GeezerVison

Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert,
but the client didn't send one, and you used rejectUnauthorized:false
the resumed session would report authorized=true. This doesn't match TLS
1.2 behaviour or make any sense, and was purely an artifact of our
internal logic for handling TLS 1.3 resumption details. We now correctly
report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection
in all cases, with a matrix test that fully checks the invariant:
authorized state after resume should always match the initial state.

Signed-off-by: Tim Perry <[email protected]>
PR-URL: #64677
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <[email protected]>

Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert,
but the client didn't send one, and you used rejectUnauthorized:false
the resumed session would report authorized=true. This doesn't match TLS
1.2 behaviour or make any sense, and was purely an artifact of our
internal logic for handling TLS 1.3 resumption details. We now correctly
report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection
in all cases, with a matrix test that fully checks the invariant:
authorized state after resume should always match the initial state.

Signed-off-by: Tim Perry <[email protected]>
PR-URL: #64677
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <[email protected]>

Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert,
but the client didn't send one, and you used rejectUnauthorized:false
the resumed session would report authorized=true. This doesn't match TLS
1.2 behaviour or make any sense, and was purely an artifact of our
internal logic for handling TLS 1.3 resumption details. We now correctly
report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection
in all cases, with a matrix test that fully checks the invariant:
authorized state after resume should always match the initial state.

Signed-off-by: Tim Perry <[email protected]>
PR-URL: #64677
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <[email protected]>

X509Certificate::GetPeerCert() built the certificate objects by deleting
entries from the stack returned by SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(), which is
owned by the SSL session. The first read emptied it, so any later read
by getPeerCertificate() or getPeerX509Certificate(), on either peer, saw
a truncated chain or nothing. Copy each issuer with X509_dup instead and
leave the session's stack untouched.

onServerSocketSecure() only called getPeerX509Certificate() to check
whether a peer certificate was present, building the whole chain on
every server handshake; that is what first exposed the destructive read.
Use a lightweight hasPeerCertificate() binding for the presence check.

Signed-off-by: Tony Gies <[email protected]>
PR-URL: #65602
Fixes: #65579
Refs: #64677
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Tim Perry <[email protected]>

X509Certificate::GetPeerCert() built the certificate objects by deleting
entries from the stack returned by SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(), which is
owned by the SSL session. The first read emptied it, so any later read
by getPeerCertificate() or getPeerX509Certificate(), on either peer, saw
a truncated chain or nothing. Copy each issuer with X509_dup instead and
leave the session's stack untouched.

onServerSocketSecure() only called getPeerX509Certificate() to check
whether a peer certificate was present, building the whole chain on
every server handshake; that is what first exposed the destructive read.
Use a lightweight hasPeerCertificate() binding for the presence check.

Signed-off-by: Tony Gies <[email protected]>
PR-URL: #65602
Fixes: #65579
Refs: #64677
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Tim Perry <[email protected]>

X509Certificate::GetPeerCert() built the certificate objects by deleting
entries from the stack returned by SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(), which is
owned by the SSL session. The first read emptied it, so any later read
by getPeerCertificate() or getPeerX509Certificate(), on either peer, saw
a truncated chain or nothing. Copy each issuer with X509_dup instead and
leave the session's stack untouched.

onServerSocketSecure() only called getPeerX509Certificate() to check
whether a peer certificate was present, building the whole chain on
every server handshake; that is what first exposed the destructive read.
Use a lightweight hasPeerCertificate() binding for the presence check.

Signed-off-by: Tony Gies <[email protected]>
PR-URL: #65602
Fixes: #65579
Refs: #64677
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Tim Perry <[email protected]>

X509Certificate::GetPeerCert() built the certificate objects by deleting
entries from the stack returned by SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(), which is
owned by the SSL session. The first read emptied it, so any later read
by getPeerCertificate() or getPeerX509Certificate(), on either peer, saw
a truncated chain or nothing. Copy each issuer with X509_dup instead and
leave the session's stack untouched.

onServerSocketSecure() only called getPeerX509Certificate() to check
whether a peer certificate was present, building the whole chain on
every server handshake; that is what first exposed the destructive read.
Use a lightweight hasPeerCertificate() binding for the presence check.

Signed-off-by: Tony Gies <[email protected]>
PR-URL: #65602
Fixes: #65579
Refs: #64677
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Tim Perry <[email protected]>

X509Certificate::GetPeerCert() built the certificate objects by deleting
entries from the stack returned by SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(), which is
owned by the SSL session. The first read emptied it, so any later read
by getPeerCertificate() or getPeerX509Certificate(), on either peer, saw
a truncated chain or nothing. Copy each issuer with X509_dup instead and
leave the session's stack untouched.

onServerSocketSecure() only called getPeerX509Certificate() to check
whether a peer certificate was present, building the whole chain on
every server handshake; that is what first exposed the destructive read.
Use a lightweight hasPeerCertificate() binding for the presence check.

Signed-off-by: Tony Gies <[email protected]>
PR-URL: #65602
Fixes: #65579
Refs: #64677
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Tim Perry <[email protected]>