If multiple connections are assigned the same queue, they're not
guaranteed to share the queue bandwidth fairly. An alternative flow queue
manager can be used to achieve fair sharing by indicating how many
simultaneous states are expected with a flows
option, unless a minimum bandwidth has been specified as well.
When packets are classified by the stateful inspection engine, a
flow identifier is assigned to all packets belonging to the state, thus
limiting the number of individual flows that can be recognized by the
resolution of a flow identifier. The current implementation is able to
classify traffic into 32767 distinct flows. However, efficient fair sharing
is observed even with a much smaller number of flows. For example on a
10Mbit/s DSL or a cable modem uplink, the following simple configuration can
be used:
queue outq on em0 bandwidth 9M max 9M flows 1024 qlimit 1024 \
default
It's important to specify the upper bound within 90-95% of the
expected bandwidth and raise the default queue limit.
If a flows option appears without a
bandwidth specification, the flow queue manager is
selected as the queueing discipline for the corresponding interface acting
as a default queue for all outgoing packets. In such a scenario, a queueing
hierarchy is not supported.
In addition to the bandwidth and flow specifications, queues
support the following options:
default
- Packets not matched by another queue are assigned to this queue. Exactly
one default queue per interface is required.
on
interface
- Specifies the interface the queue operates on. If not given, it operates
on all matching interfaces.
parent
name
- Defines which parent queue the queue should be attached to. Mandatory for
all queues except root queues. The parent queue must exist.
quantum
size
- Specifies the quantum of service for the flow queue manager. The lower the
quantum size the more advantage is given to streams of smaller packets at
the expense of bulk transfers. The default value is set to the configured
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of the specified interface.
qlimit
limit
- The maximum number of packets held in the queue. The default is 50.
Packets can be assigned to queues based on filter rules by using
the queue keyword. Normally only one
queue is specified; when a second one is specified it
will instead be used for packets which have a TOS of
lowdelay and for TCP ACKs with no data payload.
To continue the previous example, the examples below would specify
the four referenced queues, plus a few child queues. Interactive
ssh(1) sessions
get a queue with a minimum bandwidth;
scp(1) and
sftp(1) bulk
transfers go to a separate queue. The queues are then referenced by
filtering rules.
queue rootq on em0 bandwidth 100M max 100M
queue http parent rootq bandwidth 60M burst 90M for 100ms
queue developers parent http bandwidth 45M
queue employees parent http bandwidth 15M
queue mail parent rootq bandwidth 10M
queue ssh parent rootq bandwidth 20M
queue ssh_interactive parent ssh bandwidth 10M min 5M
queue ssh_bulk parent ssh bandwidth 10M
queue std parent rootq bandwidth 20M default
block return out on em0 inet all set queue std
pass out on em0 inet proto tcp from $developerhosts to any port 80 \
set queue developers
pass out on em0 inet proto tcp from $employeehosts to any port 80 \
set queue employees
pass out on em0 inet proto tcp from any to any port 22 \
set queue(ssh_bulk, ssh_interactive)
pass out on em0 inet proto tcp from any to any port 25 \
set queue mail
Tables are named structures which can hold a collection of
addresses and networks. Lookups against tables in
pf(4) are
relatively fast, making a single rule with tables much more efficient, in
terms of processor usage and memory consumption, than a large number of
rules which differ only in IP address (either created explicitly or
automatically by rule expansion).
Tables can be used as the source or destination of filter or
translation rules. They can also be used for the redirect address of
nat-to and rdr-to and in the
routing options of filter rules, but not for bitmask
pools.
Tables can be defined with any of the following
pfctl(8)
mechanisms. As with macros, reserved words may not be used as table
names.
- manually
- Persistent tables can be manually created with the
add or replace option of
pfctl(8),
before or after the ruleset has been loaded.
pf.conf
- Table definitions can be placed directly in this file and loaded at the
same time as other rules are loaded, atomically. Table definitions inside
pf.conf use the table
statement, and are especially useful to define non-persistent tables. The
contents of a pre-existing table defined without a list of addresses to
initialize it is not altered when pf.conf is
loaded. A table initialized with the empty list, {
}, will be cleared on load.
Tables may be defined with the following attributes:
const
- The
const flag prevents the user from altering the
contents of the table once it has been created. Without that flag,
pfctl(8)
can be used to add or remove addresses from the table at any time, even
when running with
securelevel(7) = 2.
counters
- The
counters flag enables per-address packet and
byte counters, which can be displayed with
pfctl(8).
persist
- The
persist flag forces the kernel to keep the
table even when no rules refer to it. If the flag is not set, the kernel
will automatically remove the table when the last rule referring to it is
flushed.
This example creates a table called “private”, to
hold RFC 1918 private network blocks, and a table called
“badhosts”, which is initially empty. A filter rule is set up
to block all traffic coming from addresses listed in either table:
table <private> const { 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16 }
table <badhosts> persist
block on fxp0 from { <private>, <badhosts> } to any
The private table cannot have its contents changed and the
badhosts table will exist even when no active filter rules reference it.
Addresses may later be added to the badhosts table, so that traffic from
these hosts can be blocked by using the following:
# pfctl -t badhosts -Tadd
204.92.77.111
A table can also be initialized with an address list specified in
one or more external files, using the following syntax:
table <spam> persist file "/etc/spammers" file "/etc/openrelays"
block on fxp0 from <spam> to any
The files /etc/spammers and
/etc/openrelays list IP addresses, one per line. Any
lines beginning with a ‘#’ are treated as comments and
ignored. In addition to being specified by IP address, hosts may also be
specified by their hostname. When the resolver is called to add a hostname
to a table, all resulting IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are
placed into the table. IP addresses can also be entered in a table by
specifying a valid interface name, a valid interface group, or the
self keyword, in which case all addresses assigned
to the interface(s) will be added to the table.
