Low-level implementations of common networking protocols, in pure Python with zero dependencies.
Decode raw header bytes into typed, immutable protocol objects — or build those objects from field values and serialize them back to their exact on-wire form. Every header is a frozen dataclass whose fields mirror the wire format, so decoded traffic is introspectable, comparable, and round-trippable.
>>> from netprotocols import Ethernet >>> eth = Ethernet.decode(frame) >>> eth Ethernet(dst='ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff', src='00:07:0d:af:f4:54', ethertype=2054) >>> eth.ethertype_name 'ARP' >>> eth.next_protocol() <class 'netprotocols.layer2.arp.ARP'> >>> bytes(eth) == frame[:eth.header_len] True
Every header is also a structural pattern — no extra code, because a
frozen dataclass auto-generates __match_args__ and every enum field
is an IntEnum, so a bare wire value matches a named one:
match ip: case IPv4(protocol=IPProtocol.TCP, ttl=t) if t > 32: ... case IPv4(protocol=IPProtocol.UDP): ...
pip install netprotocols
Requires Python 3.12+. Fully typed (py.typed, mypy strict).
Measured against dpkt 1.9.8 and scapy 2.8.0 on the 411 frames of
real captured traffic the corpus holds at 2.9.0 (CPython 3.12.12, x86-64
Linux; re-measured for 2.9.0 on 2026-11-06 — see
docs/CLAIMS.md for every number below, its
reproduction command, and its caveats):
- 3.0× faster than scapy on decode; dpkt is 1.5× faster —
uv run --group bench python scripts/benchmark.py --compare. dpkt is the faster of the two comparators. The routing captures 2.5.0 added (OSPF, BGP, PIM, RIP, VRRP) are where it pulls ahead, taking about three fifths of netprotocols' time on them. On the 140 frames the corpus held at 2.4.0 dpkt is ahead by a median 1.21× across runs. On the MPLS and LLC/SNAP captures 2.6.0 added they are level; dpkt leaves LLDP undecoded, so it is about 5× faster on those six frames, and it stops at UDP (at TCP for STUN's two TCP segments) on the TFTP, RADIUS, STUN, NTP and HSRP captures 2.7.0 added, where it is about 1.5× faster, and at TCP on the TLS capture 2.8.0 added, where it is about 2× faster. Those per-capture figures were measured for 2.8.0 and not repeated for 2.9.0. Narrowing the gap is #250. The gap moves both ways as this library and dpkt each change, and this file's job is to say so honestly rather than only when it's flattering. - Decodes further into the stack than dpkt on 175 of those 411 frames — BGP, RIP, LLDP, DNS, DHCP, NTP, RADIUS, STUN, HSRP, TFTP, TLS and VXLAN-tunnelled payloads that dpkt leaves as raw bytes (dpkt ships decoders for several of them, but its UDP and TCP never dispatch on a port), and 802.1Q tags, MPLS label stacks and SNAP headers it folds into the Ethernet and LLC headers, netprotocols decodes as layers of their own. A throughput number means little without knowing how much work it bought.
- 1.35× faster than dpkt at re-encoding a whole Ethernet/IPv4/UDP
frame (
bytes(packet)againstbytes(dpkt.ethernet.Ethernet(frame)),scripts/benchmark_encode.py) — the other half of "codec" that nobody else benchmarks. - Imports in 54 ms;
scapy.alltakes about 227 ms (scripts/benchmark_import.py, with cached bytecode, as afterpip installor after the first import; the first import after a source checkout compiles its modules and takes longer), and never touches the host doing it — importing scapy populates live interface and routing tables as a side effect of the import statement. - A 293.2 KiB wheel against scapy's 2.63 MiB — 9.2× smaller.
- Regression-gated in CI, which — as far as we could establish by
auditing ten comparable Python packet libraries' CI configurations
(dpkt, scapy, pypacker, construct, pcapkit, dnspython, pyshark,
nfstream, stackforge, PyTCP-net_proto; full citations in
docs/CLAIMS.md §1.7) — none of them gate on one.
Three of the ten (scapy, construct, stackforge) ship benchmark code
that targets the library being compared but never runs in CI
(construct disables it explicitly; stackforge's Criterion benches are
never invoked). A fourth, PyTCP-net_proto, ships a benchmark too, but
it exercises its RX daemon rather than the compared
net_protopackage, and isn't wired to CI either. A fifth, pcapkit, runs an engine benchmark weekly in CI, never on a pull request, and reports ratios without comparing them to an earlier run. None of the ten fails a build on a performance regression (re-audited 2026-11-04). - Typed where the alternatives are not.
