| 1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
| 2 | /* |
| 3 | * linux/kernel/sys.c |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds |
| 6 | */ |
| 7 | |
| 8 | #include <linux/export.h> |
| 9 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
| 10 | #include <linux/mm_inline.h> |
| 11 | #include <linux/utsname.h> |
| 12 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
| 13 | #include <linux/reboot.h> |
| 14 | #include <linux/prctl.h> |
| 15 | #include <linux/highuid.h> |
| 16 | #include <linux/fs.h> |
| 17 | #include <linux/kmod.h> |
| 18 | #include <linux/ksm.h> |
| 19 | #include <linux/perf_event.h> |
| 20 | #include <linux/resource.h> |
| 21 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| 22 | #include <linux/workqueue.h> |
| 23 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
| 24 | #include <linux/device.h> |
| 25 | #include <linux/key.h> |
| 26 | #include <linux/times.h> |
| 27 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h> |
| 28 | #include <linux/security.h> |
| 29 | #include <linux/random.h> |
| 30 | #include <linux/suspend.h> |
| 31 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
| 32 | #include <linux/signal.h> |
| 33 | #include <linux/cn_proc.h> |
| 34 | #include <linux/getcpu.h> |
| 35 | #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> |
| 36 | #include <linux/seccomp.h> |
| 37 | #include <linux/cpu.h> |
| 38 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
| 39 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
| 40 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
| 41 | #include <linux/file.h> |
| 42 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
| 43 | #include <linux/gfp.h> |
| 44 | #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> |
| 45 | #include <linux/version.h> |
| 46 | #include <linux/ctype.h> |
| 47 | #include <linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h> |
| 48 | |
| 49 | #include <linux/compat.h> |
| 50 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
| 51 | #include <linux/kprobes.h> |
| 52 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
| 53 | #include <linux/time_namespace.h> |
| 54 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> |
| 55 | #include <linux/futex.h> |
| 56 | |
| 57 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
| 58 | #include <linux/sched/autogroup.h> |
| 59 | #include <linux/sched/loadavg.h> |
| 60 | #include <linux/sched/stat.h> |
| 61 | #include <linux/sched/mm.h> |
| 62 | #include <linux/sched/coredump.h> |
| 63 | #include <linux/sched/task.h> |
| 64 | #include <linux/sched/cputime.h> |
| 65 | #include <linux/rcupdate.h> |
| 66 | #include <linux/uidgid.h> |
| 67 | #include <linux/cred.h> |
| 68 | |
| 69 | #include <linux/nospec.h> |
| 70 | |
| 71 | #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> |
| 72 | /* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */ |
| 73 | #include <generated/utsrelease.h> |
| 74 | |
| 75 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> |
| 76 | #include <asm/io.h> |
| 77 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
| 78 | |
| 79 | #include <trace/events/task.h> |
| 80 | |
| 81 | #include "uid16.h" |
| 82 | |
| 83 | #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL |
| 84 | # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
| 85 | #endif |
| 86 | #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL |
| 87 | # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
| 88 | #endif |
| 89 | #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL |
| 90 | # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
| 91 | #endif |
| 92 | #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL |
| 93 | # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
| 94 | #endif |
| 95 | #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL |
| 96 | # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
| 97 | #endif |
| 98 | #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL |
| 99 | # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
| 100 | #endif |
| 101 | #ifndef GET_ENDIAN |
| 102 | # define GET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
| 103 | #endif |
| 104 | #ifndef SET_ENDIAN |
| 105 | # define SET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
| 106 | #endif |
| 107 | #ifndef GET_TSC_CTL |
| 108 | # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) |
| 109 | #endif |
| 110 | #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL |
| 111 | # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) |
| 112 | #endif |
| 113 | #ifndef GET_FP_MODE |
| 114 | # define GET_FP_MODE(a) (-EINVAL) |
| 115 | #endif |
| 116 | #ifndef SET_FP_MODE |
| 117 | # define SET_FP_MODE(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
| 118 | #endif |
| 119 | #ifndef SVE_SET_VL |
| 120 | # define SVE_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL) |
| 121 | #endif |
| 122 | #ifndef SVE_GET_VL |
| 123 | # define SVE_GET_VL() (-EINVAL) |
| 124 | #endif |
| 125 | #ifndef SME_SET_VL |
| 126 | # define SME_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL) |
| 127 | #endif |
| 128 | #ifndef SME_GET_VL |
| 129 | # define SME_GET_VL() (-EINVAL) |
| 130 | #endif |
| 131 | #ifndef PAC_RESET_KEYS |
| 132 | # define PAC_RESET_KEYS(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
| 133 | #endif |
| 134 | #ifndef PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS |
| 135 | # define PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(a, b, c) (-EINVAL) |
| 136 | #endif |
| 137 | #ifndef PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS |
| 138 | # define PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(a) (-EINVAL) |
| 139 | #endif |
| 140 | #ifndef SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL |
| 141 | # define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(a) (-EINVAL) |
| 142 | #endif |
| 143 | #ifndef GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL |
| 144 | # define GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL() (-EINVAL) |
| 145 | #endif |
| 146 | #ifndef RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL |
| 147 | # define RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL(a) (-EINVAL) |
| 148 | #endif |
| 149 | #ifndef RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL |
| 150 | # define RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL() (-EINVAL) |
| 151 | #endif |
| 152 | #ifndef RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX |
| 153 | # define RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
| 154 | #endif |