Besides the main ruleset, pf.conf can
specify anchor attachment points. An anchor is a container that can hold
rules, address tables, and other anchors. When evaluation of the main
ruleset reaches an anchor rule,
pf(4) will proceed
to evaluate all rules specified in that anchor.
The following example blocks all packets on the external interface
by default, then evaluates all rules in the anchor named "spam",
and finally passes all outgoing connections and incoming connections to port
25:
ext_if = "kue0"
block on $ext_if all
anchor spam
pass out on $ext_if all
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to $ext_if port smtp
Anchors can be manipulated through
pfctl(8)
without reloading the main ruleset or other anchors. This loads a single
rule into the anchor, which blocks all packets from a specific address:
# echo "block in quick from 1.2.3.4 to any" | pfctl -a spam -f -
The anchor can also be populated by adding a load
anchor rule after the anchor rule. When
pfctl(8)
loads pf.conf, it will also load all the rules from
the file /etc/pf-spam.conf into the anchor.
anchor spam
load anchor spam from "/etc/pf-spam.conf"
An anchor rule can also contain a filter ruleset in a
brace-delimited block. In that case, no separate loading of rules into the
anchor is required. Brace delimited blocks may contain rules or other
brace-delimited blocks. When an anchor is populated this way, the anchor
name becomes optional. Since the parser specification for anchor names is a
string, double quote characters (‘"’) should be placed
around the anchor name.
anchor "external" on egress {
block
anchor out {
pass proto tcp from any to port { 25, 80, 443 }
}
pass in proto tcp to any port 22
}
Anchor rules can also specify packet filtering parameters using
the same syntax as filter rules. When parameters are used, the anchor rule
is only evaluated for matching packets. This allows conditional evaluation
of anchors, like:
block on $ext_if all
anchor spam proto tcp from any to any port smtp
pass out on $ext_if all
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to $ext_if port smtp
The rules inside anchor "spam" are only evaluated for
TCP packets with destination port 25. Hence, the following will only block
connections from 1.2.3.4 to port 25:
# echo "block in quick from 1.2.3.4 to any" | pfctl -a spam -f -
Matching filter and translation rules marked with the
quick option are final and abort the evaluation of
the rules in other anchors and the main ruleset. If the anchor itself is
marked with the quick option, ruleset evaluation
will terminate when the anchor is exited if the packet is matched by any
rule within the anchor.
An anchor references other anchor attachment points using the
following syntax:
anchor
name
- Evaluates the filter rules in the specified anchor.
An anchor has a name which specifies the path where
pfctl(8) can
be used to access the anchor to perform operations on it, such as attaching
child anchors to it or loading rules into it. Anchors may be nested, with
components separated by ‘/’ characters, similar to how file
system hierarchies are laid out. The main ruleset is actually the default
anchor, so filter and translation rules, for example, may also be contained
in any anchor.
Anchor rules are evaluated relative to the anchor in which they
are contained. For example, all anchor rules specified in the main ruleset
will reference anchor attachment points underneath the main ruleset, and
anchor rules specified in a file loaded from a load
anchor rule will be attached under that anchor point.
Anchors may end with the asterisk (‘*’) character,
which signifies that all anchors attached at that point should be evaluated
in the alphabetical ordering of their anchor name. For example, the
following will evaluate each rule in each anchor attached to the
"spam" anchor:
Note that it will only evaluate anchors that are directly attached
to the "spam" anchor, and will not descend to evaluate anchors
recursively.
Since anchors are evaluated relative to the anchor in which they
are contained, there is a mechanism for accessing the parent and ancestor
anchors of a given anchor. Similar to file system path name resolution, if
the sequence ‘..’ appears as an anchor path component, the
parent anchor of the current anchor in the path evaluation at that point
will become the new current anchor. As an example, consider the
following:
# printf 'anchor "spam/allowed"\n' | pfctl -f -
# printf 'anchor "../banned"\npass\n' | pfctl -a spam/allowed -f -
Evaluation of the main ruleset will lead into the spam/allowed
anchor, which will evaluate the rules in the spam/banned anchor, if any,
before finally evaluating the pass rule.
pf(4)
filters packets statefully, which has several advantages. For TCP
connections, comparing a packet to a state involves checking its sequence
numbers, as well as TCP timestamps if a rule using the
reassemble tcp parameter applies to the connection.
If these values are outside the narrow windows of expected values, the
packet is dropped. This prevents spoofing attacks, such as when an attacker
sends packets with a fake source address/port but does not know the
connection's sequence numbers. Similarly,
pf(4) knows how to
match ICMP replies to states. For example, to allow echo requests (such as
those created by ping(8)) out statefully and match incoming echo replies correctly to
states:
pass out inet proto icmp all
icmp-type echoreq
Also, looking up states is usually faster than evaluating rules.
If there are 50 rules, all of them are evaluated sequentially in O(n). Even
with 50000 states, only 16 comparisons are needed to match a state, since
states are stored in a binary search tree that allows searches in
O(log2 n).
Furthermore, correct handling of ICMP error messages is critical
to many protocols, particularly TCP.
pf(4) matches ICMP
error messages to the correct connection, checks them against connection
parameters, and passes them if appropriate. For example if an ICMP source
quench message referring to a stateful TCP connection arrives, it will be
matched to the state and get passed.