mypy --strictover the whole ofsrc/, enforced in CI. scapy shipspy.typedbut enables strict checking on 89 of its files, 2 of the 121 underscapy/layers/— the dissectors most code touches stayAny. dpkt ships nopy.typedat all, and no third-party stub package exists for it. - The only MIT-licensed, strictly-typed, zero-dependency packet codec
still under active maintenance. scapy is GPL-2.0; pypacker is
GPLv2; the newer entrants
stackforgeandPyTCP-net_protoare both GPL-3.0. The other permissive option, dpkt (BSD), last released 2022-08-18 and last committed 2024-05-05, still targets Python 2.7 and 3.5–3.9, and remains marked Beta after twelve years. - Runs where scapy cannot — including in the browser. Under a real
Pyodide runtime in CI, netprotocols imports and decodes the full
corpus cleanly. Scapy cannot even be attempted there: it is absent
from Pyodide's package set, and
from fcntl import ioctlis unconditional inscapy/arch/— confirmed by that same CI run still missing the module, plus the source citation. dpkt and pypacker were both confirmed to import cleanly under the same missing modules, but via a separate CPython-side simulation, not inside the CI job. - The only one of these libraries a
match/casestatement dissects out of the box. dpkt builds__slots__from a metaclass and generates no__match_args__; scapy routes fields through__getattr__; construct returns dicts. None gives you a pattern to match against.
None of this makes scapy less than an extraordinary piece of software — it crafts, sends, sniffs and fuzzes across thousands of protocols, and this library does none of that. The comparison above is scoped to what both are: a codec that turns bytes into typed objects and back.
One mypy --strict run says more than the bullets above:
# scapy 2.8.0 — a field name that does not exist
p.ThisFieldDoesNotExist → Any (no error)
# dpkt 1.9.8 — the whole module
import dpkt.ethernet → error: missing library stubs or py.typed
# netprotocols — a typo in a real field name
ip.proto → error: "IPv4" has no attribute
"proto"; maybe "protocol"?
| Layer | Protocol | Class | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | Ethernet II / IEEE 802.3 | Ethernet |
IEEE 802.3; the type/length field dispatches as an EtherType from 0x0600 and as an 802.3 Length (then LLC) up to 1500, which also bounds the walk's later layers |
| 2 | IEEE 802.1Q VLAN tag (802.1ad QinQ) | VLAN |
802.1Q-2018 §9.6, PCP/DEI/VID, tag stacking; the inner type/length field reads as Ethernet's does |
| 2 | IEEE 802.2 LLC | LLC |
ISO/IEC 8802-2, DSAP/SSAP and a 1- or 2-octet Control; I-format and UI PDUs dispatch on DSAP (llc.dsap); Novell raw 802.3 recognized (is_raw_ipx; the other fields are then IPX bytes), never dispatched |
| 2 | SNAP | SNAP |
IEEE Std 802, RFC 1042; OUI and PID: OUI 00-00-00 and 00-00-F8 dispatch the PID as an EtherType, any other OUI through llc.snap |
| 2 | LLDP | LLDP, LLDPTLV, LLDPChassisID, LLDPPortID |
IEEE 802.1AB, EtherType 0x88CC; every TLV through End of LLDPDU, the End TLV's bound leaving padding and an FCS undecoded; Chassis ID and Port ID (subtype and ID) and Time To Live typed, every other TLV raw with its type named |
| 2 | Spanning Tree BPDU (STP, RSTP, MSTP) | STP, STPMSTConfigurationIdentifier, STPMSTIMessage |
IEEE 802.1D-2004 §9.3, 802.1w, 802.1Q §14; LLC DSAP 0x42 (llc.dsap); Configuration (35 octets), RST (36) and Topology Change Notification (4) BPDUs in one class, branching on the BPDU Type; per-type flag accessors (TC, TCA, Proposal, Port Role, Learning, Forwarding, Agreement), the 802.1t priority / system ID extension split, timers raw and in seconds; an MST BPDU that passes 802.1Q §14.5 e) keeps its Version 3 information in mst, bounded by its Version 3 Length, read through accessors for the MST Configuration Identifier, the CIST internal fields and the MSTI Configuration Messages (MSTID, Regional Root, priorities, flags by name), with the RST prefix's Bridge Identifier and Root Path Cost also read as the CIST Regional Root Identifier and the CIST External Root Path Cost, and CIST Port Role 0 named Master; one that fails it decodes as its RST prefix |
| 2 | CDP | CDP |
Cisco Discovery Protocol, versions 1 and 2, after SNAP OUI 00-00-0C PID 0x2000 (llc.snap); the 4-byte header and the TLVs, kept raw and named from Wireshark's packet-cdp.c, with accessors for Device ID, Addresses, Port ID, Capabilities, Software version, Platform and Management Address; its checksum (RFC 1071 but for an odd final byte) in compute/verify |
| 2 | ARP | ARP |
RFC 826, IPv4-over-Ethernet binding |
| 2 | MPLS label stack | MPLS |
