The dictionary tells you that a shadow is a dark area or volume caused by an opaque object blocking some light. The definition is correct, but we need to clarify a couple of its elements: darkness and blocking. The clarification leads to the view that to see a shadow is a degree of failing to see a surface. I will also argue that seeing a silhouette (i.e. a backlit object) is a particular way of failing to see an object. Thus (...) visual discriminability is not sufficient for seeing. Finally, I argue that comparative empirical research on shadows' contribution to amodal completion in apes and humans supports the view that humans, unlike apes, perceive shadows as shadows rather than as black objects, thus lending indirect support for my view that to see a shadow is a way and degree of failing to see a surface. (shrink)
This paper defends Structural Nominalism, the view that abstract objects do not exist as mind-independent substances, but that real structural regularities instantiated in the physical world are sufficient to ground mathematical and logical necessity without appeal to a Platonic realm, a divine mind, or any transcendent ontological category. The paper argues, first, that immaterial objects fail a basic causal criterion of existence (Quine, 1948; Armstrong, 1978); second, that abstractions are functional shadows, real as states of physical cognitive systems, unreal as (...) substances; third, that the apparent necessity of mathematics is explained by the stable structural regularities of physical reality, accessed through embodied cognitive simulation rather than rational intuition of a separate realm; and fourth, that this position transcends both classical Platonism and bare nominalism by integrating structuralism into a fully naturalist ontology (Shapiro, 1997; Resnik, 1997). The paper closes by arguing that Plato’s Cave, properly understood, is precisely inverted: the abstract realm, not the physical world, is the shadow. (shrink)
Illumination is a defining characteristic of natural environments, yet its nature and spatial structure remain poorly understood. I argue first that illumination is not simply light: it is an emergent, ecologically significant kind. Illumination has features not possessed by light, and contains self‐organizing structures that persist through the continual flow of light itself. These structures are immaterial and ephemeral, yet no less real for that. I then argue that these illumination entities are genuine objects of perception. This contrasts with the (...) majority view, which explains illumination‐dependent variations in appearance solely by appeal to the perceived properties of material objects. The argument exploits the proposed ontology, which shows that the structure of illumination is more like that of continuous masses of fluid than of discrete solids. Illumination entities are thus individuated not by rigid boundaries, but by stable patterns of intensity and flow. I argue that this fluid‐like structure is mirrored by a distinctive type of perceptual organization, whereby scenes are parsed into zones and flows of illumination at multiple scales. This organization involves attributing spatial‐structural features that apply distinctively to illumination, which warrants treating it as an object of perception. (shrink)
Psychiatry inherited a convenient order. First there is a person. Then there is a social self. Then there are contents that person cannot afford to know. The Shadow arrives late, like a stain. This essay reverses the order. What clinical language calls the Shadow is not leftover darkness of an already formed subject. It is the first personality the human system develops: a fast organization of threat, face, hunger, and disappearance. Later layers do not invent the person. They imprison an (...) earlier person behind charm, competence, usefulness, or a monument of value. The official self is expensive to keep. What arrives in the nervous system can exceed what that self can hold. The first personality is fast. The later story is slow. Shame is the friction between those two tempos. Neurosis and the monument are taxes paid so that the later speaker can continue. Fatigue accumulates. There is a point at which the tax costs more than the old threat, and the later speaker fails. Locking again is not a new mood and not a new audience alone. It requires a cheaper story, a capacity to hold what returns, and a role that someone in the present actually answers. From that reversal, narcissism, borderline organization, bipolar recruitment, trauma, and usefulness change their meaning without becoming one landscape. The brief smile after a win is not the death of the mask. Collapse of the monument is another event. The essay is written for PhilArchive as a clinical-philosophical reading. No living private person is diagnosed. Structure explains recurrence. It does not wash an act. (shrink)
In his famous book "Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows" (2008), Roy Sorensen put forward a ‘blocking theory of shadows’, a causal view on these entities according to which a shadow is an absence of light caused by blockage. This approach allows him to solve a quite famous riddle on shadows, ‘the Yale puzzle’, that was devised by Robert Fogelin in the late 1960s and that Sorensen presents in the form mentioned by Bas van Fraassen (1989). István Aranyosi has (...) recently criticized Sorensen’s solution to the Yale puzzle, on the grounds that it does not resist another version of the riddle, that Aranyosi calls ‘the Bilkent puzzle’. A new perspective on shadows, the ‘Material Exstitution View’, that allegedly permits to solve both puzzles, could be adopted as an alternative. In this paper I will show that Sorensen’s blockage theory can actually handle both the Yale and the Bilkent puzzle, plus another one that I put forward (‘the donut puzzle’), which instead is fatal to Aranyosi’s position. As Sorensen puts it, nothing aside from the original blockage of light is needed. (shrink)