Finally, state tracking is required for
nat-to and rdr-to options,
in order to track address and port translations and reverse the translation
on returning packets.
pf(4)
will also create state for other protocols which are effectively stateless
by nature. UDP packets are matched to states using only host addresses and
ports, and other protocols are matched to states using only the host
addresses.
If stateless filtering of individual packets is desired, the
no state keyword can be used to specify that state
will not be created if this is the last matching rule. Note that packets
which match neither block nor pass rules, and thus are passed by default,
are effectively passed as if no state had been
specified.
A number of parameters can also be set to affect how
pf(4) handles
state tracking, as detailed below.
Much of the security derived from TCP is attributable to how well
the initial sequence numbers (ISNs) are chosen. Some popular stack
implementations choose
very poor
ISNs and thus are normally susceptible to ISN prediction exploits. By
applying a modulate state rule to a TCP connection,
pf(4) will create
a high quality random sequence number for each connection endpoint.
The modulate state directive implicitly
keeps state on the rule and is only applicable to TCP connections.
For instance:
block all
pass out proto tcp from any to any modulate state
pass in proto tcp from any to any port 25 flags S/SFRA \
modulate state
Note that modulated connections will not recover when the state
table is lost (firewall reboot, flushing the state table, etc.).
pf(4) will not be
able to infer a connection again after the state table flushes the
connection's modulator. When the state is lost, the connection may be left
dangling until the respective endpoints time out the connection. It is
possible on a fast local network for the endpoints to start an ACK storm
while trying to resynchronize after the loss of the modulator. The default
flags settings (or a more strict equivalent) should
be used on modulate state rules to prevent ACK
storms.
Note that alternative methods are available to prevent loss of the
state table and allow for firewall failover. See
carp(4) and
pfsync(4)
for further information.
By default, pf(4) passes packets that are part of a TCP handshake between the
endpoints. The synproxy state option can be used to
cause pf(4) itself
to complete the handshake with the active endpoint, perform a handshake with
the passive endpoint, and then forward packets between the endpoints.
No packets are sent to the passive endpoint before the active
endpoint has completed the handshake, hence so-called SYN floods with
spoofed source addresses will not reach the passive endpoint, as the sender
can't complete the handshake.
The proxy is transparent to both endpoints; they each see a single
connection from/to the other endpoint.
pf(4) chooses
random initial sequence numbers for both handshakes. Once the handshakes are
completed, the sequence number modulators (see previous section) are used to
translate further packets of the connection. synproxy
state includes modulate state.
Rules with synproxy state will not work if
pf(4) operates on
a bridge(4). Also they act on incoming SYN packets only.
Example:
pass in proto tcp from any to any port www synproxy state
State limiters provide a mechanism to limit the number of states
created, or the rate of state creation, by a set of rules. State limiters
are configured and loaded with the main ruleset, but can be used by rules in
any anchor. The overall number of states is still subject to the limit set
with set limit states, but the number of states
created by a subset of rules can be provided by a state limiter.
A state limiter is configured with the following statement:
state
limiter name
- Each state limiter is identified by a unique name.
State limiters support the following configuration:
id
number
- A unique identifier between 1 and 255. This configuration is
required.
limit
number
- Specify the maximum number of states. This configuration is required.
rate
number/seconds
- Limit the rate at which states can be created over a time interval. The
connection rate is an approximation calculated as a moving average.
Pass rules can specify a state limiter using the
state limiter name option. If
the number of states allowed has hit the limit, the pass rule does not match
and ruleset evaluation continues past it.
An example use case for a state limiter is to restrict the number
of connections allowed to a service that is accessible via multiple
protocols, e.g. a DNS server that can be accessed by both TCP and UDP on
port 53, DNS-over-TLS on TCP port 853, and DNS-over-HTTPS on TCP port 443
can be limited to 1000 concurrent connections:
state limiter "dns-server" id 1 limit 1000
pass in proto { tcp udp } to port domain state limiter "dns-server"
pass in proto tcp to port { 853 443 } state limiter "dns-server"
Source limiters apply limits on the number of states, or the rate
of state creation, for connections coming from a source address or network
for a set of rules. Source limiters are configured and loaded with the main
ruleset, but can be used by rules in any anchor. The overall number of
states is still subject to the limit set with set limit
states, but limits on states for a subset of source addresses and
rules can be provided with source limiters.
Source address entries in source pools are created on demand, and
are used to account for the states created for each source address or
network. A source limiter specifies the maximum number of source address
entries it will track, and can be configured to mask bits in network
prefixes to have source entries cover larger portions of the address space
if needed.
A source limiter is configured with the following statement:
source
limiter name
- Each source limiter is uniquely identified by the specified name.
Source limiter support the following configuration:
id
number
- A unique identifier between 1 and 255. This configuration is
required.
entries
number
- Specify the maximum number of source address entries. This configuration
is required.
limit
number
- Specify the maximum number of states for each source address entry. This
configuration is required.
rate
number/seconds
- Limit the rate at which states can be created by each source address entry
over a time interval. The connection rate is an approximation calculated
as a moving average.
inet
mask prefixlen
- Mask IPv4 source addresses using the prefix length specified with
prefixlen when creating an address entry. The
default IPv4 prefix length is 32 bits.
inet6
mask prefixlen
- Mask IPv6 source addresses using the prefix length specified with
prefixlen when creating an address entry. The
default IPv6 prefix length is 128 bits.
table
<table> above
hwm [below
lwm]
- Add the address to the specified table when the
number of states goes above the hwm high water mark.