RFC 3032 §2.1, EtherTypes 0x8847 and 0x8848 (and GRE's Protocol Type, RFC 4023); the whole stack as one layer of MPLSLabel entries (label, traffic class, S, TTL); no field names the payload, so it dispatches by convention to IPv4 or IPv6 — the bottom label when it is an Explicit NULL, otherwise the first nibble after the stack — and stops at a pseudowire control word |
| 3 | IPv4 | IPv4 |
RFC 791, IHL/options aware |
| 3 | IPv6 | IPv6 |
RFC 8200 |
| 3 | IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Options | IPv6HopByHopOptions |
RFC 8200 §4.3 |
| 3 | IPv6 Routing | IPv6Routing |
RFC 8200 §4.4 |
| 3 | IPv6 Fragment | IPv6Fragment |
RFC 8200 §4.5, first-fragment chaining |
| 3 | IPv6 Destination Options | IPv6DestinationOptions |
RFC 8200 §4.6 |
| 3 | ICMPv4 | ICMPv4 |
RFC 792, 8-byte header |
| 3 | ICMPv6 | ICMPv6 |
RFC 4443, 8-byte header |
| 3 | IGMP | IGMP |
RFC 1112/2236/3376, IPv4 multicast management; IGMPv3 report group records + query fields |
| 3 | GRE | GRE |
RFC 2784/2890, IP protocol 47; payload chains onward by EtherType |
| 3 | IP-in-IP | IPv4, IPv6 |
RFC 2003/4213/2473, IP protocols 4 and 41; no header of its own, so the outer IP header dispatches straight to the inner one |
| 3 | IPsec ESP | ESP |
RFC 4303, IP protocol 50; SPI and sequence number decoded, the protected remainder kept as opaque ciphertext — the chain ends here by design, since without the Security Association nothing says where the Next Header is |
| 3 | IPsec AH | AH, AHv6 |
RFC 4302, IP protocol 51; fixed fields decoded and the ICV kept raw (never verified), then the payload chains onward by next_header through the outer IP family's table — AHv6, an AH subclass, is what IPv6 dispatches to |
| 3 | OSPFv2 | OSPF |
RFC 2328, IP protocol 89 over IPv4; the 24-byte header, then Hello, Database Description, LS Request, LS Update and LS Acknowledgment parsed by typed accessors; LSA headers decoded, and the Router, Network, Summary (types 3 and 4), AS-external and NSSA (RFC 3101) LSA bodies parsed by typed accessors, other LS types' bodies kept raw; packet checksum and LSA Fletcher checksum compute/verify. OSPFv3 (RFC 5340, IPv6) is not decoded: IPv6 protocol 89 ends the walk |
| 3 | PIM-SM | PIM |
RFC 7761, IP protocol 103 from IPv4 and IPv6; common header + message-type dispatch: Hello options, Register (encapsulated packet decodable), Register-Stop, Join/Prune (also Graft/Graft-Ack), Assert parsed on demand; other types kept raw; checksum compute/verify, IPv6 pseudo-header included |
| 3 | VRRP | VRRP, VRRPv6 |
RFC 3768 (VRRPv2) and RFC 5798 (VRRPv3), IP protocol 112; one class branches on the version nibble (VRRPv2's Auth Type, Adver Int and authentication data; VRRPv3's Max Adver Int) and decodes the virtual-address list at the width of the IP family that carried it — VRRPv6, a VRRP subclass, is what IPv6 dispatches to; checksum compute/verify |
| 4 | TCP | TCP |
RFC 9293, data-offset/options aware |
| 4 | UDP | UDP |
RFC 768 |
| 4 | SCTP | SCTP, SCTPChunk, SCTPParameter |
RFC 9260, IP protocol 132; common header + chunk list (SCTPChunk) parsed on demand; typed fields of DATA, INIT, INIT ACK, SACK and I-DATA (RFC 8260) chunks, and INIT / INIT ACK parameters (SCTPParameter); an unfragmented DATA or I-DATA chunk's user data decoded by its PPID through the sctp.ppid table, which ships empty; the walk ends at SCTP; CRC32c compute/verify |
| 7 | DNS | DNS |
RFC 1035, over UDP and TCP (DNSOverTCP length shim); on-demand name decompression + resource-record parsing |
| 7 | DHCP | DHCP |
RFC 2131/2132, over UDP 67/68; TLV options parsed on demand |
| 7 | VXLAN | VXLAN |
RFC 7348, over UDP 4789; the payload is a whole Ethernet frame, which walks on through the EtherType table |
| 7 | RIP | RIP |
RFC 1058/2453, RIPv1 and RIPv2 over UDP 520; route entries (RIPEntry) and the authentication entry (RIPAuthentication: plain-text password, RFC 4822 keyed MD5/HMAC-SHA) parsed on demand; RIPng is not decoded |
| 7 | TFTP | TFTP |
RFC 1350, over UDP 69; RRQ, WRQ, DATA, ACK, ERROR and the RFC 2347 OACK, fields read on demand (filename, mode, block, data, error code and message), options as name/value pairs with blksize, timeout, tsize (RFC 2348/2349) and windowsize (RFC 7440) as numbers; port 69 reaches the request only, since the transfer runs between two ephemeral ports (RFC 1350 §4) — the rest needs decode_as with the server's port |
| 7 | RADIUS | RADIUS, RADIUSAttribute, RADIUSVendorAttribute |
RFC 2865/2866, over UDP 1812 (authentication) and 1813 (accounting); the 20-byte header (Code, Identifier, Length, the Authenticator raw) and the attribute list (RADIUSAttribute), parsed on demand: User-Name, NAS-IP-Address, NAS-Port and Framed-IP-Address typed, User-Password raw and named, Vendor-Specific's Vendor-Id read and its sub-attributes (RADIUSVendorAttribute, values raw) walked in RFC 2865 §5.26's recommended format, except for vendors with another format, kept raw; the RFC 6929 Extended-Type and Long-Extended-Type attributes (241-246) named and kept raw; every other type raw, named if RFC 2865/2866/3579 (or, for four types, RFC 2869) defines it; nothing that needs the shared secret (authenticators, Message-Authenticator, password hiding) is computed or verified |