| 155 | #ifndef PPC_GET_DEXCR_ASPECT |
| 156 | # define PPC_GET_DEXCR_ASPECT(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
| 157 | #endif |
| 158 | #ifndef PPC_SET_DEXCR_ASPECT |
| 159 | # define PPC_SET_DEXCR_ASPECT(a, b, c) (-EINVAL) |
| 160 | #endif |
| 161 | |
| 162 | /* |
| 163 | * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for |
| 164 | * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past |
| 165 | */ |
| 166 | |
| 167 | int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID; |
| 168 | int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID; |
| 169 | |
| 170 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid); |
| 171 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid); |
| 172 | |
| 173 | /* |
| 174 | * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit |
| 175 | * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures |
| 176 | */ |
| 177 | |
| 178 | int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; |
| 179 | int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWGID; |
| 180 | |
| 181 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid); |
| 182 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid); |
| 183 | |
| 184 | static const struct ctl_table overflow_sysctl_table[] = { |
| 185 | { |
| 186 | .procname = "overflowuid" , |
| 187 | .data = &overflowuid, |
| 188 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
| 189 | .mode = 0644, |
| 190 | .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, |
| 191 | .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, |
| 192 | .extra2 = SYSCTL_MAXOLDUID, |
| 193 | }, |
| 194 | { |
| 195 | .procname = "overflowgid" , |
| 196 | .data = &overflowgid, |
| 197 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
| 198 | .mode = 0644, |
| 199 | .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, |
| 200 | .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, |
| 201 | .extra2 = SYSCTL_MAXOLDUID, |
| 202 | }, |
| 203 | }; |
| 204 | |
| 205 | static int __init init_overflow_sysctl(void) |
| 206 | { |
| 207 | register_sysctl_init("kernel" , overflow_sysctl_table); |
| 208 | return 0; |
| 209 | } |
| 210 | |
| 211 | postcore_initcall(init_overflow_sysctl); |
| 212 | |
| 213 | /* |
| 214 | * Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid, |
| 215 | * or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns. |
| 216 | * |
| 217 | * Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe |
| 218 | */ |
| 219 | static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p) |
| 220 | { |
| 221 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p); |
| 222 | |
| 223 | if (uid_eq(left: pcred->uid, right: cred->euid) || |
| 224 | uid_eq(left: pcred->euid, right: cred->euid)) |
| 225 | return true; |
| 226 | if (ns_capable(ns: pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) |
| 227 | return true; |
| 228 | return false; |
| 229 | } |
| 230 | |
| 231 | /* |
| 232 | * set the priority of a task |
| 233 | * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock |
| 234 | */ |
| 235 | static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) |
| 236 | { |
| 237 | int no_nice; |
| 238 | |
| 239 | if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) { |
| 240 | error = -EPERM; |
| 241 | goto out; |
| 242 | } |
| 243 | if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, nice: niceval)) { |
| 244 | error = -EACCES; |
| 245 | goto out; |
| 246 | } |
| 247 | no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, nice: niceval); |
| 248 | if (no_nice) { |
| 249 | error = no_nice; |
| 250 | goto out; |
| 251 | } |
| 252 | if (error == -ESRCH) |
| 253 | error = 0; |
| 254 | set_user_nice(p, nice: niceval); |
| 255 | out: |
| 256 | return error; |
| 257 | } |
| 258 | |
| 259 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval) |
| 260 | { |
| 261 | struct task_struct *g, *p; |
| 262 | struct user_struct *user; |
| 263 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 264 | int error = -EINVAL; |
| 265 | struct pid *pgrp; |
| 266 | kuid_t uid; |
| 267 | |
| 268 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
| 269 | goto out; |
| 270 | |
| 271 | /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */ |
| 272 | error = -ESRCH; |
| 273 | if (niceval < MIN_NICE) |
| 274 | niceval = MIN_NICE; |
| 275 | if (niceval > MAX_NICE) |
| 276 | niceval = MAX_NICE; |
| 277 | |
| 278 | rcu_read_lock(); |
| 279 | switch (which) { |
| 280 | case PRIO_PROCESS: |
| 281 | if (who) |
| 282 | p = find_task_by_vpid(nr: who); |
| 283 | else |
| 284 | p = current; |
| 285 | if (p) |
| 286 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
| 287 | break; |
| 288 | case PRIO_PGRP: |
| 289 | if (who) |
| 290 | pgrp = find_vpid(nr: who); |
| 291 | else |
| 292 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current); |
| 293 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
| 294 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { |
| 295 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
| 296 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); |
| 297 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
| 298 | break; |
| 299 | case PRIO_USER: |
| 300 | uid = make_kuid(from: cred->user_ns, uid: who); |
| 301 | user = cred->user; |
| 302 | if (!who) |
| 303 | uid = cred->uid; |
| 304 | else if (!uid_eq(left: uid, right: cred->uid)) { |
| 305 | user = find_user(uid); |
| 306 | if (!user) |
| 307 | goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
| 308 | } |
| 309 | for_each_process_thread(g, p) { |
| 310 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), right: uid) && task_pid_vnr(tsk: p)) |
| 311 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
| 312 | } |
| 313 | if (!uid_eq(left: uid, right: cred->uid)) |
| 314 | free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */ |
| 315 | break; |
| 316 | } |
| 317 | out_unlock: |
| 318 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 319 | out: |
| 320 | return error; |
| 321 | } |
| 322 | |
| 323 | /* |
| 324 | * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will |
| 325 | * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that |
| 326 | * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19) |
| 327 | * to stay compatible. |
| 328 | */ |
| 329 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who) |
| 330 | { |
| 331 | struct task_struct *g, *p; |
| 332 | struct user_struct *user; |
| 333 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 334 | long niceval, retval = -ESRCH; |
| 335 | struct pid *pgrp; |
| 336 | kuid_t uid; |