The address will be removed from the table when the number of states drops
below the lwm low water mark. The default low water
mark is 0.
Pass rules can specify a source limiter using the
source limiter name
option.
An example use for a source limiter is the mitigation of denial of
service caused by the exhaustion of firewall resources by network or port
scans from outside the network. The states created by any one scanner from
any one source address can be limited to avoid impacting other sources.
Below, up to 10000 IPv4 hosts and IPv6 /64 networks from the external
network are each limited to a maximum of 1000 connections, and are rate
limited to creating 100 states over a 10 second interval:
source limiter "internet" id 1 entries 10000 \
limit 1000 rate 100/10 \
inet6 mask 64
block in on egress
pass in on egress source limiter "internet"
A number of options related to stateful tracking can be applied on
a per-rule basis. One of keep state,
modulate state, or synproxy
state must be specified explicitly to apply these options to a
rule.
floating
- States can match packets on any interfaces (the opposite of
if-bound). This is the default.
if-bound
- States are bound to an interface (the opposite of
floating).
max
number
- Limits the number of concurrent states the rule may create. When this
limit is reached, further packets that would create state are dropped
until existing states time out.
no-sync
- Prevent state changes for states created by this rule from appearing on
the pfsync(4) interface.
pflow
- States created by this rule are exported on the
pflow(4)
interface.
sloppy
- For TCP, uses a sloppy connection tracker that does not check sequence
numbers at all, which makes insertion and ICMP teardown attacks way
easier. This is intended to be used in situations where one does not see
all packets of a connection, e.g. in asymmetric routing situations. It
cannot be used with
modulate state or
synproxy state. For ICMP, this option allows
states to be created from replies, not just requests.
- timeout seconds
- Changes the timeout values used for states created
by this rule. For a list of all valid timeout names,
see OPTIONS above.
Multiple options can be specified, separated by commas:
pass in proto tcp from any to any \
port www keep state \
(max 100, source-track rule, max-src-nodes 75, \
max-src-states 3, tcp.established 60, tcp.closing 5)
When the source-track keyword is
specified, the number of states per source IP is tracked.
source-track
global
- The number of states created by all rules that use this option is limited.
Each rule can specify different
max-src-nodes and
max-src-states options, however state entries
created by any participating rule count towards each individual rule's
limits.
source-track
rule
- The maximum number of states created by this rule is limited by the rule's
max-src-nodes and
max-src-states options. Only state entries created
by this particular rule count toward the rule's limits.
The following limits can be set:
max-src-nodes
number
- Limits the maximum number of source addresses which can simultaneously
have state table entries.
max-src-states
number
- Limits the maximum number of simultaneous state entries that a single
source address can create with this rule.
For stateful TCP connections, limits on established connections
(connections which have completed the TCP 3-way handshake) can also be
enforced per source IP.
max-src-conn
number
- Limits the maximum number of simultaneous TCP connections which have
completed the 3-way handshake that a single host can make.
max-src-conn-rate
number/seconds
- Limit the rate of new connections over a time interval. The connection
rate is an approximation calculated as a moving average.
When one of these limits is reached, further packets that would
create state are dropped until existing states time out.
Because the 3-way handshake ensures that the source address is not
being spoofed, more aggressive action can be taken based on these limits.
With the overload
<table> state option, source IP addresses which
hit either of the limits on established connections will be added to the
named table. This table can be used in the ruleset to
block further activity from the offending host, redirect it to a tarpit
process, or restrict its bandwidth.
The optional flush keyword kills all
states created by the matching rule which originate from the host which
exceeds these limits. The global modifier to the
flush command kills all states originating from the
offending host, regardless of which rule created the state.
For example, the following rules will protect the webserver
against hosts making more than 100 connections in 10 seconds. Any host which
connects faster than this rate will have its address added to the
<bad_hosts> table and have all states originating from it flushed. Any
new packets arriving from this host will be dropped unconditionally by the
block rule.
block quick from <bad_hosts>
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp to $webserver port www keep state \
(max-src-conn-rate 100/10, overload <bad_hosts> flush global)
Traffic normalisation is a broad umbrella term for aspects of the
packet filter which deal with verifying packets, packet fragments, spoof
traffic, and other irregularities.
Scrub involves sanitising packet content in such a way that there
are no ambiguities in packet interpretation on the receiving side. It is
invoked with the scrub option, added to regular
rules.
Parameters are specified enclosed in parentheses. At least one of
the following parameters must be specified:
max-mss
number
- Reduces the maximum segment size (MSS) on TCP SYN packets to be no greater
than number. This is sometimes required in scenarios
where the two endpoints of a TCP connection are not able to carry similar
sized packets and the resulting mismatch can lead to packet fragmentation
or loss. Note that setting the MSS this way can have undesirable effects,
such as interfering with the OS detection features of
pf(4).
min-ttl
number
- Enforces a minimum TTL for matching IP packets.
no-df
- Clears the “dont-fragment” bit from a matching IPv4 packet.
Some operating systems have NFS implementations which are known to
generate fragmented packets with the “dont-fragment” bit
set. pf(4) will
drop such fragmented “dont-fragment” packets unless
no-df is specified.