| 7 | NTP | NTP, NTPControl |
RFC 5905 (NTPv4) and RFC 1305 (NTPv3), and RFC 9327's mode 6 control messages, over UDP 123, the walk choosing NTPControl by the mode in the first byte; the 48-byte header with every field raw, timestamps also as UTC datetimes (transmit_time and the rest, RFC 4330's era rule past 2036), Root Delay in seconds (signed below NTPv4, as RFC 1305 and RFC 2030 define it), stratum, kiss code and Reference ID display; RFC 7822 extension fields (NTPExtensionField, NTS's named, RFC 9748's experimental range said so) and the symmetric-key MAC (NTPMAC, not verified) parsed on demand; NTPControl decodes ntpq's mode 6 header (R, E and M bits, opcode names, sequence, status, association ID, offset, count), keeps the data raw with a name=value splitter (variables) that never raises, splits a system status word (NTPSystemStatus) and names an error response's code, and finds the MAC where ntpd and ntpsec put it (NTPMAC, not verified); ntpd's private mode 7 (ntpdc) is not decoded, so a strict walk raises InvalidFieldError on it: walk with lax=True, or take port 123 out of the walk with WITHHELD in decode_as (decode_as={"udp.port": {123: WITHHELD}}) |
| 7 | HSRP | HSRP, HSRPAdvertise, HSRPv2, HSRPv2GroupState, HSRPv2InterfaceState, HSRPv2TextAuthentication, HSRPv2MD5Authentication, HSRPv2TLV |
RFC 2281, HSRPv1 (version 0 on the wire) over UDP 1985; the 20-byte Hello, Coup and Resign message with every field raw, the Op Code and State named, the clear-text Authentication Data raw and unpadded (password), and the group's well-known virtual MAC address (virtual_mac). HSRPv2 over UDP 1985, the walk choosing HSRPv2 by the first byte, and HSRP for IPv6 over UDP 2029, in the layout of Wireshark's packet-hsrp.c: its TLVs, the Group State TLV typed (version, Op Code and State named, IP version, 12-bit group, the sender's MAC as identifier, priority, hello and hold times in milliseconds, the IPv4 or IPv6 virtual address, the HSRPv2 virtual MAC), the Interface State TLV with its active and passive group counts, the Text Authentication TLV as HSRPv1's password and the MD5 Authentication TLV with its digest raw and not verified, other TLVs raw; tested against hand-built vectors only, since no capture holds HSRPv2. Cisco's Op Code 3 interface-state Advertise over UDP 1985, the walk choosing HSRPAdvertise by the first two bytes, in the layout of packet-hsrp.c: the 16-byte message with the TLV Type and the interface's State (Dormant, Passive, Active) named and its active and passive group counts, the TLV Length and Reserved fields raw; tested against hand-built vectors only, since no capture holds an Advertise. The MD5 Authentication TLV a router with MD5 authentication appends to an HSRPv1 message, read where packet-hsrp.c reads it, a message of exactly 50 bytes whose bytes 20 and 21 are Type 4 and Length 28, as HSRP.md5_authentication, an HSRPv2MD5Authentication with its digest raw and not verified (None for every other message, decoded to its 20 bytes); tested against hand-built vectors only, since no capture holds one |
| 7 | BGP-4 | BGP |
RFC 4271, over TCP 179; one layer per message, chaining to the next in the same segment; OPEN fields and optional parameters, UPDATE withdrawn routes, path attributes (BGPPathAttribute, ORIGIN/NEXT_HOP/MED/LOCAL_PREF values decoded) and NLRI (BGPPrefix), NOTIFICATION codes; KEEPALIVE and ROUTE-REFRESH; a message split across segments needs the stream, reassembled with netprotocols.reassembly or your own |
| 7 | STUN | STUN |
RFC 8489 (and RFC 5389, which it obsoletes), over UDP and TCP 3478; the 20-byte header with its magic cookie verified (RFC 3489 messages, which have none, are rejected), the message type split into class and method by accessors, attributes (STUNAttribute) parsed on demand with their 4-byte padding kept raw; MAPPED-ADDRESS and XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS (STUNAddress, un-XORed for IPv4 and IPv6), SOFTWARE, ERROR-CODE, UNKNOWN-ATTRIBUTES; MESSAGE-INTEGRITY kept raw (it needs a key), FINGERPRINT compute/verify; over TCP one layer per message, chaining to the next in the same segment |
| 7 | TLS | TLS, TLSClientHello, TLSExtension, peek_server_name, TLSServerNamePeek |