According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, what she sees is its inner part of the farther, reflective one, and not the always-facing-Earth side of our natural satellite. To make his point clearer, he put forward the famous example of a double eclipse involving the fictional planets Far and Near. From the observer’s vantage point, the two planets have the same apparent diameter and overlap. What the agent sees is a dark disk, but (...) believes that what she is seeing is Near, because Far is behind it. Sorensen claims that what she actually sees is planet Far and that the causal theory of perception explains why this is the case. Of course, this position stands against common sense. Sorensen shows that it counters Alvin Goldman’s renowned observation criteria too. Nonetheless, he maintains, since Near is causally idle and the agent does see something, the only possible conclusion is that she sees Far, pace Goldman – and common sense. In this paper, I try to demonstrate that Sorensen is wrong and that the correct solution to the eclipse riddle is that the observer sees Near. As a matter of fact, besides meeting common sense and Goldman’s observability criteria, Near can be legitimately be considered the object of a successful perceptual discrimination even in the light of the causal theory of perception. (shrink)
Many photographs seem to be images of absences: for instance, a photograph of a shadow seems to be an image of an absence, as shadows are plausibly thought of as being absences of light. Absence photography is puzzling, however, as, first, it is a common idea that photographs can only be images of things that have caused them, and, second, it is unclear whether absences can cause anything. In this paper, I look at various ways to unravel the puzzle. Along (...) the way, I also hope to cast some light on the idea that photography is a causal medium. (shrink)
Photography is often said to be an essentially causal medium. This paper addresses the role of causality in photography and argues for three main claims: (i) a causal theory of photography does not force us to say that images of backlit objects are photographs of the back surfaces of the said objects (as Roy Sorensen would have it); rather, (ii), such images, I suggest, are photographs of the objects and what Alva Noë would call their ‘looks’; (iii) the notion of (...) ‘looks’ furnishes us with a way to move closer to an answer to the question of the appropriate causal relation in photography. (shrink)
Shadows haunt the world of common sense by being “out there” independently of whether anyone is looking. Yet they are confi ned to a single sense: sight. Like ghosts, shadows evade tactile corroboration. They do not obey the laws governing material things.
Svjetlo i sjena tvore pojmovni par koji i u okviru filozofije daje povoda za brojne aluzije . Svjetlost vrijedi, povijesno sagledano, kao paradigma prosvjetiteljstva . Karakteristično, u ovoj se paradigmi javlja kolebanje na prijelazu iz razdoblja prosvjetiteljstva u romantizam: dolazi do uzvisivanja sjene u jeku romantičnog preobraženja tamne strane ljudske egzistencije. Na primjeru novele Adelberta von Chamissa Čudnovata pripovijest Petra Schlemihla moguće je pregnantno ilustrirati spomenuti zaokret od svjetla ka sjeni. U ovom tekstu će biti predstavljena filozofska interpretacija otuđenja sjene (...) kao gubitka identiteta, kako je oslikano u pripovijesti. Nadovezujući se na tu interpretaciju, uslijedit će pokušaj određivanja strukture odnosa tijela i sjene kao poveznice s identitetom. Ni u kom slučaju sjena ne smije biti degradirana na puku popratnu pojavu, već smo je dužni promatrati kao ozbiljan element konstelacije u tvorbi identiteta . Iako njezinu pojavu obilježava kratkotrajnost, sjena je značajno implementirana u identitet tijela, s obzirom da je tijelo definirano upravo činjenicom da pri osvjetljivanju stvara sjenu. Uzajamnost se svjetla, tijela i sjene stoga primiče egzemplifikaciji alternativnog modela identiteta, analogno čemu jedno tek potencijalno obilježje predmeta u određenoj prilici postaje neophodno. Konceptom okazionalnog identiteta moguće je korigirati ontološki rigidno poimanje identiteta. (shrink)
This is a reply to Casey O'Callaghan and Jonathan Westphal’s comments on Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows. Both attempt to soften the blow to intuition that comes from the most controversial thesis of the book: we see the backs of back-lit objects. Each characterizes the viewing of silhouettes as a kind of marginal seeing that only discloses shapes, sizes and location. In response, photographs are presented to show that silhouettes are typically three-dimensional and they often have internal structure. (...) Consider the silhouette of a bird fluttering inside a cage; we see more than the outline of the cage. Orbiting this main point are subsidiary points about the distinction between shade and shadows, the nature of occlusion, the color black, and peculiarities of absent absences. (shrink)
Sorensen’s celebrated problem about the eclipse of Near and Far is given a solution in which what is seen is Far, silhouetted. Near cannot be seen, as it is in the shadow of Far. A silhouette is a shadow. The so–called Yale Puzzle is a linguistic confusion.