Unfortunately some operating systems also generate their
“dont-fragment” packets with a zero IP identification
field. Clearing the “dont-fragment” bit on packets with a
zero IP ID may cause deleterious results if an upstream router later
fragments the packet. Using random-id is
recommended in combination with no-df to ensure
unique IP identifiers.
random-id
- Replaces the IPv4 identification field with random values to compensate
for predictable values generated by many hosts. This option only applies
to packets that are not fragmented after the optional fragment
reassembly.
reassemble
tcp
- Statefully normalises TCP connections.
reassemble
tcp performs the following normalisations:
- TTL
- Neither side of the connection is allowed to reduce their IP TTL. An
attacker may send a packet such that it reaches the firewall, affects
the firewall state, and expires before reaching the destination host.
reassemble tcp will raise the TTL of all
packets back up to the highest value seen on the connection.
- Timestamp Modulation
- Modern TCP stacks will send a timestamp on every TCP packet and echo
the other endpoint's timestamp back to them. Many operating systems
will merely start the timestamp at zero when first booted, and
increment it several times a second. The uptime of the host can be
deduced by reading the timestamp and multiplying by a constant. Also
observing several different timestamps can be used to count hosts
behind a NAT device. And spoofing TCP packets into a connection
requires knowing or guessing valid timestamps. Timestamps merely need
to be monotonically increasing and not derived off a guessable base
time.
reassemble tcp will cause
scrub to modulate the TCP timestamps with a
random number.
- Extended PAWS Checks
- There is a problem with TCP on long fat pipes, in that a packet might
get delayed for longer than it takes the connection to wrap its 32-bit
sequence space. In such an occurrence, the old packet would be
indistinguishable from a new packet and would be accepted as such. The
solution to this is called PAWS: Protection Against Wrapped Sequence
numbers. It protects against it by making sure the timestamp on each
packet does not go backwards.
reassemble tcp
also makes sure the timestamp on the packet does not go forward more
than the RFC allows. By doing this,
pf(4)
artificially extends the security of TCP sequence numbers by 10 to 18
bits when the host uses appropriately randomized timestamps, since a
blind attacker would have to guess the timestamp as well.
For example:
match in all scrub (no-df random-id
max-mss 1440)
The size of IP datagrams (packets) can be significantly larger
than the maximum transmission unit (MTU) of the network. In cases when it is
necessary or more efficient to send such large packets, the large packet
will be fragmented into many smaller packets that will each fit onto the
wire. Unfortunately for a firewalling device, only the first logical
fragment will contain the necessary header information for the subprotocol
that allows pf(4)
to filter on things such as TCP ports or to perform NAT.
One alternative is to filter individual fragments with filter
rules. If packet reassembly is turned off, it is passed to the filter.
Filter rules with matching IP header parameters decide whether the fragment
is passed or blocked, in the same way as complete packets are filtered.
Without reassembly, fragments can only be filtered based on IP header fields
(source/destination address, protocol), since subprotocol header fields are
not available (TCP/UDP port numbers, ICMP code/type). The
fragment option can be used to restrict filter rules
to apply only to fragments, but not complete packets. Filter rules without
the fragment option still apply to fragments, if
they only specify IP header fields. For instance:
pass in proto tcp from any to any port 80
The rule above never applies to a fragment, even if the fragment
is part of a TCP packet with destination port 80, because without reassembly
this information is not available for each fragment. This also means that
fragments cannot create new or match existing state table entries, which
makes stateful filtering and address translation (NAT, redirection) for
fragments impossible.
In most cases, the benefits of reassembly outweigh the additional
memory cost, so reassembly is on by default.
The memory allocated for fragment caching can be limited using
pfctl(8).
Once this limit is reached, fragments that would have to be cached are
dropped until other entries time out. The timeout value can also be
adjusted.
When forwarding reassembled IPv6 packets, pf refragments them with
the original maximum fragment size. This allows the sender to determine the
optimal fragment size by path MTU discovery.
Spoofing is the faking of IP addresses, typically for malicious
purposes. The antispoof directive expands to a set
of filter rules which will block all traffic with a source IP from the
network(s) directly connected to the specified interface(s) from entering
the system through any other interface.
For example:
antispoof for lo0
Expands to:
block drop in on ! lo0 inet from 127.0.0.1/8 to any
block drop in on ! lo0 inet6 from ::1 to any
For non-loopback interfaces, there are additional rules to block
incoming packets with a source IP address identical to the interface's
IP(s). For example, assuming the interface wi0 had an IP address of 10.0.0.1
and a netmask of 255.255.255.0:
antispoof for wi0 inet
Expands to:
block drop in on ! wi0 inet from 10.0.0.0/24 to any
block drop in inet from 10.0.0.1 to any
Caveat: Rules created by the antispoof
directive interfere with packets sent over loopback interfaces to local
addresses. One should pass these explicitly.
Passive OS fingerprinting is a mechanism to inspect nuances of a
TCP connection's initial SYN packet and guess at the host's operating
system. Unfortunately these nuances are easily spoofed by an attacker so the
fingerprint is not useful in making security decisions. But the fingerprint
is typically accurate enough to make policy decisions upon.
The fingerprints may be specified by operating system class, by
version, or by subtype/patchlevel. The class of an operating system is
typically the vendor or genre and would be OpenBSD
for the pf(4)
firewall itself. The version of the oldest available
OpenBSD release on the main FTP site would be 2.6
and the fingerprint would be written as:
"OpenBSD 2.6"
The subtype of an operating system is typically used to describe
the patchlevel if that patch led to changes in the TCP stack behavior. In
the case of OpenBSD, the only subtype is for a
fingerprint that was normalised by the no-df scrub
option and would be specified as:
"OpenBSD 3.3
no-df"
Fingerprints for most popular operating systems are provided by
pf.os(5).