| 337 | |
| 338 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
| 339 | return -EINVAL; |
| 340 | |
| 341 | rcu_read_lock(); |
| 342 | switch (which) { |
| 343 | case PRIO_PROCESS: |
| 344 | if (who) |
| 345 | p = find_task_by_vpid(nr: who); |
| 346 | else |
| 347 | p = current; |
| 348 | if (p) { |
| 349 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(nice: task_nice(p)); |
| 350 | if (niceval > retval) |
| 351 | retval = niceval; |
| 352 | } |
| 353 | break; |
| 354 | case PRIO_PGRP: |
| 355 | if (who) |
| 356 | pgrp = find_vpid(nr: who); |
| 357 | else |
| 358 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current); |
| 359 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
| 360 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { |
| 361 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(nice: task_nice(p)); |
| 362 | if (niceval > retval) |
| 363 | retval = niceval; |
| 364 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); |
| 365 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
| 366 | break; |
| 367 | case PRIO_USER: |
| 368 | uid = make_kuid(from: cred->user_ns, uid: who); |
| 369 | user = cred->user; |
| 370 | if (!who) |
| 371 | uid = cred->uid; |
| 372 | else if (!uid_eq(left: uid, right: cred->uid)) { |
| 373 | user = find_user(uid); |
| 374 | if (!user) |
| 375 | goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
| 376 | } |
| 377 | for_each_process_thread(g, p) { |
| 378 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), right: uid) && task_pid_vnr(tsk: p)) { |
| 379 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(nice: task_nice(p)); |
| 380 | if (niceval > retval) |
| 381 | retval = niceval; |
| 382 | } |
| 383 | } |
| 384 | if (!uid_eq(left: uid, right: cred->uid)) |
| 385 | free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */ |
| 386 | break; |
| 387 | } |
| 388 | out_unlock: |
| 389 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 390 | |
| 391 | return retval; |
| 392 | } |
| 393 | |
| 394 | /* |
| 395 | * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid |
| 396 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style) |
| 397 | * |
| 398 | * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not |
| 399 | * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid. |
| 400 | * |
| 401 | * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its |
| 402 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing |
| 403 | * a security audit over a program. |
| 404 | * |
| 405 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be |
| 406 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be |
| 407 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
| 408 | * |
| 409 | * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem |
| 410 | * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned). |
| 411 | */ |
| 412 | #ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER |
| 413 | long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) |
| 414 | { |
| 415 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
| 416 | const struct cred *old; |
| 417 | struct cred *new; |
| 418 | int retval; |
| 419 | kgid_t krgid, kegid; |
| 420 | |
| 421 | krgid = make_kgid(from: ns, gid: rgid); |
| 422 | kegid = make_kgid(from: ns, gid: egid); |
| 423 | |
| 424 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid: krgid)) |
| 425 | return -EINVAL; |
| 426 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid: kegid)) |
| 427 | return -EINVAL; |
| 428 | |
| 429 | new = prepare_creds(); |
| 430 | if (!new) |
| 431 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 432 | old = current_cred(); |
| 433 | |
| 434 | retval = -EPERM; |
| 435 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { |
| 436 | if (gid_eq(left: old->gid, right: krgid) || |
| 437 | gid_eq(left: old->egid, right: krgid) || |
| 438 | ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
| 439 | new->gid = krgid; |
| 440 | else |
| 441 | goto error; |
| 442 | } |
| 443 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { |
| 444 | if (gid_eq(left: old->gid, right: kegid) || |
| 445 | gid_eq(left: old->egid, right: kegid) || |
| 446 | gid_eq(left: old->sgid, right: kegid) || |
| 447 | ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
| 448 | new->egid = kegid; |
| 449 | else |
| 450 | goto error; |
| 451 | } |
| 452 | |
| 453 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || |
| 454 | (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(left: kegid, right: old->gid))) |
| 455 | new->sgid = new->egid; |
| 456 | new->fsgid = new->egid; |
| 457 | |
| 458 | retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); |
| 459 | if (retval < 0) |
| 460 | goto error; |
| 461 | |
| 462 | return commit_creds(new); |
| 463 | |
| 464 | error: |
| 465 | abort_creds(new); |
| 466 | return retval; |
| 467 | } |
| 468 | |
| 469 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid) |
| 470 | { |
| 471 | return __sys_setregid(rgid, egid); |
| 472 | } |
| 473 | |
| 474 | /* |
| 475 | * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS |
| 476 | * |
| 477 | * SMP: Same implicit races as above. |
| 478 | */ |
| 479 | long __sys_setgid(gid_t gid) |
| 480 | { |
| 481 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
| 482 | const struct cred *old; |
| 483 | struct cred *new; |
| 484 | int retval; |
| 485 | kgid_t kgid; |
| 486 | |
| 487 | kgid = make_kgid(from: ns, gid); |
| 488 | if (!gid_valid(gid: kgid)) |
| 489 | return -EINVAL; |
| 490 | |
| 491 | new = prepare_creds(); |
| 492 | if (!new) |
| 493 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 494 | old = current_cred(); |
| 495 | |
| 496 | retval = -EPERM; |
| 497 | if (ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
| 498 | new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
| 499 | else if (gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->gid) || gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->sgid)) |
| 500 | new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
| 501 | else |
| 502 | goto error; |
| 503 | |
| 504 | retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); |
| 505 | if (retval < 0) |
| 506 | goto error; |
| 507 | |
| 508 | return commit_creds(new); |
| 509 | |
| 510 | error: |
| 511 | abort_creds(new); |
| 512 | return retval; |
| 513 | } |
| 514 | |
| 515 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid) |
| 516 | { |
| 517 | return __sys_setgid(gid); |
| 518 | } |
| 519 | |
| 520 | /* |
| 521 | * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID |
| 522 | */ |