I discuss a solution to the Yale shadow puzzle, due to Roy Sorensen, based on the actual process theory of causation, and argue that it does not work in the case of a new version of the puzzle, which I call "the Bilkent shadow puzzle". I offer a picture of the ontology of shadows that constitute the basis for a new solution that uniformly applies to both puzzles.
In his latest book, Roy Sorensen offers a solution to a puzzle he put forward in an earlier article -The Disappearing Act. The puzzle involves various question about how the causal theory perception is to be applied to the case of seeing shadows. Sorensen argues that the puzzle should be taken as bringing out a new way of seeing shadows. I point out a problem for Sorensenâs solution, and offer and defend an alternative view, according to which the puzzle is (...) to be interpreted as showing a new way of seeing objects, in virtue of their contrast with light. (shrink)
Minor entities provide an interesting testbed for metaphysical theories, but also for investigating the structure of concepts, as their concepts appear to be tributary of different representational systems.
In “The Reappearing Act” István Aranyosi postulates a new way of seeing to solve a puzzle posed in “The Disappearing Act;” an object that is exactly shaded can be seen simply by virtue of its contrast with its environment – just like a shadow. This object need not reflect, refract, absorb or block light. To undermine the motive for this heretical innovation, I generalize the puzzle to situations involving inexact shading. Aranyosi cannot extend his solution to these variations because he (...) needs to conserve principles of camouflage. On the bright side, the solution to the puzzle that I propose in my book Seeing Dark Things does extend to these variations. (shrink)
Roy Sorensen’s adventure in Shadowland started with his prize-winning article, "Seeing Intersecting Eclipses" (published in The Journal of Philosophy, and chosen by the board of the Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best philosophy articles of 1999), which is the basis for the first two chapters in this book. The recipe adopted in that article is followed in most of the following thirteen chapters, five of them being based on Sorensen’s previous articles on the topic: start with an open (...) mind regarding the existence and causal efficacy of absences, shadows, i.e. absences of light, in our case, devise a riddle involving perception of such absences, and draw the consequences for the philosophy of perception and/or ontology. (shrink)
Do people who see in black and white see black and white? Most people assume that totally color‐blind people see the whiteness of their shirts, the grayness of their trousers, and the blackness of their shoes. They feel the same way about animals that see only in black and white. This chapter's thesis is that only those who see in color see black and white. Its premise is that some positively equivalent representations have unequal amounts of negative information.
All shadows are holes in the light. Therefore, recent psychology on the visual perception of holes generalizes to shadows. Some holes in the light are not due to light blockage. These dark patches are distinguished from shadows.
The eclipse riddle -- Seeing surfaces -- The disappearing act -- Spinning shadows -- Berkeley's shadow -- Para-reflections -- Para-refractions : shadowgrams and the black drop -- Goethe's colored shadows -- Filtows -- Holes in the light -- Black and blue -- Seeing in black and white -- We see in the dark -- Hearing silence.
Newton says shadows are mere absences of light. Since the visual response to a lack of stimulation is black, all shadows would then be black. In his attack on Newton's optics, Goethe drew attention to subtle conditions under which there appear to be blue shadows. According to Goethe, all hues are colored shadows. Later, color scientists, most famously Edwin Land (founder of the Polaroid Corporation), appear to produce shadows of virtually every hue. Most contemporary color scientists inconsistently accept both Newton's (...) account of light and standard, textbook demonstrations of colored shadows. They should regain consistency by distinguishing between shadows and "filtows.". (shrink)
The distinction between filtows and shadows rebuts Roberto Casati's slippery slope argument for colored shadows. The metaphysics of shadows is contrasted with that of filtows and objects. Puzzles about what constitutes objects are used to motivate a parallel question with respect to objects.