RFC 9846 §5.1 (TLS 1.3, obsoleting RFC 8446) and RFC 5246 §6.2 (TLS 1.2, also obsoleted by RFC 9846) record framing, over TCP 443; one layer per record (content type, legacy version, length, the fragment raw), chaining to the next in the same segment; the handshake type and, parsed on demand, the ClientHello (TLSClientHello, its extensions as TLSExtension) and its SNI host name (server_name, RFC 6066), read from a stream reassembled with netprotocols.reassembly or your own when the ClientHello spans segments, or, opt-in, peeked from its first segment with peek_server_name() (found, absent, or not reached, which is not "no SNI"); no crypto and no handshake beyond the ClientHello's fields: nothing is decrypted, and the ServerHello, certificates and every other extension stay raw; 853, 465, 993, 995 and 8443 need decode_as; no DTLS or QUIC |
| 7 | HTTP/1.1 | HTTP |
RFC 9112/9110; one message per decode from a buffer reassembled with netprotocols.reassembly or your own; ambiguities reported as anomalies; not port-dispatched |
decode_frame() walks the whole chain and hands back a Packet:
from netprotocols import TCP, decode_frame packet = decode_frame(frame) print(packet) # Packet(Ethernet(...), IPv4(...), TCP(...)) print(packet[1].src) # '192.168.1.96' — position, unchanged print(packet[TCP].flags_str) # first TCP layer, or KeyError if none print(packet.get(TCP)) # same lookup, None instead of raising print(packet.consumed) # bytes the headers occupied print(packet.trailer) # bytes past the declared lengths, b"" if none
It works because every header answers two questions: header_len (how
many bytes it consumed) and next_protocol() (which class decodes what
follows). Trailing bytes are fine. The 802.3, IPv4, IPv6 and UDP
lengths end what the walk hands each layer, and the bytes past the
tightest of them, such as Ethernet padding or a captured FCS, are
packet.trailer; frame[packet.consumed : len(frame) - len(packet.trailer)]
is whatever the chain did not decode before them, and
frame == bytes(packet) + that + packet.trailer.
Start somewhere other than Ethernet when the buffer does — a tunnel payload, a packet quoted inside an ICMP error, a non-Ethernet link type:
decode_frame(buf, start=IPv4)
Malformed input raises exceptions rooted at a single base class:
from netprotocols import ProtocolError, TruncatedHeaderError, InvalidFieldError try: packet = decode_frame(frame) except TruncatedHeaderError: # buffer shorter than the header claims ... except InvalidFieldError: # nonsense field values (IHL < 5, bad address) ... except ProtocolError: # catches every library error ...
Every decode and validation error carries structured context
alongside its message — err.protocol names the class that raised,
err.field names the attribute at fault where one field is at fault,
and err.offset /
err.frame_offset locate the problem in bytes (in the header's own
buffer, and rebased to the whole frame when the error came through
decode_frame) — so a fuzzer, conformance suite, or validation tool
can act on where and what failed without parsing the message
(capture-file and registry errors leave protocol unset):
try: packet = decode_frame(frame) except ProtocolError as e: print(f"{e.protocol.__name__} at byte {e.frame_offset}: {e}") # IPv4 at byte 14: IPv4 IHL must be at least 5, got 0
A capture tool would usually rather keep the layers it got than lose
frame 4,000,001 to an exception. lax=True reports instead of raising:
packet = decode_frame(frame, lax=True) if packet.stopped_by is not None: log.warning("stopped after %d layers: %s", len(packet), packet.stopped_by)
Lax mode never invents a layer and never guesses — each header is
decoded exactly as strictly as before; the walk just declines to throw
away the part that worked. Chain depth is bounded (max_depth,
default 32), so a crafted frame cannot make the walker grind.
One case where reaching for lax=True is the right default, not
just a convenience: an ICMP error message's embedded packet. RFC 792
only guarantees the invoking IP header plus 8 bytes of what follows —
never a full TCP/UDP header — so decoding it with the strict path
raises on ordinary, correctly formed traffic. ICMPv4/ICMPv6 expose
this pre-wired as embedded_chain:
icmp.embedded_chain # decode_frame(icmp.embedded_packet, lax=True, start=IPv4) # → Packet([IPv4(...)]), stopped_by=TruncatedHeaderError(...)
embedded_packet stays available for the raw bytes; reach for
embedded_chain when you want them already decoded and are prepared
to read stopped_by. Outside this one RFC-mandated case, a complete
frame that fails to decode is still a bug to raise on — lax=True
elsewhere is a capture tool's choice, not a default.
read_captures() takes a capture file opened in binary mode, or its
bytes — not a path — and auto-detects classic pcap vs. pcapng from its
magic number:
from netprotocols import decode_frame, read_captures with open("traffic.pcap", "rb") as file: for timestamp, frame in read_captures(file): packet = decode_frame(frame, lax=True) ...