| 523 | static int set_user(struct cred *new) |
| 524 | { |
| 525 | struct user_struct *new_user; |
| 526 | |
| 527 | new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid); |
| 528 | if (!new_user) |
| 529 | return -EAGAIN; |
| 530 | |
| 531 | free_uid(new->user); |
| 532 | new->user = new_user; |
| 533 | return 0; |
| 534 | } |
| 535 | |
| 536 | static void flag_nproc_exceeded(struct cred *new) |
| 537 | { |
| 538 | if (new->ucounts == current_ucounts()) |
| 539 | return; |
| 540 | |
| 541 | /* |
| 542 | * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many |
| 543 | * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming |
| 544 | * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit |
| 545 | * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the |
| 546 | * failure to the execve() stage. |
| 547 | */ |
| 548 | if (is_rlimit_overlimit(ucounts: new->ucounts, type: UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, max: rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) && |
| 549 | new->user != INIT_USER) |
| 550 | current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
| 551 | else |
| 552 | current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
| 553 | } |
| 554 | |
| 555 | /* |
| 556 | * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid |
| 557 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style) |
| 558 | * |
| 559 | * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not |
| 560 | * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid. |
| 561 | * |
| 562 | * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its |
| 563 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing |
| 564 | * a security audit over a program. |
| 565 | * |
| 566 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be |
| 567 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be |
| 568 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
| 569 | */ |
| 570 | long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) |
| 571 | { |
| 572 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
| 573 | const struct cred *old; |
| 574 | struct cred *new; |
| 575 | int retval; |
| 576 | kuid_t kruid, keuid; |
| 577 | |
| 578 | kruid = make_kuid(from: ns, uid: ruid); |
| 579 | keuid = make_kuid(from: ns, uid: euid); |
| 580 | |
| 581 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid: kruid)) |
| 582 | return -EINVAL; |
| 583 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid: keuid)) |
| 584 | return -EINVAL; |
| 585 | |
| 586 | new = prepare_creds(); |
| 587 | if (!new) |
| 588 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 589 | old = current_cred(); |
| 590 | |
| 591 | retval = -EPERM; |
| 592 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
| 593 | new->uid = kruid; |
| 594 | if (!uid_eq(left: old->uid, right: kruid) && |
| 595 | !uid_eq(left: old->euid, right: kruid) && |
| 596 | !ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
| 597 | goto error; |
| 598 | } |
| 599 | |
| 600 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { |
| 601 | new->euid = keuid; |
| 602 | if (!uid_eq(left: old->uid, right: keuid) && |
| 603 | !uid_eq(left: old->euid, right: keuid) && |
| 604 | !uid_eq(left: old->suid, right: keuid) && |
| 605 | !ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
| 606 | goto error; |
| 607 | } |
| 608 | |
| 609 | if (!uid_eq(left: new->uid, right: old->uid)) { |
| 610 | retval = set_user(new); |
| 611 | if (retval < 0) |
| 612 | goto error; |
| 613 | } |
| 614 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || |
| 615 | (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(left: keuid, right: old->uid))) |
| 616 | new->suid = new->euid; |
| 617 | new->fsuid = new->euid; |
| 618 | |
| 619 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); |
| 620 | if (retval < 0) |
| 621 | goto error; |
| 622 | |
| 623 | retval = set_cred_ucounts(new); |
| 624 | if (retval < 0) |
| 625 | goto error; |
| 626 | |
| 627 | flag_nproc_exceeded(new); |
| 628 | return commit_creds(new); |
| 629 | |
| 630 | error: |
| 631 | abort_creds(new); |
| 632 | return retval; |
| 633 | } |
| 634 | |
| 635 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid) |
| 636 | { |
| 637 | return __sys_setreuid(ruid, euid); |
| 638 | } |
| 639 | |
| 640 | /* |
| 641 | * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS |
| 642 | * |
| 643 | * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program |
| 644 | * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal |
| 645 | * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets |
| 646 | * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people |
| 647 | * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid() |
| 648 | * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to |
| 649 | * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid. |
| 650 | */ |
| 651 | long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid) |
| 652 | { |
| 653 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
| 654 | const struct cred *old; |
| 655 | struct cred *new; |
| 656 | int retval; |
| 657 | kuid_t kuid; |
| 658 | |
| 659 | kuid = make_kuid(from: ns, uid); |
| 660 | if (!uid_valid(uid: kuid)) |
| 661 | return -EINVAL; |
| 662 | |
| 663 | new = prepare_creds(); |
| 664 | if (!new) |
| 665 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 666 | old = current_cred(); |
| 667 | |
| 668 | retval = -EPERM; |
| 669 | if (ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
| 670 | new->suid = new->uid = kuid; |
| 671 | if (!uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->uid)) { |
| 672 | retval = set_user(new); |
| 673 | if (retval < 0) |
| 674 | goto error; |
| 675 | } |
| 676 | } else if (!uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->uid) && !uid_eq(left: kuid, right: new->suid)) { |
| 677 | goto error; |
| 678 | } |
| 679 | |
| 680 | new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid; |
| 681 | |
| 682 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); |
| 683 | if (retval < 0) |
| 684 | goto error; |
| 685 | |
| 686 | retval = set_cred_ucounts(new); |
| 687 | if (retval < 0) |
| 688 | goto error; |
| 689 | |
| 690 | flag_nproc_exceeded(new); |
| 691 | return commit_creds(new); |
| 692 | |
| 693 | error: |
| 694 | abort_creds(new); |
| 695 | return retval; |
| 696 | } |
| 697 | |
| 698 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid) |
| 699 | { |
| 700 | return __sys_setuid(uid); |
| 701 | } |
| 702 | |
| 703 | |
| 704 | /* |
| 705 | * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid, |