Once pf(4) is
running, a complete list of known operating system fingerprints may be
listed by running:
# pfctl -so
Filter rules can enforce policy at any level of operating system
specification assuming a fingerprint is present. Policy could limit traffic
to approved operating systems or even ban traffic from hosts that aren't at
the latest service pack.
The unknown class can also be used as the
fingerprint which will match packets for which no operating system
fingerprint is known.
Examples:
pass out proto tcp from any os OpenBSD
block out proto tcp from any os Doors
block out proto tcp from any os "Doors PT"
block out proto tcp from any os "Doors PT SP3"
block out from any os "unknown"
pass on lo0 proto tcp from any os "OpenBSD 3.3 lo0"
Operating system fingerprinting is limited only to the TCP SYN
packet. This means that it will not work on other protocols and will not
match a currently established connection.
Caveat: operating system fingerprints are occasionally wrong.
There are three problems: an attacker can trivially craft packets to appear
as any operating system; an operating system patch could change the stack
behavior and no fingerprints will match it until the database is updated;
and multiple operating systems may have the same fingerprint.
In this example, the external interface is
kue0. We use a macro for the interface name, so it
can be changed easily. All incoming traffic is "normalised", and
everything is blocked and logged by default.
ext_if = "kue0"
match in all scrub (no-df max-mss 1440)
block return log on $ext_if all
Here we specifically block packets we don't want: anything coming
from source we have no back routes for; packets whose ingress interface does
not match the one in the route back to their source address; anything that
does not have our address (157.161.48.183) as source; broadcasts (cable
modem noise); and anything from reserved address space or invalid
addresses.
block in from no-route to any
block in from urpf-failed to any
block out log quick on $ext_if from ! 157.161.48.183 to any
block in quick on $ext_if from any to 255.255.255.255
block in log quick on $ext_if from { 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, \
192.168.0.0/16, 255.255.255.255/32 } to any
For ICMP, pass out/in ping queries. State matching is done on host
addresses and ICMP ID (not type/code), so replies (like 0/0 for 8/0) will
match queries. ICMP error messages (which always refer to a TCP/UDP packet)
are handled by the TCP/UDP states.
pass on $ext_if inet proto icmp all icmp-type 8 code 0
For UDP, pass out all UDP connections. DNS connections are passed
in.
pass out on $ext_if proto udp all
pass in on $ext_if proto udp from any to any port domain
For TCP, pass out all TCP connections and modulate state. SSH,
SMTP, DNS, and IDENT connections are passed in. We do not allow Windows 9x
SMTP connections since they are typically a viral worm.
pass out on $ext_if proto tcp all modulate state
pass in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any \
port { ssh, smtp, domain, auth }
block in on $ext_if proto tcp from any \
os { "Windows 95", "Windows 98" } to any port smtp
Here we pass in/out all IPv6 traffic: note that we have to enable
this in two different ways, on both our physical interface and our
tunnel.
pass quick on gif0 inet6
pass quick on $ext_if proto ipv6
This example illustrates packet tagging. There are three
interfaces: $int_if, $ext_if, and $wifi_if (wireless). NAT is being done on
$ext_if for all outgoing packets. Packets in on $int_if are tagged and
passed out on $ext_if. All other outgoing packets (i.e. packets from the
wireless network) are only permitted to access port 80.
pass in on $int_if from any to any tag INTNET
pass in on $wifi_if from any to any
block out on $ext_if from any to any
pass out quick on $ext_if tagged INTNET
pass out on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 80
In this example, we tag incoming packets as they are redirected to
spamd(8).
The tag is used to pass those packets through the packet filter.
match in on $ext_if inet proto tcp from <spammers> to port smtp \
tag SPAMD rdr-to 127.0.0.1 port spamd
block in on $ext_if
pass in on $ext_if inet proto tcp tagged SPAMD
This example maps incoming requests on port 80 to port 8080, on
which a daemon is running (because, for example, it is not run as root, and
therefore lacks permission to bind to port 80).
match in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 80 \
rdr-to 127.0.0.1 port 8080
If a pass rule is used with the
quick modifier, packets matching the translation
rule are passed without inspecting subsequent filter rules.
pass in quick on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 80 \
rdr-to 127.0.0.1 port 8080
In the example below, vlan12 is configured as 192.168.168.1; the
machine translates all packets coming from 192.168.168.0/24 to 204.92.77.111
when they are going out any interface except vlan12. This has the net effect
of making traffic from the 192.168.168.0/24 network appear as though it is
the Internet routable address 204.92.77.111 to nodes behind any interface on
the router except for the nodes on vlan12. Thus, 192.168.168.1 can talk to
the 192.168.168.0/24 nodes.
match out on ! vlan12 from 192.168.168.0/24 to any nat-to 204.92.77.111
In the example below, the machine sits between a fake internal
144.19.74.* network, and a routable external IP of 204.92.77.100. The last
rule excludes protocol AH from being translated.
pass out on $ext_if from 144.19.74.0/24 nat-to 204.92.77.100
pass out on $ext_if proto ah from 144.19.74.0/24
In the example below, packets bound for one specific server, as
well as those generated by the sysadmins are not proxied; all other
connections are.
pass in on $int_if proto { tcp, udp } from any to any port 80 \
rdr-to 127.0.0.1 port 80
pass in on $int_if proto { tcp, udp } from any to $server port 80
pass in on $int_if proto { tcp, udp } from $sysadmins to any port 80
This example maps outgoing packets' source port to an assigned
proxy port instead of an arbitrary port. In this case, proxy outgoing isakmp
with port 500 on the gateway.