A file, an io.BytesIO, a pipe or any other object with a
read(size) method is read forward from its current position, one
record or block at a time and never seeked, so memory use follows the
largest record or block, not the size of the capture; the 4-byte
magic number is read on the call, the rest as you iterate. bytes,
bytearray and memoryview (an mmap included) are copied once when
iteration starts. A stream read from position 0 gives the frames and
errors, offsets included, that its bytes give as a buffer; from a later
position, offsets count from where reading started.
Each CapturedFrame is (timestamp, data) — timestamp normalized to
nanoseconds since the Unix epoch regardless of the source format's own
resolution (classic pcap's microseconds or nanoseconds; pcapng's
per-interface if_tsresol). read_pcap()/read_pcapng() are the same
thing for a caller who already knows the format and wants to skip
detection. A malformed or truncated capture raises
MalformedCaptureError, the same ProtocolError family every other
exception in this library belongs to.
read_packets() detects the format the same way and yields
CapturedPacket(timestamp, data, interface_id, interface_name): for a
frame from a pcapng Enhanced Packet Block, the Interface ID it names
and that interface's if_name (None when the interface has none);
for a pcapng Simple Packet Block or a classic-pcap record, None for
both.
Packet.flow_key() (or the free function, netprotocols.flow_key(),
for a header pair that never went through decode_frame) returns a
canonical, direction-independent key for a TCP, UDP or SCTP
conversation — both directions of one flow produce the same key:
request = decode_frame(client_to_server_frame) reply = decode_frame(server_to_client_frame) assert request.flow_key() == reply.flow_key()
It returns None, not an error, when there is nothing to key on: no
enclosing IP layer, no TCP/UDP/SCTP layer, or a transport layer without
ports at all (ICMPv4/ICMPv6 — this library does not invent a port-slot
convention for message types that have none).
decode() and decode_frame() stay per-frame. To put IP fragments
back together, and TCP segments into each direction's byte stream, feed
every decoded packet, with the frame it came from, to a
FragmentReassembler and a StreamReassembler from
netprotocols.reassembly, a module the package does not import on its
own. A TCP segment rebuilt from fragments is fed to the stream
reassembler with the frame that completed it:
from netprotocols import IPv4, IPv6, decode_frame, read_captures from netprotocols.reassembly import ( Datagram, FragmentReassembler, StreamReassembler, ) fragments = FragmentReassembler() streams = StreamReassembler() for index, (ts, frame) in enumerate(read_captures(data)): packet = decode_frame(frame, lax=True) for event in fragments.feed(packet, frame, timestamp=ts, ref=index): handle((event,)) if isinstance(event, Datagram): start = IPv4 if event.version == 4 else IPv6 data = event.data whole = decode_frame(data, start=start, lax=True) handle(streams.feed(whole, data, timestamp=ts, ref=index)) handle(streams.feed(packet, frame, timestamp=ts, ref=index)) handle(fragments.close() + streams.close())
Each Datagram carries the whole datagram with a rebuilt header, so
the ordinary decoders and checksum helpers read it. Each StreamData
carries bytes that just became contiguous in one direction of a TCP
connection, at their stream offset, which is where the previous
StreamData or Gap of that direction ended. Append them to that
direction's buffer and decode HTTP, TLS or BGP messages from its
start (see Decoding HTTP). A Gap means bytes are missing: the
message pending in that direction's buffer is incomplete, so do not
join the bytes before the gap to those after it; drop the buffer and
resume decoding at a message boundary after the gap. Every event names its frames by the ref you passed:
event.refs are every frame it came from, event.completing_ref the
frame that completed it, and a message's completing frame is that of
the run holding its last byte.
Overlapping IPv4 fragments are resolved by a per-target
OverlapPolicy (first by default; last, bsd, linux,
windows, solaris, discard, linux-discard), and overlapping TCP
segments not yet delivered by first or last; any overlap whose
bytes differ is reported as an Overlap event under every policy, and
an overlapping IPv6 fragment discards its datagram (RFC 5722). Holes a
capture missed but the receiver acknowledged become Gap events, an
RST is reported at once and ends the stream at the closed timeout after
it when no data follows it, at close(), or at once when a SYN with a
new ISN follows, and every other rule a fragment or segment breaks is an Anomaly
event, never an exception. What each reassembler holds is bounded, and
measured on capture timestamps. Every feed() moves the capture
clock, a frame with nothing to reassemble included, and returns the
Expired events that causes; call advance(timestamp) while a live
capture is idle:
FragmentBounds |
Default |
|---|---|
max_flow_bytes |
one maximal datagram and its overheads |
max_total_bytes |
32 MiB |
max_flows |
16,384 datagrams |
max_fragments |
128 per datagram |
age_timeout |
60 s from the first fragment |
idle_timeout |
none |
StreamBounds |
Default |
|---|---|
max_flow_bytes |
4 MiB per connection |
max_total_bytes |
128 MiB |
max_flows |
65,536 connections |
retain_bytes |
64 KiB per direction, below the peer's acknowledgement |
idle_timeout_new |
60 s, until data has gone both ways |
idle_timeout_established |
3,600 s |
idle_timeout_closed |
120 s, after FIN both ways or an RST |
age_timeout |
none |
ack_gap_grace |
1 s |
HTTP.decode() reads one HTTP/1.1 message (RFC 9112) from the start of
a buffer and leaves whatever follows it alone; header_len says where
the message ended. The buffer has to be the connection's bytes, which
you reassemble with netprotocols.reassembly (see above) or your own: a TCP segment is rarely a whole message, so HTTP is
not in the port tables and decode_frame stops at TCP. Reading the
messages pipelined on one side of a connection is a loop:
from netprotocols import HTTP, HTTPDisposition def messages(stream, request_methods=()): """Each message on one side of a connection, in order. For the server's side, pass the methods of the requests it answered.""" methods = iter(request_methods) while stream: msg = HTTP.decode(stream, request_method=next(methods, None)) yield msg stream = stream[msg.header_len :] if msg.connection_disposition is not HTTPDisposition.CONTINUE: break # closed, or no longer HTTP (an upgrade or a tunnel)
TruncatedHeaderError means the message is not all there yet; once the
connection has closed, pass closed=True, which a response delimited by
the close needs and which turns a short message into InvalidFieldError.
