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GeezerVison is showing github.com — fix(component,view): wrap component render and createTemplate() for Trusted Types by JosunLP · Pull Request #266 · bQuery/bQuery

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@JosunLP

@JosunLP JosunLP commented Sep 27, 2026

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Summary

  • Under an enforced require-trusted-types-for 'script' CSP, component() rendering and createTemplate() no longer throw TypeError: … requires 'TrustedHTML' assignment.
  • Component output is not sanitized a second time, so <slot>, part and form attributes survive.

Motivation

Fixes #253. docs/concepts/security-model.md promises that bQuery defaults satisfy an enforced Trusted Types CSP. Both sinks, however, assigned plain strings to innerHTML.

trustedHtmlForSink() would not have worked either: it re-sanitizes with the default allow list, which strips exactly what the component allow lists keep (<slot>, part), and for templates it would strip the bq-* attributes.

Changes included

  • src/security/trusted-types.ts:
    • New internal trustedPreparedHtmlForSink(prepared). It wraps exactly that string through the existing bquery-sanitizer policy without re-sanitizing, so no new policy name has to be allowed in the CSP.
    • The pass-through is module-private and armed only for that one synchronous createHTML call. Any other input to the policy is sanitized as before.
    • New __resetTrustedTypesPolicy() test hook, marked @internal.
  • src/component/component.ts: render output goes through the new helper.
  • src/view/mount.ts: createTemplate() goes through the new helper.
  • docs/concepts/security-model.md: documents the covered sinks and the deliberate exceptions (htmlUnsafe(), unsanitized bq-html).
  • tests/trusted-types-sinks.test.ts: emulates enforcement with a mock policy plus innerHTML setters that reject plain strings. It covers component render (slot and part preserved), createTemplate(), and a check that the pass-through does not stay armed.

Validation

  • bunx eslint + bunx prettier
  • bunx tsc --noEmit (tsconfig.json and tsconfig.test.json)
  • bun run check
  • bun run build (not run)
  • bun test: 3520 pass, 0 fail. With the component and view changes reverted, the two sink tests fail.

Checklist

  • I followed the contributing guidelines.
  • I added or updated tests where behavior changed.
  • I updated documentation when public behavior or developer workflow changed.
  • I confirmed the change does not introduce security-sensitive regressions: component output is already sanitized, and templates are author-trusted per the view threat model.

Notes for reviewers

  • Trade-off: under Trusted Types, createTemplate() with untrusted input used to throw. It is now accepted, the same as without Trusted Types. This matches the documented contract that templates are author-controlled, but it is a policy decision worth a second look.
  • The emulation cannot prove real browser enforcement; a real-browser lane ([Feature]: Add a real-browser test lane (Playwright) #214) would.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

https://claude.ai/code/session_01MdbZH1BQLrEGMoMD3gdBBo


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@claude
fix(component,view): wrap component render and createTemplate() for T…
304eecf
…rusted Types

Component render output (already sanitized with the component allow
lists) and createTemplate() templates (author-controlled) were assigned
to innerHTML as plain strings, so every component render threw under an
enforced require-trusted-types-for 'script' CSP -- contradicting the
security model docs. Routing them through trustedHtmlForSink() would
re-sanitize with the default allow list and strip <slot>/part/bq-*.

Add an internal trustedPreparedHtmlForSink() that wraps exactly one
prepared string through the existing bquery-sanitizer policy without a
second sanitizer pass (the pass-through is armed only for that
synchronous call), and use it at both sinks.