match out on $ext_if inet proto udp from any port isakmp to any \
nat-to ($ext_if) port 500
One more example uses rdr-to to redirect a
TCP and UDP port to an internal machine.
match in on $ext_if inet proto tcp from any to ($ext_if) port 8080 \
rdr-to 10.1.2.151 port 22
match in on $ext_if inet proto udp from any to ($ext_if) port 8080 \
rdr-to 10.1.2.151 port 53
In this example, a NAT gateway is set up to translate internal
addresses using a pool of public addresses (192.0.2.16/28). A given source
address is always translated to the same pool address by using the
source-hash keyword. The gateway also translates
incoming web server connections to a group of web servers on the internal
network.
match out on $ext_if inet from any to any nat-to 192.0.2.16/28 \
source-hash
match in on $ext_if proto tcp from any to any port 80 \
rdr-to { 10.1.2.155 weight 2, 10.1.2.160 weight 1, \
10.1.2.161 weight 8 } round-robin
The bidirectional address translation example uses a single
binat-to rule that expands to a
nat-to and an rdr-to
rule.
pass on $ext_if from 10.1.2.120 to any binat-to 192.0.2.17
The previous example is identical to the following set of
rules:
pass out on $ext_if inet from 10.1.2.120 to any \
nat-to 192.0.2.17 static-port
pass in on $ext_if inet from any to 192.0.2.17 rdr-to 10.1.2.120
In the example below, a router handling both address families
translates an internal IPv4 subnet to IPv6 using the well-known 64:ff9b::/96
prefix:
pass in on $v4_if inet af-to inet6 from ($v6_if) to 64:ff9b::/96
Paired with the example above, the example below can be used on
another router handling both address families to translate back to IPv4:
pass in on $v6_if inet6 to 64:ff9b::/96 af-to inet from ($v4_if)
Syntax for pf.conf in BNF:
line = ( option | pf-rule |
antispoof-rule | queue-rule | anchor-rule |
anchor-close | load-anchor | table-rule | include )
option = "set" ( [ "timeout" ( timeout | "{" timeout-list "}" ) ] |
[ "ruleset-optimization" [ "none" | "basic" |
"profile" ] ] |
[ "optimization" [ "default" | "normal" | "high-latency" |
"satellite" | "aggressive" | "conservative" ] ]
[ "limit" ( limit-item | "{" limit-list "}" ) ] |
[ "loginterface" ( interface-name | "none" ) ] |
[ "block-policy" ( "drop" | "return" ) ] |
[ "state-policy" ( "if-bound" | "floating" ) ]
[ "state-defaults" state-opts ]
[ "fingerprints" filename ] |
[ "skip on" ifspec ] |
[ "debug" ( "emerg" | "alert" | "crit" | "err" |
"warning" | "notice" | "info" | "debug" ) ] |
[ "reassemble" ( "yes" | "no" ) [ "no-df" ] ] )
pf-rule = action [ ( "in" | "out" ) ]
[ "log" [ "(" logopts ")"] ] [ "quick" ]
[ "on" ( ifspec | "rdomain" number ) ] [ af ]
[ protospec ] [ hosts ] [ filteropts ]
logopts = logopt [ [ "," ] logopts ]
logopt = "all" | "matches" | "user" | "to" interface-name
filteropts = filteropt [ [ "," ] filteropts ]
filteropt = user | group | flags | icmp-type | icmp6-type |
"tos" tos |
( "no" | "keep" | "modulate" | "synproxy" ) "state"
[ "(" state-opts ")" ] | "scrub" "(" scrubopts ")" |
"fragment" | "allow-opts" | "once" |
"divert-packet" "port" port | "divert-reply" |
"divert-to" host "port" port |
"label" string | "tag" string | [ "!" ] "tagged" string |
"max-pkt-rate" number "/" seconds |
"set delay" number |
"set prio" ( number | "(" number [ [ "," ] number ] ")" ) |
"set queue" ( string | "(" string [ [ "," ] string ] ")" ) |
"rtable" number | "probability" number"%" |
"state limiter" name |
"state limiter" name "(" limiter-opts ")" |
"source limiter" name |
"source limiter" name "(" limiter-opts ")" | "prio" number |
"af-to" af "from" ( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" )
[ "to" ( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" ) ] |
"binat-to" ( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" )
[ portspec ] [ pooltype ] |
"rdr-to" ( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" )
[ portspec ] [ pooltype ] |
"nat-to" ( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" )
[ portspec ] [ pooltype ] [ "static-port" ] |
[ route ] | [ "set tos" tos ] |
[ [ "!" ] "received-on" ( interface-name | interface-group ) ]
scrubopts = scrubopt [ [ "," ] scrubopts ]
scrubopt = "no-df" | "min-ttl" number | "max-mss" number |
"reassemble tcp" | "random-id"
antispoof-rule = "antispoof" [ "log" ] [ "quick" ]
"for" ifspec [ af ] [ "label" string ]
table-rule = "table" "<" string ">" [ tableopts ]
tableopts = tableopt [ tableopts ]
tableopt = "persist" | "const" | "counters" |
"file" string | "{" [ tableaddrs ] "}"
tableaddrs = tableaddr-spec [ [ "," ] tableaddrs ]