A response's framing can depend on the request it answers, which the
bytes do not say: a response to HEAD, or a 2xx to CONNECT, has no
body whatever its Content-Length claims, so pass request_method.
>>> msg = HTTP.decode(response, request_method="HEAD") >>> msg.status_code, msg.framing, msg.header("content-length"), msg.raw_body (200, <HTTPFraming.NONE: 'none'>, '42', b'')
The message is held verbatim (bytes(msg) == msg.head + msg.raw_body),
and anything implementations read differently is decoded the way RFC
9112 resolves it and reported, not rejected, so a smuggling attempt
shows up instead of hiding behind an exception:
>>> msg = HTTP.decode( ... b"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: a\r\nContent-Length: 4\r\n" ... b"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\n" ... ) >>> msg.framing, msg.connection_disposition (<HTTPFraming.CHUNKED: 'chunked'>, <HTTPDisposition.CLOSE: 'close'>) >>> [(a.kind.name, a.field, a.offset) for a in msg.anomalies] [('CL_AND_TE', 'content-length', 26)]
Every decoded header works with match/case today, with no code
written for it: a frozen dataclass auto-generates __match_args__,
and every enum field is an IntEnum, so a class pattern can match a
named value against the plain int the wire actually carries. See
ARCHITECTURE.md for why
both of those hold and how to keep them holding.
IPv4, TCP and DHCP are wide enough (11-15 fields) that their
full auto-generated positional form is unusable, so those three
additionally curate a short __match_args__ by hand — the fields
someone matching by position actually reaches for:
match ip: case IPv4(src, dst, IPProtocol.TCP): print(f"TCP: {src} -> {dst}")
Keyword patterns (case IPv4(protocol=IPProtocol.TCP)) work on every
field regardless, curated or not, and stay the documented default.
HTTP's fields are raw bytes, so its __match_args__ names properties
instead: case HTTP("GET", target) for a request, case HTTP(None, None, 404) for a response.
from netprotocols import IPv4, IPProtocol, TCP match packet.layers: case [_, IPv4(protocol=IPProtocol.TCP) as ip, TCP(flags_str=f), *_] \ if "SYN" in f and "ACK" not in f: print(f"connection attempt from {ip.src}") case [_, IPv4() as ip, TCP(), *_]: print(f"TCP from {ip.src}") case _: print("not a TCP-over-IPv4 frame")
The dispatch tables are public, so a protocol this library does not implement can join the walk without forking it:
from netprotocols import Protocol from netprotocols.registry import register @register("ethertype", 0x88B5) # IEEE 802 Local Experimental class Telemetry(Protocol): ...
The seven tables the walk reads are ethertype, llc.dsap,
llc.snap, ip.proto, ip.proto.v6, udp.port and tcp.port, each
named after the wire field it dispatches on. An eighth, sctp.ppid,
maps an SCTP Payload Protocol Identifier to a decoder for the user data
of an unfragmented DATA or I-DATA chunk; the walk ends at SCTP and never
reads it, SCTPChunk.decode_user_data(registry) does, and it ships
empty, since this library decodes no PPID's payload. To
change decoding for one call only — DNS on a nonstandard port in one
capture — say so per call instead of registering globally:
decode_frame(frame, decode_as={"udp.port": {6969: DNS}})
To stop a key from dispatching at all, map it to WITHHELD: it then
dispatches to nothing, as a port nothing is registered on does, so the
walk ends at UDP unless the other port names a class. None there
raises TypeError. The same value withholds a key globally:
from netprotocols.registry import WITHHELD, register decode_frame(frame, decode_as={"udp.port": {1812: WITHHELD}}) register("udp.port", 1812, WITHHELD, override=True) # every walk
See ARCHITECTURE.md for how the tables fit together
and how ip.proto.v6 inherits ip.proto.