Fixes #253

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MdbZH1BQLrEGMoMD3gdBBo
@coderabbitai

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@github-actions github-actions Bot added component Changes to the component module security Changes to the security module view Changes to the view module docs Changes to the documentation tests Chenges to the tests labels Sep 27, 2026
claude and others added 2 commits September 27, 2026 21:59
@claude
fix(security): wrap DOMParser input for Trusted Types in the DOM sani…
70f5d9e
…tizer

DOMParser.parseFromString is itself a Trusted Types sink, so under an
enforced require-trusted-types-for 'script' CSP the DOM backend threw
before any sink write -- including inside the policy's own createHTML,
so component render (and every sanitizeHtml call) still failed. Hand the
input to the parser through the same bquery-sanitizer pass-through (the
parsed document is inert and only leaves after the allow lists ran), and
emulate enforcement on parseFromString in the sink tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MdbZH1BQLrEGMoMD3gdBBo
@JosunLP
Merge branch 'dev' into claude/fix-trusted-types-component-sinks
2ef7306
@JosunLP
JosunLP marked this pull request as ready for review September 27, 2026 23:59
@JosunLP
JosunLP merged commit 10e78eb into dev Sep 28, 2026
27 checks passed

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@JosunLP
JosunLP deleted the claude/fix-trusted-types-component-sinks branch September 28, 2026 00:00
This was referenced Sep 28, 2026
[Bug]: Component render and createTemplate() throw under an enforced Trusted Types CSP #253
Closed
release: 1.17.1 #272
Merged
JosunLP added a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 30, 2026
@JosunLP @claude
release: 1.17.1 (#272)
2d48260
## Summary

- Release PR for **1.17.1**. It brings everything on `dev` since
`1.17.0` into `main`.
- Security-and-correctness patch closing the 1.17.0 audit:
  - three security fixes in `server` and `ssr`;
- ten bug fixes across `core`, `router`, `server`, `reactive`, `forms`,
`store`, `component` and `view`.
- No API removals and no module status transitions. A few behaviour
changes are listed under **Notes for reviewers**.

## Motivation

`dev` is 13 PR merges ahead of `main` (#259–#271). Together they close
issues #246–#253, #256 and #258 (all closed) and the three privately
reported vulnerabilities fixed in #269, #270 and #271.

## Changes included

This PR targets `main`, so the diff shows the whole `1.17.0 → 1.17.1`
delta: **48 files, +2007/−100**. It has three commits on top of `dev`.

**Release commit (`d9d20de`)** contains only metadata and documentation:

- **Version:** `package.json` → `1.17.1`. `AGENT.md`, `llms.txt`,
`.github/copilot-instructions.md`, `.cursorrules` and `.clinerules` are
synced; `check:ai-guidance` passes. `SECURITY.md` already lists
`1.17.x`.
- **Changelog:** `CHANGELOG.md` gets a `[1.17.1] - 2026-09-28` entry
with Security / Fixed / Changed sections.
- **Release notes:** new `docs/release-notes/1.17.1.md`, plus a row in
the release-notes index.
- **Pre-existing doc fixes:**
  - The 1.17.0 release notes page was missing from the sidebar.
- Its date and CHANGELOG anchor said `2026-09-21`; the release date is
`2026-09-25`, so the anchor pointed nowhere.
- **Guides aligned with shipped behaviour:**
- `api-core.md` describes `show()`/`hide()`/`toggle()` and camelCase
`css()` as they work after #262/#263.
  - `router.md` documents decoded params (#260).

**Review-fix commits (`61198bc`, `640830a`)** address the findings from
the review on this PR:

- **Session-bound CSRF (#271):**
- Requests without a stored session use the signed CSRF cookie and never
write to the session. Anonymous traffic can no longer fill the capped
session store or evict real sessions from it.
- A session created during such a request adopts the cookie secret, so
forms rendered earlier still verify.
- A session created or regenerated with `$regenerate()` (a login) always
gets a fresh secret, so a planted cookie cannot reach the authenticated
session.
  - A session removed with `$destroy()` is not written back.
- For a stored session the secret is bound before `next()`, so a token
read later from a streamed body or `ctx.sse()` stays valid.
- **`toggle()` (#263):** `hidden="until-found"` counts as hidden even
with an inline `display`, because it hides through `content-visibility`.
The `api-core.md` list entry now names the inline-`display` exception.