tableaddr-spec = [ "!" ] tableaddr [ "/" mask-bits ]
tableaddr = hostname | ifspec | "self" |
ipv4-dotted-quad | ipv6-coloned-hex
queue-rule = "queue" string [ "on" interface-name ] queueopts-list
anchor-rule = "anchor" [ string ] [ ( "in" | "out" ) ] [ "on" ifspec ]
[ af ] [ protospec ] [ hosts ] [ filteropt-list ] [ "{" ]
anchor-close = "}"
load-anchor = "load anchor" string "from" filename
queueopts-list = queueopts-list queueopts | queueopts
queueopts = ([ "bandwidth" bandwidth ] | [ "min" bandwidth ] |
[ "max" bandwidth ] | [ "parent" string ] |
[ "default" ]) |
([ "flows" number ] | [ "quantum" number ]) |
[ "qlimit" number ]
bandwidth = bandwidth-spec [ "burst" bandwidth-spec "for" number "ms" ]
bandwidth-spec = number ( "" | "K" | "M" | "G" )
action = "pass" | "match" | "block" [ return ]
return = "drop" | "return" |
"return-rst" [ "(" "ttl" number ")" ] |
"return-icmp" [ "(" icmpcode [ [ "," ] icmp6code ] ")" ] |
"return-icmp6" [ "(" icmp6code ")" ]
icmpcode = ( icmp-code-name | icmp-code-number )
icmp6code = ( icmp6-code-name | icmp6-code-number )
ifspec = ( [ "!" ] ( interface-name | interface-group ) ) |
"{" interface-list "}"
interface-list = [ "!" ] ( interface-name | interface-group )
[ [ "," ] interface-list ]
route = ( "route-to" | "reply-to" | "dup-to" )
( redirhost | "{" redirhost-list "}" )
af = "inet" | "inet6"
protospec = "proto" ( proto-name | proto-number |
"{" proto-list "}" )
proto-list = ( proto-name | proto-number ) [ [ "," ] proto-list ]
hosts = "all" |
"from" ( "any" | "no-route" | "urpf-failed" | "self" |
host | "{" host-list "}" | "route" string ) [ port ]
[ os ]
"to" ( "any" | "no-route" | "self" | host |
"{" host-list "}" | "route" string ) [ port ]
ipspec = "any" | host | "{" host-list "}"
host = [ "!" ] ( address [ "weight" number ] |
address [ "/" mask-bits ] [ "weight" number ] |
"<" string ">" )
redirhost = address [ "/" mask-bits ]
address = ( interface-name | interface-group |
"(" ( interface-name | interface-group ) ")" |
hostname | ipv4-dotted-quad | ipv6-coloned-hex )
host-list = host [ [ "," ] host-list ]
redirhost-list = redirhost [ [ "," ] redirhost-list ]
port = "port" ( unary-op | binary-op | "{" op-list "}" )
portspec = "port" ( number | name ) [ ":" ( "*" | number | name ) ]
os = "os" ( os-name | "{" os-list "}" )
user = "user" ( unary-op | binary-op | "{" op-list "}" )
group = "group" ( unary-op | binary-op | "{" op-list "}" )
unary-op = [ "=" | "!=" | "<" | "<=" | ">" | ">=" ]
( name | number )
binary-op = number ( "<>" | "><" | ":" ) number
op-list = ( unary-op | binary-op ) [ [ "," ] op-list ]
os-name = operating-system-name
os-list = os-name [ [ "," ] os-list ]
flags = "flags" ( [ flag-set ] "/" flag-set | "any" )
flag-set = [ "F" ] [ "S" ] [ "R" ] [ "P" ] [ "A" ] [ "U" ] [ "E" ]
[ "W" ]
icmp-type = "icmp-type" ( icmp-type-code | "{" icmp-list "}" )
icmp6-type = "icmp6-type" ( icmp-type-code | "{" icmp-list "}" )
icmp-type-code = ( icmp-type-name | icmp-type-number )
[ "code" ( icmp-code-name | icmp-code-number ) ]
icmp-list = icmp-type-code [ [ "," ] icmp-list ]
tos = ( "lowdelay" | "throughput" | "reliability" |
[ "0x" ] number )
state-opts = state-opt [ [ "," ] state-opts ]
state-opt = ( "max" number | "no-sync" | timeout | "sloppy" |
"pflow" | "source-track" [ ( "rule" | "global" ) ] |
"max-src-nodes" number | "max-src-states" number |
"max-src-conn" number |
"max-src-conn-rate" number "/" number |
"overload" "<" string ">" [ "flush" [ "global" ] ] |
"if-bound" | "floating" )
timeout-list = timeout [ [ "," ] timeout-list ]
timeout = ( "tcp.first" | "tcp.opening" | "tcp.established" |
"tcp.closing" | "tcp.finwait" | "tcp.closed" | "tcp.tsdiff" |
"udp.first" | "udp.single" | "udp.multiple" |
"icmp.first" | "icmp.error" |
"other.first" | "other.single" | "other.multiple" |
"frag" | "interval" | "src.track" |
"adaptive.start" | "adaptive.end" ) number
limit-list = limit-item [ [ "," ] limit-list ]
limit-item = ( "states" | "frags" | "src-nodes" | "tables" |
"table-entries" ) number
pooltype = ( "bitmask" | "least-states" |
"random" | "round-robin" |
"source-hash" [ ( hex-key | string-key ) ] )
[ "sticky-address" ]
limiter-opts = "block" | "no-match"
include = "include" filename
- /etc/hosts
- Host name database.
- /etc/pf.conf
- Default location of the ruleset file.
- /etc/examples/pf.conf
- Example ruleset file.
- /etc/pf.os
- Default location of OS fingerprints.
- /etc/protocols
- Protocol name database.
- /etc/services
- Service name database.
The pf.conf file format first appeared in
OpenBSD 3.0.
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