The experience of a man in a perfectly dark cave is a representation of an absence of light, not an absence of representation. There is certainly a difference between his perceptual knowledge and that of his blind companion. Only the sighted man can tell whether the cave is dark just by looking. But perhaps he is merely inferring darkness from his failure to see. To get an unambiguous answer, the focus is switched from perceptual knowledge to nonepistemic seeing. The conclusion (...) is that we see even in the limiting case of absolute darkness – regardless of whether we believe we are seeing. We see little of practical interest. But in terms of basic information, we see about as much as we do when the lights are on. Depending on what has gone before and after, we may even see ordinary objects. (shrink)
An observer is viewing a double eclipse of the sun. Traveling east is the heavenly body Far. Traveling west and nearer to him is the smaller body Near. Near is close enough to exactly compensate for its smaller size with respect to shadow formation. Near and Far look the same size from his vantage point. When Near falls exactly under the shadow of Far, it is as if one of these heavenly bodies had disappeared. Does the observer see Near or (...) Far? The chapter's thesis is that the causal theory of perception correctly favors Far. (shrink)
A para-reflection is a privational phenomenon that is often mistaken as a reflection. You have seen them as the “reflection” of your pupil in the mirror. Your iris reflects light in the standard way but your pupil absorbs all but a negligible amount of light (as do other dark things such as coal and black velvet). Para-reflections work by contrast. Since they are parasitic on their host reflections, para-reflections are relational and dependent in a way that reflections are not. Nevertheless, (...) para-reflections obey nearly all the laws of reflection with exquisite fidelity. Physicists and psychologists who study optics have neglected these everyday phenomena. Happily, physicists have been attentive and insightful about other privational phenomena such as vacuums and cold spots. This kind of subtle treatment of negative things needs to be extended to optics. (shrink)
A conceptual artist suspends a solid cone beneath a lamp to cast a shadow. The shadow has the shape of a truncated cone. (The cone looks like the triangle in the letter A. The shadow looks like the area below the triangle.) The artist next slides a dark brick of the same shape and color as the shadow into the exact spot occupied by the shadow. This intrusion leaves no room for the shadow, so it is destroyed. This snug fit (...) also makes the brick invisible because the brick is no longer absorbing light. So what is the observer seeing? (shrink)
Can a flame cast a shadow? The blocker theory of shadows answers no because flames emit light. However, a candle on a white surface does appear to cast a flame. Denying that the dark patch created by the flame is a shadow saves the blocker theory of shadows. It is instead a shadowgram – a kind of para-refraction much like the para-reflections of the preceding chapters.
In his _New Theory of Vision_, George Berkeley argued that touch is the basis for the spatial sensitivity of the remaining senses. There appear to be counterexamples, that is, intangibles that are spatial: rainbows, the sky, microscopic entities, and holes. A flexible Berkeleian can argue with surprising plausibility that these are actually tangible. However, Berkeley (and his two centuries of followers and adversaries) overlooked how shadows are genuine counterexamples. Echoes of Berkeley's theory of vision can still be heard in contemporary (...) vision research. These echoes are also affected by the fact that shadows are entirely visual. (shrink)
This chapter defends a surprising implication of the causal theory of perception: we see silhouetted objects by virtue of seeing their back surfaces. The primacy of surfaces is reviewed to support the principle that we see opaque objects by seeing their surfaces. Since the front surface of a silhouetted object is idle, the causal theory rules out the possibility that we see silhouettes by seeing their front surfaces. Only back surfaces are available.
The causal theory of perception says we see things in virtue of the experiences they cause. This theory comports well with common sense and science. However, the theory has trouble explaining how we see black objects, shadows, and holes. They are not seen by virtue of the light they reflect into our eyes. This book is aimed at resolving the anomalies posed by dark things.
Black has attracted commentary from a long list of philosophers: Empedocles, Aristotle, Goethe, Wittgenstein, and, more recently, C. L. Hardin and Jonathan Westphal. Color scientists have joined the discussion with a sufficient condition for being black: indiscriminate light absorption. This chapter denies that this is also a necessary condition. In particular, the blackness of shadows is defended. Emphasis is placed on the physical and metaphysical variety of black things: sunspots, black holes, light traps, and so on.