| 706 | * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid(). |
| 707 | */ |
| 708 | long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) |
| 709 | { |
| 710 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
| 711 | const struct cred *old; |
| 712 | struct cred *new; |
| 713 | int retval; |
| 714 | kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid; |
| 715 | bool ruid_new, euid_new, suid_new; |
| 716 | |
| 717 | kruid = make_kuid(from: ns, uid: ruid); |
| 718 | keuid = make_kuid(from: ns, uid: euid); |
| 719 | ksuid = make_kuid(from: ns, uid: suid); |
| 720 | |
| 721 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid: kruid)) |
| 722 | return -EINVAL; |
| 723 | |
| 724 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid: keuid)) |
| 725 | return -EINVAL; |
| 726 | |
| 727 | if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid: ksuid)) |
| 728 | return -EINVAL; |
| 729 | |
| 730 | old = current_cred(); |
| 731 | |
| 732 | /* check for no-op */ |
| 733 | if ((ruid == (uid_t) -1 || uid_eq(left: kruid, right: old->uid)) && |
| 734 | (euid == (uid_t) -1 || (uid_eq(left: keuid, right: old->euid) && |
| 735 | uid_eq(left: keuid, right: old->fsuid))) && |
| 736 | (suid == (uid_t) -1 || uid_eq(left: ksuid, right: old->suid))) |
| 737 | return 0; |
| 738 | |
| 739 | ruid_new = ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(left: kruid, right: old->uid) && |
| 740 | !uid_eq(left: kruid, right: old->euid) && !uid_eq(left: kruid, right: old->suid); |
| 741 | euid_new = euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(left: keuid, right: old->uid) && |
| 742 | !uid_eq(left: keuid, right: old->euid) && !uid_eq(left: keuid, right: old->suid); |
| 743 | suid_new = suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(left: ksuid, right: old->uid) && |
| 744 | !uid_eq(left: ksuid, right: old->euid) && !uid_eq(left: ksuid, right: old->suid); |
| 745 | if ((ruid_new || euid_new || suid_new) && |
| 746 | !ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
| 747 | return -EPERM; |
| 748 | |
| 749 | new = prepare_creds(); |
| 750 | if (!new) |
| 751 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 752 | |
| 753 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
| 754 | new->uid = kruid; |
| 755 | if (!uid_eq(left: kruid, right: old->uid)) { |
| 756 | retval = set_user(new); |
| 757 | if (retval < 0) |
| 758 | goto error; |
| 759 | } |
| 760 | } |
| 761 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) |
| 762 | new->euid = keuid; |
| 763 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1) |
| 764 | new->suid = ksuid; |
| 765 | new->fsuid = new->euid; |
| 766 | |
| 767 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); |
| 768 | if (retval < 0) |
| 769 | goto error; |
| 770 | |
| 771 | retval = set_cred_ucounts(new); |
| 772 | if (retval < 0) |
| 773 | goto error; |
| 774 | |
| 775 | flag_nproc_exceeded(new); |
| 776 | return commit_creds(new); |
| 777 | |
| 778 | error: |
| 779 | abort_creds(new); |
| 780 | return retval; |
| 781 | } |
| 782 | |
| 783 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid) |
| 784 | { |
| 785 | return __sys_setresuid(ruid, euid, suid); |
| 786 | } |
| 787 | |
| 788 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp) |
| 789 | { |
| 790 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 791 | int retval; |
| 792 | uid_t ruid, euid, suid; |
| 793 | |
| 794 | ruid = from_kuid_munged(to: cred->user_ns, uid: cred->uid); |
| 795 | euid = from_kuid_munged(to: cred->user_ns, uid: cred->euid); |
| 796 | suid = from_kuid_munged(to: cred->user_ns, uid: cred->suid); |
| 797 | |
| 798 | retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp); |
| 799 | if (!retval) { |
| 800 | retval = put_user(euid, euidp); |
| 801 | if (!retval) |
| 802 | return put_user(suid, suidp); |
| 803 | } |
| 804 | return retval; |
| 805 | } |
| 806 | |
| 807 | /* |
| 808 | * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid. |
| 809 | */ |
| 810 | long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) |
| 811 | { |
| 812 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
| 813 | const struct cred *old; |
| 814 | struct cred *new; |
| 815 | int retval; |
| 816 | kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid; |
| 817 | bool rgid_new, egid_new, sgid_new; |
| 818 | |
| 819 | krgid = make_kgid(from: ns, gid: rgid); |
| 820 | kegid = make_kgid(from: ns, gid: egid); |
| 821 | ksgid = make_kgid(from: ns, gid: sgid); |
| 822 | |
| 823 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid: krgid)) |
| 824 | return -EINVAL; |
| 825 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid: kegid)) |
| 826 | return -EINVAL; |
| 827 | if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid: ksgid)) |
| 828 | return -EINVAL; |
| 829 | |
| 830 | old = current_cred(); |
| 831 | |
| 832 | /* check for no-op */ |
| 833 | if ((rgid == (gid_t) -1 || gid_eq(left: krgid, right: old->gid)) && |
| 834 | (egid == (gid_t) -1 || (gid_eq(left: kegid, right: old->egid) && |
| 835 | gid_eq(left: kegid, right: old->fsgid))) && |
| 836 | (sgid == (gid_t) -1 || gid_eq(left: ksgid, right: old->sgid))) |
| 837 | return 0; |
| 838 | |
| 839 | rgid_new = rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(left: krgid, right: old->gid) && |
| 840 | !gid_eq(left: krgid, right: old->egid) && !gid_eq(left: krgid, right: old->sgid); |
| 841 | egid_new = egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(left: kegid, right: old->gid) && |
| 842 | !gid_eq(left: kegid, right: old->egid) && !gid_eq(left: kegid, right: old->sgid); |
| 843 | sgid_new = sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(left: ksgid, right: old->gid) && |
| 844 | !gid_eq(left: ksgid, right: old->egid) && !gid_eq(left: ksgid, right: old->sgid); |
| 845 | if ((rgid_new || egid_new || sgid_new) && |
| 846 | !ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
| 847 | return -EPERM; |
| 848 | |
| 849 | new = prepare_creds(); |
| 850 | if (!new) |
| 851 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 852 | |
| 853 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) |
| 854 | new->gid = krgid; |
| 855 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) |
| 856 | new->egid = kegid; |
| 857 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) |
| 858 | new->sgid = ksgid; |
| 859 | new->fsgid = new->egid; |
| 860 | |
| 861 | retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); |
| 862 | if (retval < 0) |
| 863 | goto error; |
| 864 | |
| 865 | return commit_creds(new); |
| 866 | |
| 867 | error: |
| 868 | abort_creds(new); |
