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GeezerVison is showing datatracker.ietf.org — RFC 7616: HTTP Digest Access Authentication Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Shekh-Yusef, Ed. Request for Comments: 7616 Avaya Obsoletes: 2617 D. Ahrens Category: Standards Track Independent ISSN: 2070-1721 S. Bremer Netzkonform September 2015 RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. Shekh-Yusef, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Syntax Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. ABNF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Digest Access Authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. Overall Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Representation of Digest Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field . . . . . . . 5 3.4. The Authorization Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.4.1. Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.4.2. A1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.4.3. A2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.4.4. Username Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.4.5. Parameter Values and Quoted-String . . . . . . . . . 12 3.4.6. Various Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.5. The Authentication-Info and Proxy-Authentication-Info Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.6. Digest Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.7. Security Protocol Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.8. Proxy-Authenticate and Proxy-Authorization . . . . . . . 17 3.9. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.9.1. Example with SHA-256 and MD5 . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.9.2. Example with SHA-512-256, Charset, and Userhash . . . 19 4. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.1. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.2. Storing Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.3. Authentication of Clients Using Digest Authentication . . 22 5.4. Limited-Use Nonce Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.5. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.6. Weakness Created by Multiple Authentication Schemes . . . 24 5.7. Online Dictionary Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.8. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.9. Chosen Plaintext Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.10. Precomputed Dictionary Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.11. Batch Brute-Force Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.12. Parameter Randomness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.13. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.1. Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Authentication . . . . . 27 6.2. Digest Scheme Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Appendix A. Changes from RFC 2617 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Shekh-Yusef, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 example is "[email protected]". (See Section 2.2 of [RFC7235] for more details.) domain A quoted, space-separated list of URIs, as specified in [RFC3986], that define the protection space. If a URI is a path-absolute, it is relative to the canonical root URL. (See Section 2.2 of [RFC7235].) An absolute-URI in this list may refer to a different server than the web-origin [RFC6454]. The client can use this list to determine the set of URIs for which the same authentication information may be sent: any URI that has a URI in this list as a prefix (after both have been made absolute) MAY be assumed to be in the same protection space. If this parameter is omitted or its value is empty, the client SHOULD assume that the protection space consists of all URIs on the web-origin. This parameter is not meaningful in Proxy-Authenticate header fields, for which the protection space is always the entire proxy; if present, it MUST be ignored. nonce A server-specified string which should be uniquely generated each time a 401 response is made. It is advised that this string be Base64 or hexadecimal data. Specifically, since the string is passed in the header field lines as a quoted string, the double- quote character is not allowed, unless suitably escaped. The contents of the nonce are implementation dependent. The quality of the implementation depends on a good choice. A nonce might, for example, be constructed as the Base64 encoding of timestamp H(timestamp ":" ETag ":" secret-data) where timestamp is a server-generated time, which preferably includes micro- or nanoseconds, or other non-repeating values; ETag is the value of the HTTP ETag header field associated with the requested entity; and secret-data is data known only to the server. With a nonce of this form, a server would recalculate the hash portion after receiving the client authentication header field and reject the request if it did not match the nonce from that header field or if the timestamp value is not recent enough. In this way, the server can limit the time of the nonce's validity. The inclusion of the ETag prevents a replay request for an updated version of the resource. Including the IP address of the client in the nonce would appear to offer the server the ability to limit the reuse of the nonce to the same client that Shekh-Yusef, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 originally got it. However, that would break because requests from a single user often go through different proxies. Also, IP address spoofing is not that hard. An implementation might choose not to accept a previously used nonce or a previously used digest, in order to protect against a replay attack. Or, an implementation might choose to use one-time nonces or digests for POST or PUT requests and a timestamp for GET requests. For more details on the issues involved, see Section 5 of this document. The nonce is opaque to the client. opaque A string of data, specified by the server, that SHOULD be returned by the client unchanged in the Authorization header field of subsequent requests with URIs in the same protection space. It is RECOMMENDED that this string be Base64 or hexadecimal data. stale A case-insensitive flag indicating that the previous request from the client was rejected because the nonce value was stale. If stale is true, the client may wish to simply retry the request with a new encrypted