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tiran requested review from AA-Turner, emmatyping, erlend-aasland, gpshead, itamaro and picnixz as code owners October 21, 2026 15:03

tiran force-pushed the ssl-distrust-emudhra-keys branch from a2f652f to 6275d65 Compare October 21, 2026 15:03

tiran requested a review from ericsnowcurrently as a code owner October 21, 2026 15:31

tomato42 reviewed Oct 21, 2026

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gpshead reviewed Oct 21, 2026

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sethmlarson reviewed Oct 21, 2026

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gpshead reviewed Oct 21, 2026

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cherry_picker 7dd8b4736a1419750b94a388e6d158be15836fe6 3.15

cherry_picker 7dd8b4736a1419750b94a388e6d158be15836fe6 3.14

cherry_picker 7dd8b4736a1419750b94a388e6d158be15836fe6 3.13

cherry_picker 7dd8b4736a1419750b94a388e6d158be15836fe6 3.12

cherry_picker 7dd8b4736a1419750b94a388e6d158be15836fe6 3.11

…VE-2026-115557) (GH-160042) (#160568)

The ssl module now rejects TLS certificate chains that contain any of a set of
compromised eMudhra intermediate CA keys.  This is an extraordinary measure and
a last line of defense: removing trust is primarily the job of the platform root
store, and the built-in denylist only blocks connections while that update has
not yet reached the OS, a container image, or a bundled trust store in various
Python packages.  Entries are added to the denylist only under a very high
threshold.

The denylist matches on the public key (the SHA-256 digest of the RFC-5280
SubjectPublicKeyInfo), so it also covers the cross-signed certificates that
reuse one of the distrusted keys.

---------




(cherry picked from commit 7dd8b47)

Co-authored-by: Christian Heimes <[email protected]>

…VE-2026-115557) (GH-160042) (#160569)

The ssl module now rejects TLS certificate chains that contain any of a set of
compromised eMudhra intermediate CA keys.  This is an extraordinary measure and
a last line of defense: removing trust is primarily the job of the platform root
store, and the built-in denylist only blocks connections while that update has
not yet reached the OS, a container image, or a bundled trust store in various
Python packages.  Entries are added to the denylist only under a very high
threshold.

The denylist matches on the public key (the SHA-256 digest of the RFC-5280
SubjectPublicKeyInfo), so it also covers the cross-signed certificates that
reuse one of the distrusted keys.

---------




(cherry picked from commit 7dd8b47)

Co-authored-by: Christian Heimes <[email protected]>

…VE-2026-115557) (GH-160042) (#160570)

The ssl module now rejects TLS certificate chains that contain any of a set of
compromised eMudhra intermediate CA keys.  This is an extraordinary measure and
a last line of defense: removing trust is primarily the job of the platform root
store, and the built-in denylist only blocks connections while that update has
not yet reached the OS, a container image, or a bundled trust store in various
Python packages.  Entries are added to the denylist only under a very high
threshold.

The denylist matches on the public key (the SHA-256 digest of the RFC-5280
SubjectPublicKeyInfo), so it also covers the cross-signed certificates that
reuse one of the distrusted keys.

(cherry picked from commit 7dd8b47)

Co-authored-by: Christian Heimes <[email protected]>

…VE-2026-115557) (GH-160042) (#160571)

The ssl module now rejects TLS certificate chains that contain any of a set of
compromised eMudhra intermediate CA keys.  This is an extraordinary measure and
a last line of defense: removing trust is primarily the job of the platform root
store, and the built-in denylist only blocks connections while that update has
not yet reached the OS, a container image, or a bundled trust store in various
Python packages.  Entries are added to the denylist only under a very high
threshold.

The denylist matches on the public key (the SHA-256 digest of the RFC-5280
SubjectPublicKeyInfo), so it also covers the cross-signed certificates that
reuse one of the distrusted keys.

(cherry picked from commit 7dd8b47)

Co-authored-by: Christian Heimes <[email protected]>

…VE-2026-115557) (GH-160042) (GH-160572)

The ssl module now rejects TLS certificate chains that contain any of a set of
compromised eMudhra intermediate CA keys.  This is an extraordinary measure and
a last line of defense: removing trust is primarily the job of the platform root
store, and the built-in denylist only blocks connections while that update has
not yet reached the OS, a container image, or a bundled trust store in various
Python packages.  Entries are added to the denylist only under a very high
threshold.

The denylist matches on the public key (the SHA-256 digest of the RFC-5280
SubjectPublicKeyInfo), so it also covers the cross-signed certificates that
reuse one of the distrusted keys.

(cherry picked from commit 7dd8b47)

Co-authored-by: Christian Heimes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Łukasz Langa <[email protected]>

…keys (CVE-2026-115557) (pythonGH-160042) (pythonGH-160572)

The ssl module now rejects TLS certificate chains that contain any of a set of
compromised eMudhra intermediate CA keys.  This is an extraordinary measure and
a last line of defense: removing trust is primarily the job of the platform root
store, and the built-in denylist only blocks connections while that update has
not yet reached the OS, a container image, or a bundled trust store in various
Python packages.  Entries are added to the denylist only under a very high
threshold.

The denylist matches on the public key (the SHA-256 digest of the RFC-5280
SubjectPublicKeyInfo), so it also covers the cross-signed certificates that
reuse one of the distrusted keys.

(cherry picked from commit 7dd8b47)

Co-authored-by: Christian Heimes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Łukasz Langa <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit af52b41)

3.10.22.x: 3.10 keeps the test certificates directly in Lib/test (no
certdata/ subdirectory) and builds _ssl from setup.py, so distrusted.zip
lands in Lib/test and distrusted_spki.h is added to the _ssl depends in
setup.py instead of MODULE__SSL_DEPS.

…keys (CVE-2026-115557) (pythonGH-160042) (pythonGH-160572)

The ssl module now rejects TLS certificate chains that contain any of a set of
compromised eMudhra intermediate CA keys.  This is an extraordinary measure and
a last line of defense: removing trust is primarily the job of the platform root
store, and the built-in denylist only blocks connections while that update has
not yet reached the OS, a container image, or a bundled trust store in various
Python packages.  Entries are added to the denylist only under a very high
threshold.

The denylist matches on the public key (the SHA-256 digest of the RFC-5280
SubjectPublicKeyInfo), so it also covers the cross-signed certificates that
reuse one of the distrusted keys.

(cherry picked from commit 7dd8b47)

Co-authored-by: Christian Heimes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Łukasz Langa <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit af52b41)

3.10.22.x: 3.10 keeps the test certificates directly in Lib/test (no
certdata/ subdirectory) and builds _ssl from setup.py, so distrusted.zip
lands in Lib/test and distrusted_spki.h is added to the _ssl depends in
setup.py instead of MODULE__SSL_DEPS.

(cherry picked from commit 2691076)