| 869 | return retval; |
| 870 | } |
| 871 | |
| 872 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid) |
| 873 | { |
| 874 | return __sys_setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid); |
| 875 | } |
| 876 | |
| 877 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp) |
| 878 | { |
| 879 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 880 | int retval; |
| 881 | gid_t rgid, egid, sgid; |
| 882 | |
| 883 | rgid = from_kgid_munged(to: cred->user_ns, gid: cred->gid); |
| 884 | egid = from_kgid_munged(to: cred->user_ns, gid: cred->egid); |
| 885 | sgid = from_kgid_munged(to: cred->user_ns, gid: cred->sgid); |
| 886 | |
| 887 | retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp); |
| 888 | if (!retval) { |
| 889 | retval = put_user(egid, egidp); |
| 890 | if (!retval) |
| 891 | retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp); |
| 892 | } |
| 893 | |
| 894 | return retval; |
| 895 | } |
| 896 | |
| 897 | |
| 898 | /* |
| 899 | * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This |
| 900 | * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at |
| 901 | * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when |
| 902 | * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access.. |
| 903 | */ |
| 904 | long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid) |
| 905 | { |
| 906 | const struct cred *old; |
| 907 | struct cred *new; |
| 908 | uid_t old_fsuid; |
| 909 | kuid_t kuid; |
| 910 | |
| 911 | old = current_cred(); |
| 912 | old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(to: old->user_ns, uid: old->fsuid); |
| 913 | |
| 914 | kuid = make_kuid(from: old->user_ns, uid); |
| 915 | if (!uid_valid(uid: kuid)) |
| 916 | return old_fsuid; |
| 917 | |
| 918 | new = prepare_creds(); |
| 919 | if (!new) |
| 920 | return old_fsuid; |
| 921 | |
| 922 | if (uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->uid) || uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->euid) || |
| 923 | uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->suid) || uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->fsuid) || |
| 924 | ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
| 925 | if (!uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->fsuid)) { |
| 926 | new->fsuid = kuid; |
| 927 | if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) |
| 928 | goto change_okay; |
| 929 | } |
| 930 | } |
| 931 | |
| 932 | abort_creds(new); |
| 933 | return old_fsuid; |
| 934 | |
| 935 | change_okay: |
| 936 | commit_creds(new); |
| 937 | return old_fsuid; |
| 938 | } |
| 939 | |
| 940 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid) |
| 941 | { |
| 942 | return __sys_setfsuid(uid); |
| 943 | } |
| 944 | |
| 945 | /* |
| 946 | * Samma på svenska.. |
| 947 | */ |
| 948 | long __sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid) |
| 949 | { |
| 950 | const struct cred *old; |
| 951 | struct cred *new; |
| 952 | gid_t old_fsgid; |
| 953 | kgid_t kgid; |
| 954 | |
| 955 | old = current_cred(); |
| 956 | old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(to: old->user_ns, gid: old->fsgid); |
| 957 | |
| 958 | kgid = make_kgid(from: old->user_ns, gid); |
| 959 | if (!gid_valid(gid: kgid)) |
| 960 | return old_fsgid; |
| 961 | |
| 962 | new = prepare_creds(); |
| 963 | if (!new) |
| 964 | return old_fsgid; |
| 965 | |
| 966 | if (gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->gid) || gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->egid) || |
| 967 | gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->sgid) || gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->fsgid) || |
| 968 | ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { |
| 969 | if (!gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->fsgid)) { |
| 970 | new->fsgid = kgid; |
| 971 | if (security_task_fix_setgid(new,old,LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) |
| 972 | goto change_okay; |
| 973 | } |
| 974 | } |
| 975 | |
| 976 | abort_creds(new); |
| 977 | return old_fsgid; |
| 978 | |
| 979 | change_okay: |
| 980 | commit_creds(new); |
| 981 | return old_fsgid; |
| 982 | } |
| 983 | |
| 984 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid) |
| 985 | { |
| 986 | return __sys_setfsgid(gid); |
| 987 | } |
| 988 | #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ |
| 989 | |
| 990 | /** |
| 991 | * sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process |
| 992 | * |
| 993 | * Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and |
| 994 | * the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in |
| 995 | * which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group. |
| 996 | * |
| 997 | * This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change. |
| 998 | */ |
| 999 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid) |
| 1000 | { |
| 1001 | return task_tgid_vnr(current); |
| 1002 | } |
| 1003 | |
| 1004 | /* Thread ID - the internal kernel "pid" */ |
| 1005 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid) |
| 1006 | { |
| 1007 | return task_pid_vnr(current); |
| 1008 | } |
| 1009 | |
| 1010 | /* |
| 1011 | * Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could |
| 1012 | * change from under us. However, we can use a stale |
| 1013 | * value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see |
| 1014 | * release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct). |
| 1015 | */ |
| 1016 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid) |
| 1017 | { |
| 1018 | int pid; |
| 1019 | |
| 1020 | rcu_read_lock(); |
| 1021 | pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent)); |
| 1022 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 1023 | |
| 1024 | return pid; |
| 1025 | } |
| 1026 | |
| 1027 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid) |
| 1028 | { |
| 1029 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
| 1030 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()); |
| 1031 | } |
| 1032 | |
| 1033 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid) |
| 1034 | { |
| 1035 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
| 1036 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid()); |
| 1037 | } |
| 1038 | |
| 1039 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid) |
| 1040 | { |
| 1041 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
| 1042 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid()); |
| 1043 | } |
| 1044 | |
| 1045 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid) |
| 1046 | { |
| 1047 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