Source changes by PR:

| PR | Change |
| --- | --- |
| #269 | Security: `serveStatic` `realpath` containment for
precompressed sidecars |
| #270 | Security: Node adapter answers handler errors with `500`
instead of crashing; cancels streams and aborts `request.signal` on
disconnect |
| #271 | Security: signed CSRF tokens bound to the session and rotated
on `$regenerate()` (refined in `61198bc`/`640830a`) |
| #259 | `deepEqual`/`isEqual` kind mismatches (#246) |
| #260 | Router: decoded params, encoded static segments (#247) |
| #261 | Server: encoded static route segments (#248) |
| #262 | `css()` camelCase (#249) |
| #263 | `toggle()`/`hide()`/`show()` (#250) |
| #264 | Already-aborted `AbortSignal` in `http` and `listen()` (#251) |
| #265 | Linear-time `email()` (#252) |
| #266 | Trusted Types for component render, `createTemplate()` and the
DOM sanitizer (#253) |
| #267 | `memoryStore()` sweeping, LRU eviction, default cap (#256) |
| #268 | `SECURITY.md` supported line and drift check (#258) |

## Validation

- [x] `bunx eslint .` + `bun run format:check`
- [x] `bun run build`, `check:publish`, `check:size`, `check:package`
- [x] `bun test`: 3568 pass, 0 fail; `test:types` and `lint:types` clean
- [x] `bun run test:coverage` (coverage floor), `bun run check` (incl.
`check:ai-guidance` → 1.17.1) and `bun run docs:build` (no dead links)
- [x] Each regression test added in the review-fix commits fails without
its fix.

## Checklist

- [x] I followed the contributing guidelines.
- [x] I added or updated tests where behavior changed. They were added
in the individual fix PRs and in the review-fix commits.
- [x] I updated documentation when public behavior or developer workflow
changed.
- [x] I confirmed the change does not introduce security-sensitive
regressions.

## Notes for reviewers

**Behaviour changes when upgrading** (also in the CHANGELOG and release
notes):

- **Router params are decoded.** Remove any manual
`decodeURIComponent()`.
- **CSRF with `session()` before `csrf({ secret })`:**
- requests with a stored session get no `bq.csrf` cookie; the secret
lives in the session;
  - visitors without a session keep the signed `bq.csrf` cookie;
- the token rotates on `$regenerate()`, so render a fresh
`csrfToken(ctx)` after login;
  - `bindToSession: false` opts out.
- **`listen({ signal })`** rejects when the signal is aborted before or
during binding.
- **The default session store** evicts beyond 10 000 live sessions.
- **`show()` without an argument** keeps the inline `display` of an
element that is not inline-hidden.
- **`email()`** rejects empty domain labels and addresses over 254
characters.

**Known limitation:** forms rendered to visitors without a session (for
example the login form) rely on the signed cookie, as before 1.17.1. The
server guide recommends a `__Host-` cookie name for that case.

**After merging:** tag `v1.17.1`, publish, and merge `main` back into
`dev`, as after 1.17.0. The review-fix commits exist only on this
branch, so that merge back is required. Consider publishing a GitHub
Security Advisory for ≤ 1.17.0 that covers #269–#271.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

https://claude.ai/code/session_01MdbZH1BQLrEGMoMD3gdBBo

---
_Generated by [Claude
Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_01MdbZH1BQLrEGMoMD3gdBBo)_

<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->

## Summary by CodeRabbit

* **Bug Fixes**
* Improved protection against static-file sidecar paths escaping the
configured root and strengthened CSRF protection for session-backed
requests.
* Node server handlers now handle errors and client disconnects more
safely; server startup also responds correctly to cancelled requests.
* Fixed URL-encoded route matching, CSS property handling, visibility
toggling, equality checks, HTTP cancellation, and email validation.
* Expired sessions are cleaned up, and the default in-memory session
store now limits its capacity.

* **Documentation**
* Added version 1.17.1 release notes and updated security guidance and
feature documentation.

<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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@JosunLP @claude
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