response, without re-prompting the user for a new username and password. The server SHOULD only set stale to true if it receives a request for which the nonce is invalid. If stale is false, or anything other than true, or the stale parameter is not present, the username and/or password are invalid, and new values MUST be obtained. algorithm A string indicating an algorithm used to produce the digest and an unkeyed digest. If this is not present, it is assumed to be "MD5". If the algorithm is not understood, the challenge SHOULD be ignored (and a different one used, if there is more than one). When used with the Digest mechanism, each one of the algorithms has two variants: Session variant and non-Session variant. The non-Session variant is denoted by "<algorithm>", e.g., "SHA-256", and the Session variant is denoted by "<algorithm>-sess", e.g., "SHA-256-sess". In this document, the string obtained by applying the digest algorithm to the data "data" with secret "secret" will be denoted by KD(secret, data), and the string obtained by applying the Shekh-Yusef, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 unkeyed digest algorithm to the data "data" will be denoted H(data). KD stands for Keyed Digest, and the notation unq(X) means the value of the quoted-string X without the surrounding quotes and with quoting slashes removed. For "<algorithm>" and "<algorithm>-sess" H(data) = <algorithm>(data) and KD(secret, data) = H(concat(secret, ":", data)) For example: For the "SHA-256" and "SHA-256-sess" algorithms H(data) = SHA-256(data) i.e., the digest is the "<algorithm>" of the secret concatenated with a colon concatenated with the data. The "<algorithm>-sess" is intended to allow efficient third-party authentication servers; for the difference in usage, see the description in Section 3.4.2. qop This parameter MUST be used by all implementations. It is a quoted string of one or more tokens indicating the "quality of protection" values supported by the server. The value "auth" indicates authentication; the value "auth-int" indicates authentication with integrity protection. See the descriptions below for calculating the response parameter value for the application of this choice. Unrecognized options MUST be ignored. charset This is an OPTIONAL parameter that is used by the server to indicate the encoding scheme it supports. The only allowed value is "UTF-8". userhash This is an OPTIONAL parameter that is used by the server to indicate that it supports username hashing. Valid values are: "true" or "false". Default value is "false". Shekh-Yusef, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted string syntax values for the following parameters: realm, domain, nonce, opaque, and qop. For historical reasons, a sender MUST NOT generate the quoted string syntax values for the following parameters: stale and algorithm. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 qop Indicates what "quality of protection" the client has applied to the message. Its value MUST be one of the alternatives the server indicated it supports in the WWW-Authenticate header field. These values affect the computation of the response. Note that this is a single token, not a quoted list of alternatives as in WWW- Authenticate. cnonce This parameter MUST be used by all implementations. The cnonce value is an opaque quoted ASCII-only string value provided by the client and used by both client and server to avoid chosen plaintext attacks, to provide mutual authentication, and to provide some message integrity protection. See the descriptions below of the calculation of the rspauth and response values. nc This parameter MUST be used by all implementations. The nc parameter stands for "nonce count". The nc value is the hexadecimal count of the number of requests (including the current request) that the client has sent with the nonce value in this request. For example, in the first request sent in response to a given nonce value, the client sends "nc=00000001". The purpose of this parameter is to allow the server to detect request replays by maintaining its own copy of this count -- if the same nc value is seen twice, then the request is a replay. See the description below of the construction of the response value. userhash This OPTIONAL parameter is used by the client to indicate that the username has been hashed. Valid values are: "true" or "false". Default value is "false". For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted string syntax for the following parameters: username, realm, nonce, uri, response, cnonce, and opaque. For historical reasons, a sender MUST NOT generate the quoted string syntax for the following parameters: algorithm, qop, and nc. If a parameter or its value is improper, or required parameters are missing, the proper response is a 4xx error code. If the response is invalid, then a login failure SHOULD be logged, since repeated login failures from a single client may indicate an attacker attempting to Shekh-Yusef, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 guess passwords. The server implementation SHOULD be careful with the information being logged so that it won't put a cleartext password (e.g., entered into the username field) into the log. The definition of the response above indicates the encoding for its value. The following definitions show how the value is computed. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 be used in conjunction with a third-party authentication service so that the web server would not need the actual password value. The specification of such a protocol is beyond the scope of this specification. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 No white space is allowed in any of the strings to which the digest function H() is applied, unless that white space exists in the quoted strings or entity body whose contents make up the string to be digested. For example, the string A1 illustrated above must be Mufasa:[email protected]:Circle Of Life with no white space on either side of the colons, but with the white space between the words used in the password value. Likewise, the other strings digested by H() must not have white space on either side of the colons that delimit their fields, unless that white space was in the quoted strings or entity body being digested. Also, note that if integrity protection is applied (qop=auth-int), the H(entity-body) is the hash of the entity body, not the message body -- it is computed before any transfer encoding is applied by the sender and after it has been removed by the recipient. Note that this includes multipart boundaries and embedded header fields in each part of any multipart content-type. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 rspauth The optional response digest in the rspauth parameter supports mutual authentication -- the server proves that it knows the user's secret, and with qop=auth-int also provides limited integrity protection of the response. The rspauth value is calculated as for the response in the Authorization header field, except that if qop is set to "auth" or is not specified in the Authorization header field for the request, A2 is A2 = ":" request-uri and if "qop=auth-int", then A2 is A2 = ":" request-uri ":" H(entity-body) cnonce and nc The cnonce value and nc value MUST be the ones for the client request to which this message is the response. The rspauth, cnonce, and nc parameters MUST be present if "qop=auth" or "qop=auth-int" is specified. The Authentication-Info header field is allowed in the trailer of an HTTP message transferred via chunked transfer coding. For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted string syntax for the following parameters: nextnonce, rspauth, and cnonce. For historical reasons, a sender MUST NOT generate the quoted string syntax for the following parameters: qop and nc. For historical reasons, the nc value MUST be exactly 8 hexadecimal digits. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 The client response to a WWW-Authenticate challenge for a protection space starts an authentication session with that protection space. The authentication session lasts until the client receives another WWW-Authenticate challenge from any server in the protection space. A client SHOULD remember the username, password, nonce, nonce count, and opaque values associated with an authentication session to use to construct the Authorization header field in future requests within that protection space. The Authorization header field MAY be included preemptively; doing so improves server efficiency and avoids extra round trips for authentication challenges. The server MAY choose to accept the old Authorization header field information, even though the nonce value included might not be fresh. Alternatively, the server MAY return a 401 response with a new nonce value in the WWW-Authenticate header field, causing the client to retry the request; by specifying "stale=true" with this response, the server tells the client to retry with the new nonce, but without prompting for a new username and password. Because the client is required to return the value of the opaque parameter given to it by the server for the duration of a session, the opaque data can be used to transport authentication session state information. (Note that any such use can also be accomplished more easily and safely by including the state in the nonce.) For example, a server could be responsible for authenticating content that actually sits on another server. It would achieve this by having the first 401 response include a domain parameter whose value includes a URI on the second server, and an opaque parameter whose value contains the state information. The client will retry the request, at which time the server might respond with "HTTP Redirection" (Section 6.4 of [RFC7231]), pointing to the URI on the second server. The client will follow the redirection and pass an Authorization header field, including the <opaque> data. Proxies MUST be completely transparent in the Digest access authentication scheme. That is, they MUST forward the WWW- Authenticate, Authentication-Info, and Authorization header fields untouched. If a proxy wants to authenticate a client before a request is forwarded to the server, it can be done using the Proxy- Authenticate and Proxy-Authorization header fields described in Section 3.8 below. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 client supports it. A client is encouraged to fail gracefully if the server specifies only authentication schemes it cannot handle. When a server receives a request to access a resource, the server might challenge the client by responding with "401 Unauthorized" response and include one or more WWW-Authenticate header fields. If the server responds with multiple challenges, then each one of these challenges MUST use a different digest algorithm. The server MUST add these challenges to the response in order of preference, starting with the most preferred algorithm, followed by the less preferred algorithm. This specification defines the following algorithms: o SHA2-256 (mandatory to implement) o SHA2-512/256 (as a backup algorithm) o MD5 (for backward compatibility). When the client receives the first challenge, it SHOULD use the first challenge it supports, unless a local policy dictates otherwise. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 Note that, in principle, a client could be asked to authenticate itself to both a proxy and an end-server, but never in the same response. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 If the client chooses to use the SHA-256 algorithm for calculating the response, the client responds with a new request including the following Authorization header field: Authorization: Digest username="Mufasa", realm="[email protected]", uri="/dir/index.html", algorithm=SHA-256, nonce="7ypf/xlj9XXwfDPEoM4URrv/xwf94BcCAzFZH4GiTo0v", nc=00000001, cnonce="f2/wE4q74E6zIJEtWaHKaf5wv/H5QzzpXusqGemxURZJ", qop=auth, response="753927fa0e85d155564e2e272a28d1802ca10daf449 6794697cf8db5856cb6c1", opaque="FQhe/qaU925kfnzjCev0ciny7QMkPqMAFRtzCUYo5tdS" RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 The client can prompt the user for the required credentials and send a new request with following Authorization header field: Authorization: Digest username="488869477bf257147b804c45308cd62ac4e25eb717 b12b298c79e62dcea254ec", realm="[email protected]", uri="/doe.json", algorithm=SHA-512-256, nonce="5TsQWLVdgBdmrQ0XsxbDODV+57QdFR34I9HAbC/RVvkK", nc=00000001, cnonce="NTg6RKcb9boFIAS3KrFK9BGeh+iDa/sm6jUMp2wds69v", qop=auth, response="ae66e67d6b427bd3f120414a82e4acff38e8ecd9101d 6c861229025f607a79dd", opaque="HRPCssKJSGjCrkzDg8OhwpzCiGPChXYjwrI2QmXDnsOS", userhash=true If the client cannot provide a hashed username for any reason, the