| 1048 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid()); |
| 1049 | } |
| 1050 | |
| 1051 | static void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms) |
| 1052 | { |
| 1053 | u64 tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime; |
| 1054 | |
| 1055 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, ut: &tgutime, st: &tgstime); |
| 1056 | cutime = current->signal->cutime; |
| 1057 | cstime = current->signal->cstime; |
| 1058 | tms->tms_utime = nsec_to_clock_t(x: tgutime); |
| 1059 | tms->tms_stime = nsec_to_clock_t(x: tgstime); |
| 1060 | tms->tms_cutime = nsec_to_clock_t(x: cutime); |
| 1061 | tms->tms_cstime = nsec_to_clock_t(x: cstime); |
| 1062 | } |
| 1063 | |
| 1064 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf) |
| 1065 | { |
| 1066 | if (tbuf) { |
| 1067 | struct tms tmp; |
| 1068 | |
| 1069 | do_sys_times(tms: &tmp); |
| 1070 | if (copy_to_user(to: tbuf, from: &tmp, n: sizeof(struct tms))) |
| 1071 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1072 | } |
| 1073 | force_successful_syscall_return(); |
| 1074 | return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(x: get_jiffies_64()); |
| 1075 | } |
| 1076 | |
| 1077 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
| 1078 | static compat_clock_t clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(clock_t x) |
| 1079 | { |
| 1080 | return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(clock_t_to_jiffies(x)); |
| 1081 | } |
| 1082 | |
| 1083 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct compat_tms __user *, tbuf) |
| 1084 | { |
| 1085 | if (tbuf) { |
| 1086 | struct tms tms; |
| 1087 | struct compat_tms tmp; |
| 1088 | |
| 1089 | do_sys_times(tms: &tms); |
| 1090 | /* Convert our struct tms to the compat version. */ |
| 1091 | tmp.tms_utime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(x: tms.tms_utime); |
| 1092 | tmp.tms_stime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(x: tms.tms_stime); |
| 1093 | tmp.tms_cutime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(x: tms.tms_cutime); |
| 1094 | tmp.tms_cstime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(x: tms.tms_cstime); |
| 1095 | if (copy_to_user(to: tbuf, from: &tmp, n: sizeof(tmp))) |
| 1096 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1097 | } |
| 1098 | force_successful_syscall_return(); |
| 1099 | return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(jiffies); |
| 1100 | } |
| 1101 | #endif |
| 1102 | |
| 1103 | /* |
| 1104 | * This needs some heavy checking ... |
| 1105 | * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully |
| 1106 | * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it. |
| 1107 | * |
| 1108 | * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really |
| 1109 | * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user |
| 1110 | * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91 |
| 1111 | * |
| 1112 | * !PF_FORKNOEXEC check to conform completely to POSIX. |
| 1113 | */ |
| 1114 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid) |
| 1115 | { |
| 1116 | struct task_struct *p; |
| 1117 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
| 1118 | struct pid *pids[PIDTYPE_MAX] = { 0 }; |
| 1119 | struct pid *pgrp; |
| 1120 | int err; |
| 1121 | |
| 1122 | if (!pid) |
| 1123 | pid = task_pid_vnr(tsk: group_leader); |
| 1124 | if (!pgid) |
| 1125 | pgid = pid; |
| 1126 | if (pgid < 0) |
| 1127 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1128 | rcu_read_lock(); |
| 1129 | |
| 1130 | /* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock |
| 1131 | * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM |
| 1132 | */ |
| 1133 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
| 1134 | |
| 1135 | err = -ESRCH; |
| 1136 | p = find_task_by_vpid(nr: pid); |
| 1137 | if (!p) |
| 1138 | goto out; |
| 1139 | |
| 1140 | err = -EINVAL; |
| 1141 | if (!thread_group_leader(p)) |
| 1142 | goto out; |
| 1143 | |
| 1144 | if (same_thread_group(p1: p->real_parent, p2: group_leader)) { |
| 1145 | err = -EPERM; |
| 1146 | if (task_session(task: p) != task_session(task: group_leader)) |
| 1147 | goto out; |
| 1148 | err = -EACCES; |
| 1149 | if (!(p->flags & PF_FORKNOEXEC)) |
| 1150 | goto out; |
| 1151 | } else { |
| 1152 | err = -ESRCH; |
| 1153 | if (p != group_leader) |
| 1154 | goto out; |
| 1155 | } |
| 1156 | |
| 1157 | err = -EPERM; |
| 1158 | if (p->signal->leader) |
| 1159 | goto out; |
| 1160 | |
| 1161 | pgrp = task_pid(task: p); |
| 1162 | if (pgid != pid) { |
| 1163 | struct task_struct *g; |
| 1164 | |
| 1165 | pgrp = find_vpid(nr: pgid); |
| 1166 | g = pid_task(pid: pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID); |
| 1167 | if (!g || task_session(task: g) != task_session(task: group_leader)) |
| 1168 | goto out; |
| 1169 | } |
| 1170 | |
| 1171 | err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid); |
| 1172 | if (err) |
| 1173 | goto out; |
| 1174 | |
| 1175 | if (task_pgrp(task: p) != pgrp) |
| 1176 | change_pid(pids, task: p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid: pgrp); |
| 1177 | |
| 1178 | err = 0; |
| 1179 | out: |
| 1180 | /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */ |
| 1181 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
| 1182 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 1183 | free_pids(pids); |
| 1184 | return err; |
| 1185 | } |
| 1186 | |
| 1187 | static int do_getpgid(pid_t pid) |
| 1188 | { |
| 1189 | struct task_struct *p; |
| 1190 | struct pid *grp; |
| 1191 | int retval; |
| 1192 | |
| 1193 | rcu_read_lock(); |
| 1194 | if (!pid) |
| 1195 | grp = task_pgrp(current); |
| 1196 | else { |
| 1197 | retval = -ESRCH; |
| 1198 | p = find_task_by_vpid(nr: pid); |
| 1199 | if (!p) |
| 1200 | goto out; |
| 1201 | grp = task_pgrp(task: p); |
| 1202 | if (!grp) |
| 1203 | goto out; |
| 1204 | |
| 1205 | retval = security_task_getpgid(p); |
| 1206 | if (retval) |
| 1207 | goto out; |
| 1208 | } |
| 1209 | retval = pid_vnr(pid: grp); |
| 1210 | out: |
| 1211 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 1212 | return retval; |
| 1213 | } |
| 1214 | |
| 1215 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid) |
| 1216 | { |
| 1217 | return do_getpgid(pid); |
| 1218 | } |
| 1219 | |
| 1220 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP |
| 1221 | |
| 1222 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp) |
| 1223 | { |
| 1224 | return do_getpgid(pid: 0); |
| 1225 | } |
| 1226 | |
| 1227 | #endif |
| 1228 | |
| 1229 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid) |