If a spinning sphere casts a shadow, does the shadow also spin? This riddle is the point of departure for an investigation into the nature of shadow movement. A general theory of motion will encompass all moving things, not just physical objects. The ultimate thesis is that round shadows do indeed spin. Shadows are followers of the objects that cast them. Parts of the shadow correspond to parts of the leader, so motion of the caster's parts accounts for motions of (...) the shadow's parts. The chapter ends with a discussion of how the dynamic aspects of shadows impose subtle constraints on other puzzles about shadows. (shrink)
The opening thesis is that we hear silence. Since silence is the absence of sound, we can perceive absences. We also perceive an absence when we see darkness. There is a sensation of darkness – blackness. But there is no sensation of silence. In this respect, hearing silence is a more direct experience of an absence than seeing darkness. Although there is no sensation of silence, we still know what it is like to experience silence. There are introspectible gaps in (...) sensation. (shrink)
Mainstream metaphysics has been preoccupied by inquiring into the nature of major kinds of entities, like objects, properties and events, while avoiding minor entities, like shadows or holes. However, one might want to hope that dealing with such minor entities could be profitable for even solving puzzles about major entities. I propose a new ontological puzzle, the Shadow of Constitution Puzzle, incorporating the old puzzle of material constitution, with shadows in the role of the minor entity to guide our approach (...) to the issues involved. I then analyze the standard answers to the original puzzle of constitution, in their role as potential solutions to the new puzzle. Finally, I discuss three views that can solve the proposed puzzle. (shrink)
This issue of The Monist is devoted to the metaphysics of lesser kinds, which is to say those kinds of entity that are not generally recognized as occupying a prominent position in the categorial structure of the world. Why bother? We offer two sorts of reason. The first is methodological. In mathematics, it is common practice to study certain functions (for instance) by considering limit cases: What if x = 0? What if x is larger than any assigned value? Physics, (...) too, often studies the (idealized) initial and boundary conditions of a given system: What would happen in the case of a perfect sphere, or a perfectly black body? In the cognitive sciences, research often thrives on the analysis of cognitive errors, perceptual illusions, brain pathologies. Also in logic one can learn a lot by studying special, anomalous scenarios such as those exhibited by the paradoxes: it is unlikely that we actually find ourselves in a soritical context, or in a liar-like situation, but the fact that we might—or simply the fact that we can conceive of such a possibility—is important enough to deserve careful consideration. In short, the odd, the unfamiliar, the extra-ordinary, the limit cases are perfectly at home in scientific and more broadly intellectual discourse at various levels, where they can be fruitfully engaged in a sophisticated way (witness the existence of specific confining and managing strategies for dealing with them); and they are important precisely because they instruct us concerning the normal, the obvious, and the paradigmatic. The same goes for metaphysics, we submit. Although its major concern is, naturally, with such core entities as substances, properties, or hunks of solid matter, a lot may be learned by paying attention to those limit cases where we find ourselves dealing with entities of much lesser kinds, whether real or putative. (shrink)
If a spinning sphere casts a shadow, does the shadow also spin? This riddle is the point of departure for an investigation into the nature of shadow movement. A general theory of motion will encompass all moving things, not just physical objects. Ultimately, I argue that round shadows do indeed spin. Shadows are followers of the objects that cast them. Parts of the shadow correspond to parts of the leader, so motion of the caster's parts accounts for motions of the (...) shadow's parts. I conclude with a discussion of how the dynamic aspects of shadows impose subtle constraints on other puzzles about shadows. (shrink)
We show that cast shadows can have a significant influence on the speed of visual search. In particular, we find that search based on the shape of a region is affected when the region is darker than the background and corresponds to a shadow formed by lighting from above. Results support the proposal that an early-level system rapidly identifies regions as shadows and then discounts them, making their shapes more difficult to access. Several constraints used by this system are mapped (...) out, including constraints on the luminance and texture of the shadow region, and on the nature of the item casting the shadow. Among other things, this system is found to distinguish between line elements (items containing only edges) and surface elements (items containing visible surfaces), with only the latter deemed capable of casting a shadow. (shrink)
The relationships between art and cognition constitute a very wide set of largely unexplored and at times undefined or much too speculative problems. The field is narrowed down by imposing some constraints. It is proposed that the depiction of cast shadows, in its early history, could provide an ideal case study which conforms to the constraints. This paper addresses some methodological problems of the study of this case. A sample of relevant Renaissance images is discussed. A typology of depicted cast (...) shadows is proposed upon which further empirical research could be built. (shrink)
Roy Sorensen has discussed a scenario he calls 'the Disappearing Act', introduced a puzzle based on this scenario, and offered a solution to this puzzle. We argue against Sorensen's solution and offer our own.
Imagine a child playing in the afternoon sun, suddenly jerking her arm one way then the other, trying to catch her shadow out. The game, the child soon learns, is one that she can never win. Her shadow moves the moment she does. Such childish games father common sense wisdom; when things move, so do their shadows. Or do they? A spinning sphere casts a shadow. But does its shadow also spin? The question takes you by surprise. Surely not? you (...) think. But then again, why not? This is the trope of Sorensen’s work. A seemingly simple phenomenon is probed in just the right way and, without warning, you are unsure what to say. (shrink)
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