client can try a request with this Authorization header field: Authorization: Digest username*=UTF-8''J%C3%A4s%C3%B8n%20Doe, realm="[email protected]", uri="/doe.json", algorithm=SHA-512-256, nonce="5TsQWLVdgBdmrQ0XsxbDODV+57QdFR34I9HAbC/RVvkK", nc=00000001, cnonce="NTg6RKcb9boFIAS3KrFK9BGeh+iDa/sm6jUMp2wds69v", qop=auth, response="ae66e67d6b427bd3f120414a82e4acff38e8ecd9101d 6c861229025f607a79dd", opaque="HRPCssKJSGjCrkzDg8OhwpzCiGPChXYjwrI2QmXDnsOS", userhash=false RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 For the username, recipients MUST support all characters defined in the "UsernameCasePreserved" profile defined in Section 3.3 of [RFC7613], with the exception of the colon (":") character. For the password, recipients MUST support all characters defined in the "OpaqueString" profile defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC7613]. If the user agent does not support the encoding indicated by the server, it can fail the request. When usernames cannot be sent hashed and include non-ASCII characters, clients can include the username* parameter instead (using the value encoding defined in [RFC5987]). RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 realm is part of the digested data stored in the password file. It means that if one Digest Authentication password file is compromised, it does not automatically compromise others with the same username and password (though it does expose them to brute-force attack). There are two important security consequences of this. First, the password file must be protected as if it contained unencrypted passwords, because, for the purpose of accessing documents in its realm, it effectively does. A second consequence of this is that the realm string SHOULD be unique among all realms that any single user is likely to use. In particular, a realm string SHOULD include the name of the host doing the authentication. The inability of the client to authenticate the server is a weakness of Digest Authentication. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 For applications where no possibility of replay attack can be tolerated, the server can use one-time nonce values that will not be honored for a second use. This requires the overhead of the server remembering which nonce values have been used until the nonce timestamp (and hence the digest built with it) has expired, but it effectively protects against replay attacks. An implementation must give special attention to the possibility of replay attacks with POST and PUT requests. Unless the server employs one-time or otherwise limited-use nonces and/or insists on the use of the integrity protection of "qop=auth-int", an attacker could replay valid credentials from a successful request with counterfeit data or other message body. Even with the use of integrity protection, most metadata in header fields is not protected. Proper nonce generation and checking provides some protection against replay of previously used valid credentials, but see Section 5.8. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 dependent on the server implementation) may affect the ease of mounting a replay attack. A range of server options is appropriate since, for example, some implementations may be willing to accept the server overhead of one-time nonces or digests to eliminate the possibility of replay. Others may be satisfied with a nonce like the one recommended above, i.e., restricted to a single IP address and a single ETag or with a limited lifetime. The bottom line is that *any* compliant implementation will be relatively weak by cryptographic standards, but *any* compliant implementation will be far superior to Basic Authentication. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 The initial registry contains the following entries: +----------------+-------------+-----------+ | Hash Algorithm | Digest Size | Reference | +----------------+-------------+-----------+ | "MD5" | 128 | RFC 7616 | | "SHA-512-256" | 256 | RFC 7616 | | "SHA-256" | 256 | RFC 7616 | +----------------+-------------+-----------+ Each one of the algorithms defined in the registry might have a "-sess" variant, e.g., MD5-sess, SHA-256-sess, etc. To clarify the purpose of the existing "HTTP Digest Algorithm Values" registry and to avoid confusion between the two registries, IANA has added the following description to the existing "HTTP Digest Algorithm Values" registry: This registry lists the algorithms that can be used when creating digests of an HTTP message body, as specified in RFC 3230. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>. [RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>. [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>. [RFC5987] Reschke, J., "Character Set and Language Encoding for Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Header Field Parameters", RFC 5987, DOI 10.17487/RFC5987, August 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5987>. [RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454, DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>. [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>. [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>. [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>. [RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>. Shekh-Yusef, et al. Standards Track [Page 29] RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 [RFC7613] Saint-Andre, P. and A. Melnikov, "Preparation, Enforcement, and Comparison of Internationalized Strings Representing Usernames and Passwords", RFC 7613, DOI 10.17487/RFC7613, August 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7613>. [RFC7615] Reschke, J., "HTTP Authentication-Info and Proxy- Authentication-Info Response Header Fields", RFC 7615, DOI 10.17487/RFC7615, September 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7615>. RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 RFC 7616 HTTP Digest Access Authentication September 2015 The authors would like to thank Barry Leiba for his help with the registry. Authors' Addresses Rifaat Shekh-Yusef (editor) Avaya 250 Sidney Street Belleville, Ontario Canada Phone: +1-613-967-5267 Email: [email protected] David Ahrens Independent California United States Email: [email protected] Sophie Bremer Netzkonform Germany Email: [email protected] Shekh-Yusef, et al. Standards Track [Page 32]
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