Constructors take friendly values (string MAC/IP addresses, integer
fields) and validate them; bytes() emits the exact on-wire form.
Packet concatenates a stack of layers:
from netprotocols import ARP, Ethernet, Packet, random_mac sha = random_mac() frame = Packet( Ethernet(dst="ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff", src=sha, ethertype=0x0806), ARP(htype=1, ptype=0x0800, hlen=6, plen=4, oper=1, sha=sha, spa="192.168.1.96", tha="00:00:00:00:00:00", tpa="192.168.1.254"), ) raw = bytes(frame) # ready for a raw socket
Checksums are computed and verified on request — never silently:
compute()/verify() in netprotocols.checksum (the internet
checksum, VRRP's — the message alone in VRRPv2, behind the IP
pseudo-header in VRRPv3, with VRRPv3 over IPv4 verified in either
form — PIM's, CDP's with its odd final byte summed as Cisco does, and
SCTP's CRC32c via crc32c(); OSPF's LSA checksums via
lsa_checksum()/verify_lsa()), and
Packet.with_checksums() to fill a whole stack before sending.
Every class exposes human-readable properties next to the raw fields:
Ethernet.ethertype_name, IPv4.protocol_name, IPv4.flags_name,
TCP.flags_str ("SYN ACK"), ARP.oper_name, ICMPv4.type_name,
and hexadecimal renderings such as checksum_hex_str. Unknown values
degrade gracefully ("0x88b5", "unknown (47)") instead of raising.
See ARCHITECTURE.md for a guided tour: how a header
byte layout maps onto a dataclass, the decode contract, the
next_protocol() chain, and a cookbook for adding a new protocol.
This library is the engine behind RootWire, a network traffic monitor built on it (formerly Packet-Sniffer).
The current roadmap, #170, closes the protocol gap against dpkt, scapy and pypacker in five tiers: transport and tunneling, routing, L2 discovery, AAA and infrastructure services, and TLS record framing with SNI. That issue tracks each tier's protocols and target version, so they are not restated here. The HTTP/1.1 codec (#214, #223, #226) shipped as 2.3.0 outside those tiers, and the first tier — IP-in-IP, VXLAN, ESP, AH and SCTP (#230, #231, #232, #233, #234) — as 2.4.0, and the second — VRRP, RIP, OSPF, PIM and BGP (#243, #245, #246, #247, #248) — as 2.5.0, and the third — MPLS, LLDP, LLC/SNAP, STP and CDP (#252, #253, #254, #255, #256) — as 2.6.0, and the fourth — TFTP, RADIUS, STUN, NTP and HSRP (#266, #265, #267, #269, #279) — as 2.7.0, and the fifth — TLS record framing with SNI (#284, #290) — as 2.8.0, which completes the roadmap's protocol tiers (see CHANGELOG.md).
The roadmap before it, the post-1.3.0 #107, is complete — five tiers plus a competitor CI audit (#124) and the comparative-claims embargo lift that closed it out:
| Version | Theme |
|---|---|
| 1.3.1 | Hygiene |
| 1.4.0 | Decode performance |
| 2.0.0 | A public protocol registry, a shipped chain walker, flow keys — released |
| 2.1.0 | Typed accessors and pattern-matching ergonomics |
| 2.2.0 | Universal round-trip properties, nightly fuzzing, a pcap reader — released |
Everything through 2.2.0 has landed on master. The since-landed
decode-throughput fix
(#147) and a
CodeFactor tooling cleanup
(#156) are now
released as
2.2.1.
2.1.0's and 1.3.1/1.4.0's work shipped folded into 2.0.0 and 2.2.0
rather than as their own versions, but the roadmap's original "only at
a major version bump" release policy wasn't actually held to: 2.0.0,
2.2.0, 2.2.1, 2.3.0, 2.4.0, 2.5.0, 2.6.0, 2.7.0, 2.8.0 and now 2.9.0 are all on PyPI, and the comparative claims above
draw on the finished tree. The wave before that one — TCP
and IPv4 option parsing, ICMP message bodies, NDP, IPv6
extension-header TLV options, the GRE checksum arm, a DNS-over-TCP
corpus fixture and ipaddress accessors — shipped in 1.3.0; see
CHANGELOG.md.
Development uses uv: uv sync, then
the seven checks CI enforces: uv run ruff check,
uv run ruff format --check, uv run flake8 src (docstrings, via
pydoclint), uv run mypy, uv run pytest,
python3 scripts/check_markers.py (no work markers) and
uv run sphinx-build -W -n -b dummy docs <outdir> (docstring
cross-references). The test suite runs across Python 3.12–3.14;
ruff, flake8, mypy and Sphinx run on 3.12. The test suite is
anchored by a 509-frame corpus of real captured traffic
across 43 scenarios
(tests/fixtures/MANIFEST.md, which says
which layers a script built rather than the kernel) plus
property-based fuzzing of the decode path. See
CONTRIBUTING.md for the full workflow and
ARCHITECTURE.md for the design and the
add-a-protocol cookbook.