| 1230 | { |
| 1231 | struct task_struct *p; |
| 1232 | struct pid *sid; |
| 1233 | int retval; |
| 1234 | |
| 1235 | rcu_read_lock(); |
| 1236 | if (!pid) |
| 1237 | sid = task_session(current); |
| 1238 | else { |
| 1239 | retval = -ESRCH; |
| 1240 | p = find_task_by_vpid(nr: pid); |
| 1241 | if (!p) |
| 1242 | goto out; |
| 1243 | sid = task_session(task: p); |
| 1244 | if (!sid) |
| 1245 | goto out; |
| 1246 | |
| 1247 | retval = security_task_getsid(p); |
| 1248 | if (retval) |
| 1249 | goto out; |
| 1250 | } |
| 1251 | retval = pid_vnr(pid: sid); |
| 1252 | out: |
| 1253 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 1254 | return retval; |
| 1255 | } |
| 1256 | |
| 1257 | static void set_special_pids(struct pid **pids, struct pid *pid) |
| 1258 | { |
| 1259 | struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader; |
| 1260 | |
| 1261 | if (task_session(task: curr) != pid) |
| 1262 | change_pid(pids, task: curr, PIDTYPE_SID, pid); |
| 1263 | |
| 1264 | if (task_pgrp(task: curr) != pid) |
| 1265 | change_pid(pids, task: curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid); |
| 1266 | } |
| 1267 | |
| 1268 | int ksys_setsid(void) |
| 1269 | { |
| 1270 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
| 1271 | struct pid *sid = task_pid(task: group_leader); |
| 1272 | struct pid *pids[PIDTYPE_MAX] = { 0 }; |
| 1273 | pid_t session = pid_vnr(pid: sid); |
| 1274 | int err = -EPERM; |
| 1275 | |
| 1276 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
| 1277 | /* Fail if I am already a session leader */ |
| 1278 | if (group_leader->signal->leader) |
| 1279 | goto out; |
| 1280 | |
| 1281 | /* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the |
| 1282 | * proposed session id. |
| 1283 | */ |
| 1284 | if (pid_task(pid: sid, PIDTYPE_PGID)) |
| 1285 | goto out; |
| 1286 | |
| 1287 | group_leader->signal->leader = 1; |
| 1288 | set_special_pids(pids, pid: sid); |
| 1289 | |
| 1290 | proc_clear_tty(p: group_leader); |
| 1291 | |
| 1292 | err = session; |
| 1293 | out: |
| 1294 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
| 1295 | free_pids(pids); |
| 1296 | if (err > 0) { |
| 1297 | proc_sid_connector(task: group_leader); |
| 1298 | sched_autogroup_create_attach(p: group_leader); |
| 1299 | } |
| 1300 | return err; |
| 1301 | } |
| 1302 | |
| 1303 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid) |
| 1304 | { |
| 1305 | return ksys_setsid(); |
| 1306 | } |
| 1307 | |
| 1308 | DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem); |
| 1309 | |
| 1310 | #ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE |
| 1311 | #define override_architecture(name) \ |
| 1312 | (personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \ |
| 1313 | copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \ |
| 1314 | sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE))) |
| 1315 | #else |
| 1316 | #define override_architecture(name) 0 |
| 1317 | #endif |
| 1318 | |
| 1319 | /* |
| 1320 | * Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0". |
| 1321 | * Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40 |
| 1322 | * And we map 4.x and later versions to 2.6.60+x, so 4.0/5.0/6.0/... would be |
| 1323 | * 2.6.60. |
| 1324 | */ |
| 1325 | static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len) |
| 1326 | { |
| 1327 | int ret = 0; |
| 1328 | |
| 1329 | if (current->personality & UNAME26) { |
| 1330 | const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE; |
| 1331 | char buf[65] = { 0 }; |
| 1332 | int ndots = 0; |
| 1333 | unsigned v; |
| 1334 | size_t copy; |
| 1335 | |
| 1336 | while (*rest) { |
| 1337 | if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3) |
| 1338 | break; |
| 1339 | if (!isdigit(c: *rest) && *rest != '.') |
| 1340 | break; |
| 1341 | rest++; |
| 1342 | } |
| 1343 | v = LINUX_VERSION_PATCHLEVEL + 60; |
| 1344 | copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf)); |
| 1345 | copy = scnprintf(buf, size: copy, fmt: "2.6.%u%s" , v, rest); |
| 1346 | ret = copy_to_user(to: release, from: buf, n: copy + 1); |
| 1347 | } |
| 1348 | return ret; |
| 1349 | } |
| 1350 | |
| 1351 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name) |
| 1352 | { |
| 1353 | struct new_utsname tmp; |
| 1354 | |
| 1355 | down_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
| 1356 | memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp)); |
| 1357 | up_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
| 1358 | if (copy_to_user(to: name, from: &tmp, n: sizeof(tmp))) |
| 1359 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1360 | |
| 1361 | if (override_release(release: name->release, len: sizeof(name->release))) |
| 1362 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1363 | if (override_architecture(name)) |
| 1364 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1365 | return 0; |
| 1366 | } |
| 1367 | |
| 1368 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME |
| 1369 | /* |
| 1370 | * Old cruft |
| 1371 | */ |
| 1372 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name) |
| 1373 | { |
| 1374 | struct old_utsname tmp; |
| 1375 | |
| 1376 | if (!name) |
| 1377 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1378 | |
| 1379 | down_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
| 1380 | memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp)); |
| 1381 | up_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
| 1382 | if (copy_to_user(to: name, from: &tmp, n: sizeof(tmp))) |
| 1383 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1384 | |
| 1385 | if (override_release(release: name->release, len: sizeof(name->release))) |
| 1386 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1387 | if (override_architecture(name)) |
| 1388 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1389 | return 0; |
| 1390 | } |
| 1391 | |
| 1392 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name) |
| 1393 | { |
| 1394 | struct oldold_utsname tmp; |
| 1395 | |
| 1396 | if (!name) |
| 1397 | return -EFAULT; |
| 1398 | |
| 1399 | memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); |
| 1400 | |
| 1401 | down_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
| 1402 | memcpy(&tmp.sysname, &utsname()->sysname, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
| 1403 | memcpy(&tmp.nodename, &utsname()->nodename, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
| 1404 | memcpy(&tmp.release, &utsname()->release, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
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